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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Financial liberalization programs have been adopted by many countries in Latin 
America during the past twenty years. Opening the economy to inflows and outflows of 
capital – ‘opening the capital account’ – has been a key part of these programs. Many 
economists have heralded capital account liberalization as a ‘fast track’ to economic 
growth and efficiency in developing countries, partly due to the way that it tightens the 
constraints on governments and disciplines them to avoid ‘bad’ policies. Others, 
however, have emphasized the dangers of capital account openness, such as its close 
relationship with financial crises and the substantial risks it poses for macroeconomic 
stability. 
 
While some governments have sustained the opening of their capital account over 
decades, others have reversed course after only a short time. The existing literature has 
focused on the adoption of capital account liberalization, but has neglected to consider 
the reasons for its durability or fragility. My dissertation addresses the question of why 
different countries have sustained their opening of the capital account to different 
degrees and for different periods. The central argument is that the sustainability of 
capital account openness is determined by domestic informal institutions. By informal 
institutions I refer to the shared understandings or rules among a country’s 
policymaking and business elites about legitimate economic policies. Whether capital 
account openness is sustained over time depends on the extent of domestic agreement as 
to whether capital controls continue to be effective and legitimate, or whether they have 
lost their effectiveness and legitimacy as instruments of macroeconomic policymaking. 
Not only is my dissertation the first study of the sustainability of capital account 
openness, it is the first to emphasize the importance of informal institutions as distinct 
from formal ones. 
 
The next question refers to the factors that determine the content of domestic informal 
institutions, such that they favor capital account openness in some countries, and are 
much more equivocal in others. My answer emphasizes the legacy of pre-liberalization 
state-business relations. Capital account openness is unlikely to be sustained over time 
if the export-oriented sector of the economy – concerned about a stable and competitive 
exchange rate – preserves its leverage over national policymaking. Conversely, capital 
account openness tends to become a durable policy if economic actors benefitting from 
capital mobility and largely unaffected by exchange-rate issues dominate state-business 
relations. 
 
After the introduction, Chapter 2 describes the essential elements of capital account 
policy and explains the methodological approach of the dissertation. Chapter 3 provides 
an overview of the literature to explain capital account policy. It distinguishes between 
interest-based, institutionalist, and ideas-based approaches located at different levels of 
analysis. This review highlights a notable gap in the literature. Analyses of the role of 
informal institutions at the domestic level are conspicuously lacking. My dissertation 
seeks to fill this analytical lacuna. 
 
Chapter 4 analyzes the international campaign for capital freedom, personified by the 
International Monetary Fund. How did the push for capital account liberalization come 
into being at the international level, and how has the capital account policy discourse 
within the IMF evolved until the present time? Ultimately, the attempt to transform 
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capital freedom into an international norm was not successful. The effects of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-98 within and outside the IMF undermined the international 
norm campaign, symbolized by the failure of the attempt to change the IMF’s Articles 
of Agreement in order to give the organization the legal mandate over member-states’ 
capital account policies. However, the IMF still subscribes to the idea that the free 
movement of capital is a desirable policy for all countries. 
 
Yet country responses have been very different. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the link 
between IMF prescriptions and domestic policy outcomes, fleshing out the central 
argument with case studies of Peru and Colombia, respectively, in the time period from 
1990 to the present day. Both countries shared similar economic challenges, a national 
community of elite economists convinced of free-market principles, and outside 
pressure from the IMF. At the start of the liberalization period in the early 1990s, both 
switched from a largely closed to a largely open capital account. However, due to the 
effect of different informal institutions based on different state-business relations, Peru 
and Colombia then followed different paths. The two cases serve to illustrate that, in the 
broader context of financial liberalization, socially shared understandings about 
legitimate economic policies reinforce or constrain the impact of international norms, 
thus making – or breaking – attempts at economic reform. 
 
Scholars interested in explaining the sustainability of neoliberal economic reforms and 
the impact of international norms and ideas on domestic policy choices ignore the role 
of domestic informal institutions at their peril. Traditional approaches focused on 
material interests, formal political and economic institutions, and global norms and 
ideas fail to account for the variation of capital account policy in an age of mobile 
capital. Paying heed to the change and continuity of shared understandings about 
legitimate economic policies is key to understanding both the influence of international 
norms on domestic policy, and the durability or fragility of economic reforms. In order 
to become institutionalized in the domestic political economy, international norms 
setting out to diffuse free-market policies must encounter a social context in which 
alternative development strategies have lost their legitimacy.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. The Research Question: The Sustainability of Open Capital Accounts 
 
Economic globalization, it is often said, moves all countries in the same policy 
direction, towards free markets. But if so, why do we still observe so much national 
variation in economic institutions and policies? If developing countries are the weakest 
players in the game, why do some of them – not necessarily the biggest – resist the 
trend towards global convergence, whether by not instituting free-market reforms in the 
first place or by pulling back after having put them in place? Why are neoliberal 
economic policy choices durable in some countries, but not in others? 
I seek to answer these general questions with respect to one specific public 
policy: government intervention in the international flow of capital. National 
governments traditionally possess a variety of legal instruments to limit the entry and 
departure of financial flows across their borders. International capital flows are affected 
by the administrative restrictions recorded on the capital account of the balance of 
payments. Measuring the openness or closedness of the capital account provides an 
important indicator for government priorities vis-à-vis macroeconomic policymaking. 
Capital account openness signals outward-oriented economic objectives and an explicit 
commitment to achieve integration into global capital markets as the basis for domestic 
investment and growth. In contrast, capital account closedness signals inward-oriented 
economic objectives, giving priority to domestic sources of finance, and preserving 
government autonomy over monetary policy. As a result, exploring the evolution of 
capital account policy provides important insights into the political priorities for 
macroeconomic policymaking in an age of economic globalization. 
Despite national prerogatives over capital account policy, some general trends at 
the international level can be discerned over time. Stringent limits on capital mobility 
were the rule in the history of the international monetary system during the twentieth 
century. Most often, short-lived episodes of capital freedom were succeeded by longer 
periods of restrictions in the aftermath of financial crashes (Frieden 2006; Eichengreen 
2008). Historically, free capital mobility has had several comings and an at least equal 
number of reversals. Hence, there is no in-built guarantee that the current era of capital 
mobility is bound to last (Flandreau et al. 2003). 
The political ascent of Keynesian economic thinking after the Great Depression 
provided the intellectual background for one of the pillars of the Post-World War II 
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monetary system: extensive controls on short-term capital flows in the context of the 
Bretton Woods regime (Ruggie 1983; Eichengreen 1996). However, at the beginning of 
the 1990s, it seemed as if the pendulum had turned decidedly in favor of capital 
freedom. An increasing number of developing countries followed the example of the 
industrial world and abolished administrative restrictions on international capital flows. 
Global finance was the poster-child for demonstrating the unifying force of economic 
globalization, especially for developing countries. Once the floodgates for international 
capital flows opened, there was, supposedly, no turning back. The removal of all 
remaining legal restrictions on international capital movements was merely a matter of 
time. Powerful structural forces and political coalitions at the national and international 
level had formed to see to their end. Capital account openness appeared to be here to 
stay. 
Latin America has been the favorite laboratory for such predictions. Having 
learned the ‘hard lessons’ from the 1980s debt crisis, countries embraced the blessings 
of free trade and free capital in the 1990s. The end of the Cold War and the concomitant 
change of the development model towards neoliberalism provided the overall context 
for capital account liberalization. Despite its exclusion from the original list of policy 
commandments contained in the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1990), the 
opening of the capital account was an integral part of virtually all economic reform 
programs in Latin America during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Yet after two decades of neoliberal economic reforms, capital account policy has 
reflected a surprising degree of variation. Even though the overall level of capital 
account openness has increased in virtually all regions of the developing world during 
the past twenty years, capital account liberalization has not proved sustainable 
everywhere. Some countries still follow the free-market teachings to the letter and have 
maintained or even increased their capital account openness during the past twenty 
years. In contrast, other countries have developed second thoughts about the neoliberal 
reform agenda, retracting or abolishing altogether at least some of the economic policies 
they had embraced earlier. My dissertation explores the variation of national capital 
account policy amidst the global trend towards greater capital account openness. It 
focuses on the Latin American region, which together with Eastern Europe was the 
leading capital account liberalizer in the developing world during the 1990s. It analyzes 
the different paths of capital account policy that Latin American countries have pursued 
after the initial adoption of open capital accounts. 
 11
Rather than focusing on the well-known ‘globalization rebels’ condemning the 
underlying ideology and the malignant consequences of the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
(think of Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez), I am interested in the contrast 
between countries which belong to the group of ‘capital mobility enthusiasts’ and those 
which belong to the group of ‘capital mobility laggards’. What factors determine to 
which group a country belongs in the medium and long run? In a nutshell, I want to 
know what factors explain the policy choices of both the eager followers and the 
laggards of capital account freedom. Put simply, what happens after the adoption of 
neoliberal policies? What makes them stick(y) in some countries, but not in others? 
Applied to capital account policy, my research question is why some countries have 
pursued a consistently open capital account policy, whereas other countries have been 
more ambivalent to embrace capital mobility. 
Possible explanations in the political science literature point to international 
forces that shape domestic policymaking – so-called ‘outside-in’ explanations. One 
strand argues that pressure from international financial organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund, using coercive and persuasive instruments in order to 
spread and embed the emerging norm of capital account openness, lies behind domestic 
capital account policy. Another approach emphasizes the importance of the epistemic 
community of neoliberal economists that has come to dominate economic policymaking 
in Latin America in the recent past. On the other hand, ‘inside-out’ explanations of 
capital account policy highlight the role of domestic political and economic institutions 
such as the partisanship of the executive, the fragmentation of the legislative, the 
exchange-rate regime, or the independence of the Central Bank as crucial variables.  
Complementing these approaches, I refer to the legacy of pre-liberalization informal 
institutions underlying contemporary economic policymaking. Informal institutions 
refer to the shared understandings or rules among a country’s policymaking and 
business elites about legitimate economic policies. I argue that the transformation of 
informal institutions during the process of economic opening is a key factor behind the 
durability of capital account openness in Latin America. 
This introductory chapter describes the overall context for the global trend 
towards greater capital account openness starting at the end of the twentieth century. At 
the same time, it highlights the variation of capital account policies between countries, 
with a particular focus on the Latin American region, amidst the global convergence 
around higher capital account openness. The chapter briefly reviews the state of the 
literature explaining capital account policy from distinct analytical perspectives. It 
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suggests that domestic informal institutions constitute a crucial factor which determines 
the durability or fragility of open capital accounts. The chapter illustrates the 
explanatory power of domestic informal institutions with regard to the different 
trajectories of capital account policy in Peru and Colombia after 1990. Finally, it 
provides an overview of the structure of the dissertation. 
 
1.2. The International Campaign for Open Capital Accounts 
 
 
Despite its arcane technical character allegedly only accessible to economists, 
capital account policy has genuine political salience. Indeed, the history of the 
international monetary system during the twentieth century reflects the ´battle of ideas’ 
between the supporters of capital freedom and its critics (Abdelal 2007). The openness 
or closedness of the capital account became a bone of contention well beyond academic 
discussions among economists. Whether a country was open or closed to international 
capital flows was seen as an important element of its model of economic development 
and its priorities for macroeconomic policymaking. In other words, capital account 
policy is inextricably linked with political decisions on the general path of economic 
development that countries pursue. Similar to the perennial academic and political 
debates over free trade, national capital account policy has been subjected to changing 
international conditions, trends, and incentives. 
In the last decades of the twentieth century, the inward-oriented development 
model used by many developing countries after the end of World War II came under 
attack from various fronts. Severe legal limits on the free flow of international capital 
were an essential element of this model, known as Import-Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) and applied in virtually all Latin American countries. Combining Keynesian 
economics with the heterodox, structuralist tradition of the so-called “ECLA school”1 
personified by Raúl Prebisch (Love 2005; Rodríguez 2006; Dosman 2008), almost all 
Latin American countries pursued a policy of closed capital accounts. Apart from a 
short-lived episode of capital account liberalization during the late 1970s in the 
Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), the level of capital account 
openness in Latin America was rather low, although slightly higher than in other 
regions of the developing world until the early 1980s due to Latin America’s traditional 
dependence on foreign capital. In the course of the 1980s, the ISI model became a 
                                               
1 Named after the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA) of the United 
Nations based in Santiago de Chile. 
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victim of its internal faults and a sustained campaign at the national and international 
level facilitated by the rise of its principal competitor – neoclassical economics. 
Neoclassical economics and its political off-spring in the form of neoliberalism 
propagate an outward-oriented model of economic development focused on the 
liberalization of markets. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of its principal 
ideological contender provided free-market enthusiasts with the political and intellectual 
basis for their campaign to relegate the ISI model to the history books. The 
liberalization of trade and finance became the battle cry for a new generation of 
economists and policymakers in Latin America. In many countries, they succeeded in 
replacing the ISI model with a new strategy or ideology for economic development 
based on neoclassical economics and epitomized by the ‘Washington Consensus’. 
Associated with this overall intellectual and political change was a negative perspective 
on capital controls as an integral part of the old, now defunct economic paradigm. An 
international campaign was launched during the 1980s – following the trend in 
industrial countries – to rid the developing world generally, and Latin America 
specifically, of closed capital accounts. This campaign possessed intellectual 
protagonists within the international academic discourse and determined political actors 
united by their shared commitment to neoclassical economics and their declared 
intention to make the developing world safe for global finance. 
In turn, many orthodox economists and policymakers have heralded the opening 
of the national economy to inflows and outflows of capital as a ‘fast track’ to economic 
growth and efficiency, especially in developing countries. Obstfeld succinctly 
summarizes the benefits of international capital mobility according to conventional 
wisdom among neoclassical economists: 
 
International financial markets allow residents of different countries to pool 
various risks, achieving more effective insurance than purely domestic 
arrangements would allow. Furthermore, a country suffering a temporary 
recession or natural disaster can borrow abroad. Developing countries with little 
capital can borrow to finance investment, thereby promoting economic growth 
without sharp increases in saving rates. At the global level, the international 
capital market channels world savings to its most productive uses, irrespective of 
location. (…) The other main potential positive role of international capital 
markets is to discipline policymakers who might be tempted to exploit a captive 
domestic capital market. Unsound policies – for example, excessive government 
borrowing or inadequate bank regulation – would spark speculative capital 
outflows and higher domestic interest rates. In theory, a government's fear of 
these effects should make rash behavior less attractive (Obstfeld 1998: 10).  
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In contrast, heterodox economists, harking back to the warnings of John 
Maynard Keynes and Hyman Minsky about unfettered international financial markets, 
emphasize the resulting constraints on government autonomy in several economic 
policy domains, the substantial risks of capital account liberalization for 
macroeconomic stability, especially its close relationship with the occurrence of 
financial crises, and the lack of compelling evidence for the growth-enhancing effects of 
open capital accounts (Stiglitz 2000; Rodrik and Subramanian 2009). For these scholars, 
the rather tangible costs of capital account openness outweigh the benefits as described 
by Obstfeld. They argue that capital controls maintain important macroeconomic 
functions for developing countries in today’s globalized, complex international financial 
system: they can be used to stabilize short-term volatile capital flows; they can give 
policymakers additional policy instruments that allow them more effective and less 
costly macroeconomic stabilization measures; they can promote growth and increase 
economic efficiency by reducing the volatility of financing and of real macroeconomic 
performance; and they can discourage long-term capital outflows (Ocampo et al. 2008). 
Leaving behind the debate in the narrow circles of academic discourse, the 
supporters of capital account freedom counted with powerful political allies, too. 
Having established capital account freedom in their own economies during the 1970s 
and 1980s, industrial country governments now sought to promote its adoption in the 
developing world. In line with neoclassical economics, they prescribed capital account 
liberalization as a panacea for integrated global markets promising faster economic 
growth everywhere. A prominent and forceful spokesperson for this campaign – 
crossing intellectual and political boundaries – was Harvard economics professor, 
former US Treasury Secretary, and currently Director of the White House’s National 
Economic Council for President Obama, Lawrence Summers. He outlined a world free 
of restrictions on trade and finance in prosaic terms: 
 
Imagine a country whose harbors are filled with rocks, a special kind of rock that 
blocks any ship carrying products from coming in. And imagine a proposal to 
remove the rocks from the harbors. Would it be a good thing? Many people 
would say yes. They would say that citizens would have a wider choice of goods 
at lower prices. They would say that producers would have a wider choice of 
inputs at lower costs, making them more competitive and able to pay higher 
wages. They would say that greater competition would spur productivity, would 
expand capacity, would reduce inflation, and would reduce capital costs. To be 
sure, the removal of these rocks would bring about changes in the economy. But 
every day, in every way, our market economy, through changes in technology, 
communications, and transportation, is removing natural barriers and making 
communication and trade much easier (Summers 2000: 3-4). 
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What had been a successful strategy for industrial countries, i.e., the free flow of 
international capital, must be a good thing for developing countries, too. Capital account 
freedom was meant to lift all boats with the tide.2 
The fact that dissimilar countries in the developing world arrived at similar 
conclusions in terms of ‘appropriate’ economic policies at around the same time 
indicates the importance of international factors in explaining domestic choices on 
capital account policy. An international norm advocating the liberalization of the capital 
account emerged during the 1980s and 1990s and found its intellectual host and key 
political advocate in the International Monetary Fund. 
As I show in Chapter 4, largely independent from outside pressure, the IMF 
signed up to the neoclassical imperative of capital account freedom during the 1980s 
and subsequently promoted the adoption of capital account liberalization in developing 
countries. The IMF acted as a “norm entrepreneur” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1999) for 
the cause of financial openness and tried to change its Articles of Agreement in 1997 in 
order to provide the organization with legal jurisdiction over national capital account 
policies. 
Up until the Asian financial crisis during the late 1990s, the IMF was an active 
supporter and key advocate of the emerging norm of capital account openness in the 
international monetary system. While the organization stopped promoting the rapid, 
unconditional liberalization of the capital account in the aftermath of the Asian crisis 
and the failure of the amendment to change its legal charter, the Fund nonetheless 
continues to support the goal of international capital mobility until the present day. 
However, ascertaining the IMF’s actual impact on capital account policy 
outcomes requires detailed country-level studies because domestic actors also respond 
to quite different incentives than those of the IMF – incentives rooted in the domestic 
polity. The domestic social context is the cognitive filter through which emerging 
international norms are refracted. Understanding the national variation of capital 
account policy after the initial adoption of liberalization thus requires a closer look 
inside the ‘black box’ of domestic politics. Whereas international factors might explain 
the simultaneous adoption of similar economic policies in developing countries, a 
purely structural perspective fails to account for the variation of capital account policy 
despite powerful universal forces in favor of its homogenization. 
                                               
2 In the context of the current financial crisis, Summers has become somewhat more skeptical that 
economic globalization will automatically bring benefits for all countries – including workers in his own 
country – and has called for international regulatory measures to promote “healthy globalization” 
(Financial Times, May 5, 2008). 
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1.3. The Variation of Capital Account Policy Amidst Global Convergence 
 
My dissertation is concerned with the explanation of capital account policy after 
the initial adoption of liberalization. Why has capital account liberalization been 
sustainable only in some countries given comparable external and internal challenges 
for all countries? Before discussing the relevant academic literature and my explanatory 
focus on domestic informal institutions, a few words on the national variation amidst 
global and regional convergence in capital account policy are in order. 
The global trend of capital account policy over the last four decades is 
straightforward: the world as a whole has been moving steadily towards greater 
openness (see Figure 1.1 below). The process of dismantling capital controls after the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system usually started with restrictions on 
capital outflows and quickly spilled over to all types of administrative controls. During 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, industrial countries generally, and Western European 
ones specifically, took the lead in the gradual relaxation of capital account restrictions 
(Reisen and Fischer 1993; Helleiner 1994). Especially in the context of formal 
agreements under auspices of the OECD and the European Union, virtually all industrial 
countries established high levels of capital account openness by the end of the 1980s 
and have maintained them until the present time.3 By 1993, the threshold of zero, i.e., 
the mean, in the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness (see Chapter 2) was passed. As a 
result, from that point onwards capital accounts at the global level have been more open 
than closed. 
The developing world jumped on the liberalization bandwagon 10 to 15 years 
after the industrial countries. But once they did, their pace towards greater capital 
account openness was impressive. According to the Chinn-Ito index, financial openness 
across 130 developing countries more than doubled between 1975 and 2002 (see Figure 
1.2 below). 
Despite the striking growth of capital account freedom in the developing world, 
notable differences persist in terms of the level of openness and the pace and pattern of 
opening between industrial and developing countries. The widespread expectation that 
developing countries would simply follow the lead of their industrial counterparts and 
quickly and steadily move towards higher levels of capital account openness has not 
been matched by reality (see Figure 1.3 below). 
                                               
3 There may indeed be reversals of this trend in developed countries in the aftermath of the current 
financial crisis but the relevant cross-country data are not available yet. The last available year in the 
relevant dataset refers to 2007. 
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Figure 1.1  Capital account openness worldwide, 1970-2007 
 
Source: Chinn and Ito 2008. In this index, “0” is constructed as the mean of the series. 
 
Figure 1.2  Capital account openness in developed and developing countries, 1970-2007 
 
Source: Chinn and Ito 2008. 
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Figure 1.3  Percentage of developing countries opening or closing a capital control, 
1971-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brune and Gibbons Guisinger 2009. 
 
 
In fact, significant regional variation of capital account policy has been a 
defining feature of the post-Bretton Woods monetary era (see Figure 1.4 below). While 
some regions such as the Middle East and North Africa registered stagnation in capital 
account liberalization after an initial leap in the early 1970s, others such as East and 
Southeast Asia showed a moderate reversal after the experience with the financial crisis 
in the late 1990s. Besides Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America experienced the 
most dramatic decline in capital account restrictions in the early 1990s. Starting in the 
mid-1990s, Latin America has had the highest degree of capital account openness 
among all developing regions, while still trailing behind the industrial world by around 
40%. 
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multifaceted restrictions on international capital movements, primarily by abolishing 
longstanding restrictions on capital outflows. Controls on capital outflows had actually 
been tightened in many countries in the context of the debt crisis at the beginning and 
during the middle of the 1980s. As a result, capital account openness in Latin America 
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reversal in the mid-1990s and in recent years has reached a historically high plateau (see 
Figure 1.5 below). 
 
Figure 1.4  Financial openness in different regions of the world, 1965-2003 
Source: Brune 2006.  
 
Figure 1.5  Capital account openness in Latin America, 1970-2007 
 
Source: Chinn and Ito 2008. 
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However, the overall regional trend somewhat obscures the national variation of 
capital account policies in the aftermath of liberalization. Although the regional trend 
clearly points towards greater financial openness, national capital account policies after 
1990 did not follow a uniform pattern. Most Latin American countries liberalized 
administrative restrictions on capital outflows and inflows in the early 1990s. As a 
result, the regional trend towards greater capital account openness during the 1990s 
reflects the experience of the majority of countries with the simultaneous liberalization 
of both capital outflows and inflows. Only after experiencing the negative effects of 
drastically increased capital inflows did some, but by no means all, governments 
reintroduce inflow controls or invent them from scratch. 
On the other hand, as they relaxed controls on outflows, some Latin American 
governments moved more reluctantly to remove restrictions on capital inflows fearing 
that increased capital flows could bring more volatility. In particular, large inflows and 
sudden outflows of capital, including short-term flows or ‘hot money’ could lead to 
macroeconomic instability, the loss of monetary autonomy, and to the undermining of 
export growth through real exchange rate appreciation (Magud and Reinhart 2007). At 
the same time, once liberalized, capital outflows have been left largely unrestricted.4 
Let me briefly illustrate the different paths of capital account policy in Latin 
America with reference to the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. While their policies 
before 1990 showed a relative homogeneity at a low level of capital account openness, 
their post-1990 policy trajectories have substantially diverged from each other. Even 
though the overall trend is towards greater capital account openness, somewhat erratic 
changes and frequent reversals have characterized the capital account policies of the 
three leading Latin American economies. As a result, the capital account openness 
indicator locates them at rather different levels by 2007 (see Figure 1.6 below). 
Argentina embarked on a full-scale financial liberalization program during the 
Menem administration. The country was portrayed as the poster-child of ‘Washington 
Consensus’ policies in its most radical version (Blustein 2005). The capital account 
openness indicator went up exponentially during the early 1990s and experienced 
relatively few changes, least of all in the backward direction. Yet the financial crisis of 
2001-2002 changed the picture dramatically. Within record time, Argentina’s capital 
                                               
4 The strategy to simultaneously introduce controls on capital inflows and liberalize capital outflows was 
justified as corresponding measures to dampen the appreciation of domestic currencies (Larraín 2000). 
For example, Colombia liberalized outflows in 1992 following a surge of inflows during the previous 
year. The government did so by extending the liberalization of export-surrender requirements to all 
exporters, by allowing local agents to hold offshore stocks (up to a limit), and by easing restrictions on 
the provision of foreign loans (Labán and Larraín 2000: 22-23). 
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account openness indicator went from being one of the highest to one of the lowest in 
Latin America. The two Kirchner governments have maintained a relatively low level of 
capital account openness until the present time (Dominguez and Tesar 2007). 
 
Figure 1.6  Capital account openness in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1970-2007 
 
Source: Chinn and Ito 2008. 
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one of the most open countries to international capital flows in Latin America. At the 
same time, the government has maintained its traditional instruments for the regulation 
of capital inflows within its macroeconomic policy toolkit, applying them selectively 
throughout the recent past (Cowan and De Gregorio 2007).5 
The variation of capital account policies in Latin America amidst the general 
trend towards greater openness is surprising. The enthusiasm for liberalization during 
the early 1990s was replaced by frequent policy reversals indicating the fragility of open 
capital accounts. As a result, the exponential increase in capital account openness in the 
early 1990s came to a halt, giving rise to policy changes, most dramatically in 
Argentina. The neoliberal fever for open capital accounts quickly dissipated in some 
countries (Argentina), never really blossomed in others (Brazil), and took hold in a few 
countries, albeit with some important limitations (Chile). Given similar macroeconomic 
challenges as well as formal political and economic institutions during the liberalization 
period, one would have expected broadly similar policies – moving quickly and steadily 
towards the level of capital account openness reached by industrial countries. In sum, 
the observed variation of capital account policies in Latin America in an age of financial 
globalization – purportedly leading to uniform economic policies – needs explanation. 
National choices on capital account policy are situated in an international 
context. The domestic decision to liberalize the capital account has been inextricably 
linked to global and regional dynamics. Systemic-international factors help explain the 
global and regional trend towards increased capital account openness. Chapter 4 focuses 
on the internal change within the International Monetary Fund by which the 
organization came to embrace capital account openness as a desirable policy for 
developing countries. I argue that the main drivers of this normative change were 
located at the internal level of the organization and not imposed from outside. 
The IMF specifies the internationally accepted range of policy options in capital 
account management. I trace the evolution of the Fund’s thinking on capital account 
policy from the 1980s to the present day, emphasizing the continuity of the capital 
account freedom imperative – albeit now with qualifications and nuances. Given the 
IMF’s normative change in favor of rapid and unconditional capital account 
liberalization in the early 1990s, the range of policy options delineated by the 
international community for developing countries was rather narrow. Capital account 
openness was clearly on its way to becoming a global policy norm. However, the failure 
                                               
5 However, the Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement signed in 2004 significantly limits the 
application of these instruments (Bhagwati and Tarullo 2003). 
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of the amendment to the Articles of Agreement to institutionalize capital account 
openness in the midst of the Asian crisis undermined the persuasive power of the IMF 
to promote capital account liberalization among its member-states. As a result, the range 
of acceptable capital account policy options available to developing countries increased 
substantially after 1998. While the IMF continues to advocate the positive effects of 
open capital accounts, the transformation of the idea of capital account liberalization 
into an international norm under the control and supervision of the IMF failed. 
International factors constitute the structural context for domestic capital account 
policy. To what extent international actors such as the IMF are able to shape domestic 
decisions on capital account management is an important issue for empirical research. 
Based on the analysis of the Peruvian and Colombian cases, I argue that policy 
decisions on the flow of international capital were not determined by outside actors such 
as the IMF. Although the Fund was the principal disseminator and key ‘intellectual 
cheerleader’ for capital account liberalization in the early and mid-1990s, it did not 
dictate the content of the adopted policies in the two countries. Instead, domestic-level 
factors are responsible for the variation of capital account policy in Latin America, 
turning countries into capital mobility enthusiasts or laggards, respectively. 
 
1.4. Explaining Capital Account Policy Variation: The Role of Domestic Informal   
Institutions and State-Business Relations 
 
Explanations of capital account policy have become somewhat of a cottage 
industry in political science. An area usually reserved for economists, the remarkable 
increase in capital account openness during the past four decades has sparked the 
interest and attention of a wide range of political scientists. Scholars have primarily 
focused on the question of why capital account liberalization became a policy outcome 
in several countries at around the same time. Their theoretical and empirical analyses 
initially focused on industrial or OECD countries where capital account liberalization 
started earlier than in the rest of the world. 
The existing literature can be categorized in several clusters according to (i) the 
level of analysis, and (ii) the ontological framework used to explain capital account 
policy. On the one hand, we have the well-known distinction between three images or 
broad levels of analysis – individual, domestic, and international – introduced by Waltz 
(1959). On the other hand, we can distinguish between three ontological frameworks – 
interests, institutions, and ideas – considered to be the main drivers of economic policies 
generally, and capital account policy specifically (see Chapter 3). 
 24
However, existing approaches overwhelmingly focus on the adoption of capital 
account liberalization, but are less able to account for the variation of capital account 
policy after the initial opening. I posit that the literature has largely neglected to 
consider the domestic informal foundations of capital account policy as a key element to 
account for this variance. In my dissertation I seek to rectify this shortcoming. 
I argue that informal institutions at the domestic level are a crucial factor in 
order to understand the stability or instability of capital account openness over time. I 
define informal institutions as socially shared rules and understandings underpinning 
and legitimizing economic policies. An institution is “a relatively stable collection of 
practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific 
situations” (March and Olsen 1999: 308). In my usage of the term, informal institutions 
are essentially equivalent to what social constructivists call “intersubjective beliefs” 
(Searle 1995). However, it is important to emphasize the distinction between informal 
institutions or intersubjective beliefs on the one hand, and norms on the other. The two 
concepts are closely related but their difference is linked to aggregation: 
 
the norm definition isolates single standards of behavior, whereas institutions 
emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are structured together and 
interrelate (Finnemore and Sikkink 1999: 251).  
 
In other words, informal institutions are a collection of practices and rules and 
not just a specific norm that governs actor behavior vis-à-vis a specific policy issue, 
such as human rights or environmental standards. As a result, the term informal 
institution or collectively held beliefs and understandings are meant to inform the 
behavior of a wide range of actors in terms of broad policy areas. 
Likewise, the emphasis on domestic informal institutions is distinct from 
arguments about transnationally operating epistemic communities based on collectively 
shared ideas and the influence of these groups over policy outcomes (Haas 1992). Some 
scholars have emphasized the crucial role played by politically influential economists 
trained abroad in “neoliberal economics programs” for the shift towards capital account 
liberalization in developing countries generally, and Latin America specifically 
(Biglaiser 2002b; Chwieroth 2007a). In contrast, I argue that the shared ideas of the 
neoliberal epistemic community must be socially embedded within the domestic 
context, i.e., above and beyond the representation of members of this group in high-
ranking government positions, in order to shape capital account policy over the medium 
and long run. Put differently, I aim to demonstrate that the mere presence of foreign-
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trained neoliberal economists in influential government positions is not a sufficient 
condition for the durability of capital account openness but requires the embeddedness 
of their ideas in socially shared rules and understandings (Granovetter 1985). Specific 
economic ideas acquired during professional training abroad must thus be subjected to 
the test of domestic social resonance. Depending on the particular social context, 
neoliberal ideas about capital account management encounter either a receptive or a 
difficult terrain. 
The longevity of capital account openness is based on an informal agreement 
among the country’s political and economic elites that restricting international capital 
flows is an idea whose time is gone. The durability of capital account freedom is 
predicated upon the collectively shared belief that capital controls have lost their 
legitimacy as instruments of macroeconomic policymaking. The extent to which this 
conviction has become entrenched within a country’s political and economic discourse 
and social practice explains the sustainability of capital account openness over time. In 
contrast, if socially shared rules and understandings underpinning and legitimizing 
previous forms of capital account policy survive the initial adoption of capital account 
liberalization, achieving a high level of capital account openness on a durable basis is 
unlikely. Informal institutions dating back to the times of the ISI model stand in the way 
of making open capital accounts a general and permanent feature of the political 
economy in Latin America. 
Informal institutions come in different, country-specific forms. As a result, 
economic policymaking is characterized by idiosyncratic factors, which vary from 
country to country, even within the same geographical region (Helmke and Levitsky 
2006). Notwithstanding their distinct characteristics and origins, the durability of capital 
account openness requires a specific shared belief among the domestic elites, namely 
that capital controls have lost their legitimacy as instruments of macroeconomic 
policymaking for good. The institutional foundation for the sustainability of capital 
account openness only exists if the prevailing economic discourse and its concomitant 
social rules, understandings, and practices reflect the illegitimacy of capital controls. In 
other words, the social embeddedness of the principled belief in capital account freedom 
constitutes an indispensable condition for maintaining an open capital account. 
Countries face a policy dilemma after the initial liberalization of the capital 
account. Confronted with real exchange rate appreciation, they can either decide to 
privilege the continued inflow of foreign capital based on a restrictive monetary policy, 
e.g., with a view to achieving low inflation and remaining attractive for foreign 
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investors, or focus on macroeconomic stability, policy autonomy, and external 
competitiveness by – at least temporarily – restricting the inflow of foreign capital. The 
specific domestic context, in particular the socially shared rules and understandings 
about legitimate economic policies and the nature of state-business relations provide the 
background against which this dilemma is resolved, leading either to the durability of 
capital account openness, or its fragility. 
An important ingredient of informal institutions shaping capital account policy 
are state-business relations. The longevity of capital account openness is closely linked 
to a specific form of relations between the state and the private sector. The interests of 
export-oriented sectors – worried about the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
induced by trade liberalization and increasing capital inflows – must be superseded by 
sectors for which the stability and, above all, competitiveness of the exchange rate are 
not primordial concerns. The latter group forms the backbone of support for durable 
capital account openness within the business community. This group must become the 
preferred interlocutor and political ally for the government. Whereas previously 
restrictions on international capital flows constituted a socially accepted instrument of 
macroeconomic management, a public-private alliance must be able to convince the 
public at large that capital controls are once and for all delegitimized. An economic 
crisis that is associated with the existence of capital controls provides a fertile ground 
for the long-term stability and success of this alliance between policymakers and parts 
of the business community. 
However, a highly organized domestic business community dominated by a pro-
capital mobility constituency requires a congenial social context in order to guarantee 
the sustainability of capital account openness. Yet concerns about exchange-rate 
stability and competitiveness and the concomitant call for restrictions on capital inflows 
fall on deaf ears if collectively shared beliefs about legitimate economic policies 
exclude capital controls from the toolkit of policymakers. In contrast, if domestic 
informal institutions continue to include capital controls as essential, though not 
necessarily permanent instruments in the arsenal of policymakers, an open capital 
account has a rather short shelf-life. 
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1.5. Informal Institutions and State-Business Relations in Action: Comparing    
Capital Account Policy in Peru and Colombia 
 
 
 In order to demonstrate the empirical validity of my claim about the crucial role 
of informal domestic institutions and a specific set of state-business relations for the 
sustainability of capital account openness, I now analyze the trajectory of capital 
account policy in Peru and Colombia after 1990. Despite similar macroeconomic 
challenges and comparable formal institutions, both countries pursued different paths 
after the initial adoption of capital account liberalization. I posit that different socially 
shared rules and understandings about legitimate economic policies and different forms 
of state-business relations account for the variation. 
 The change in social rules and understandings in the context of the initial 
adoption of capital account liberalization during the early 1990s constitutes the 
institutional foundation for the durability of capital account freedom in Peru. In 
contrast, the survival and continued relevance of pre-liberalization collective beliefs and 
social practices, specifically the tradition of pragmatism and consensus-orientation 
among the political and economic elites, account for the fragility of capital account 
openness in Colombia. 
Peru and Colombia illustrate the different paths that countries have taken in 
response to the dilemma between maintaining real exchange-rate stability in order to 
preserve the external competitiveness of the domestic economy, or giving priority to 
capital inflows as a source of domestic growth. Although both countries arrived at the 
initial decision to open the capital account for different reasons, they faced similar 
macroeconomic challenges in its aftermath. Both had to deal with exchange-rate 
appreciation and its negative consequences for the domestic economy. Their choices in 
response to this fact reflected different priorities for macroeconomic policymaking. 
While both countries adopted floating exchange rate regimes during the 1990s, Peruvian 
policymakers privileged inflation control and stable or increasing capital inflows over 
other macroeconomic objectives, whereas their Colombian counterparts tried to 
reconcile a low inflation policy with the preservation of external competitiveness for the 
national economy. Both strategies, in turn, led to different capital account policies. 
Capital controls were virtually outlawed in Peru after 1990. In contrast, Colombia’s 
capital account policy showed frequent changes between opening and closing, mainly in 
reaction to drastic movements of capital inflows and the exchange rate. These different 
priorities for capital account management are informed by specific informal institutions 
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governing economic policymaking and specific state-business relations in both 
countries. Thus, comparing divergent paths of capital account policy after the initial 
liberalization provides for important insights into the institutional basis for sustained 
neoliberal economic policies. 
The specific political and economic context in which capital account openness 
was initially adopted plays a critical role for its endurance. An economic crisis is not a 
necessary condition for the initial adoption of capital account liberalization. However, 
the long-term political and social effects of an economic crisis help explain when and 
why capital account openness becomes a durable policy. Conversely, the absence of an 
economic crisis during the initial adoption of capital account liberalization undermines 
its viability over the medium and long run. 
 
Peru 
 
The deep economic crisis that engulfed Peru in the second half of the 1980s 
provided the launching pad for the initial liberalization of the capital account. The crisis 
enabled the rapid adoption of several components of capital account openness. First, 
due to the legacy of the (first) García administration, the country was trapped in an 
untenable macroeconomic situation in 1990, having become a pariah of the international 
financial community because of hyperinflation and the moratorium on debt payments. 
Capital inflows had virtually dried up, and capital flight was rampant. The incoming 
Fujimori administration quickly realized that its room for maneuver in economic policy 
was close to zero. This, in turn, shaped the risk perception on part of the political 
leadership, driving the government to accept high risks in economic policy. In other 
words, the risks of capital account liberalization for macroeconomic stability were 
systematically discarded, hoping that the short-term gains in form of low inflation and 
increased capital inflows would materialize just in time before the risks of radical free-
market reforms became apparent. 
Second, the crisis undermined the legitimacy of any form of heterodox economic 
thinking and their associated policies, as practiced by the García administration during 
the 1980s. It also enabled the rise and integration into the Fujimori government of a new 
epistemic community: neoliberal economists. Representatives of this group were 
appointed to high-ranking positions during the first years of the Fujimori administration, 
from where they could implement their economic agenda without much interference 
from society. 
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Third, the economic crisis gave international financial institutions, and the IMF 
in particular, an important role vis-à-vis the Peruvian government. In exchange for 
providing fresh financial resources, it could dictate the terms of the required economic 
reforms. However, outside pressure for the adoption of neoliberal reforms was not 
necessary. In fact, the Fujimori administration became a model student in its 
interactions with the IMF, liberalizing the economy well beyond what it was asked to do 
by the IMF and other international financial institutions. The government’s eagerness 
for liberalization also included capital account policy. 
However, the factors that explain the initial adoption of capital account openness 
do not necessarily guarantee its maintenance over time. To domestic-level processes 
have accompanied the sustainability of capital account liberalization in Peru. First, a 
structural shift in the balance of power among domestic business groups and the 
subsequent reconfiguration of state-business relations. 
After introducing radical economic reforms in the early 1990s, several leading 
protagonists of the neoliberal epistemic community lost their positions in the 
government and were replaced by business sector representatives. These new actors 
represented the interests of a specific group within the business community, namely the 
financial and mining sectors. In contrast, industrialists and non-traditional exporters lost 
political influence during the 1990s. As a result, the longevity of capital account 
openness in Peru is linked to the political leverage of a specific alliance of business 
sectors that profit from free capital mobility but are less affected by its negative 
consequences in terms of exchange-rate volatility and appreciation. This pro-capital 
freedom coalition gained the upper hand in terms of influencing government policy over 
the non-mining export-oriented sectors of the economy during the Fujimori 
administration. The coalition has been able to maintain its veto-player position over 
capital account policy until the present time. 
However, the control of a specific business alliance over policy decisions is not 
a sufficient condition to explain why capital account openness has enjoyed widespread 
support in the Peruvian society writ large. I argue that one of the long-term effects of 
the 1980s economic crisis has been a national taboo regarding the use of capital 
controls. Restrictions on the free flow of international capital lost their justification as a 
legitimate tool of economic policymaking in Peru based on the widely shared 
association between capital controls and economic chaos in the collective memory of 
the late 1980s. The social agreement around capital mobility extends beyond the 
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neoliberal epistemic community of economists and members of the business 
community. It has become an informal institution in the Peruvian society. 
 
Colombia 
 
In contrast to Peru, the factors explaining the initial adoption of capital account 
liberalization in Colombia during the early 1990s do not have an economic origin. In 
fact, compared with its regional neighbors Colombia was in a rather privileged 
macroeconomic position at the end of the 1980s. Thus, neoliberal economic reforms 
were not a response to a desperate state of the national economy. Instead, they were the 
result of a comprehensive attempt to “modernize” the country initiated by the Gaviria 
administration in 1990. Parts of its economic modernization agenda was capital account 
liberalization. The Gaviria administration – mainly composed of members of the 
neoliberal epistemic community represented by the youngish president himself – was 
able to convince the political and economic elites of the country that liberalization was 
the only viable path to maintain the competitiveness of the Colombian economy in the 
long run. 
However, the political and discursive dominance of the neoliberal epistemic 
community was relatively short-lived. Most importantly, it was not able to do away with 
the informal institution that traditionally governed economic policymaking in 
Colombia: pragmatism.6 Described as an economic policy stance “based on selective 
but firm government intervention, that neither fully choked the private sector with 
overregulation, nor allowed it to flourish” (Edwards 2001: 28), pragmatism tries to 
correct the negative effects of free-market economic policies with corresponding state 
interventions. In other words, it tries to establish a balance between the reign of market 
forces and the need to ensure macroeconomic stability. Faced with one of the negative 
side-effects of free-market reforms in form of real exchange-rate appreciation, and 
based on the congenial, consensus-oriented nature of state-business relations, 
Colombian policymakers displayed their pragmatist roots, ignoring both the pure 
principles of neoclassical economics as well as the exhortations of the IMF, and chose 
                                               
6 Observers may question the appropriateness of the term informal institution when referring to 
pragmatism. However, interpreting institutions according to sociological institutionalism as structures and 
mechanisms of social order and cooperation governing the political and economic behavior of a 
community, I believe the term is useful in order to highlight an informal feature of the economic 
policymaking process in Colombia. Pragmatism constitutes a “shared mental model” of the Colombian 
policymaking and business community. It provides “a framework that allows members of a group to 
make sense of social, political, and economic conditions” (Abdelal et al. 2006: 699) and to make 
decisions in accordance with their cognitive priors (Hall 1993; Denzau and North 2000). 
 31
to impose temporary quantitative controls on capital inflows, the so-called encaje 
system or URR. 
An engrained sense of pragmatism has continued to shape economic 
policymaking in Colombia and thereby prevented the institutionalization of capital 
account openness as a long-term policy. In contrast to Peru, the freedom of international 
capital movements is not regarded as a symbolic, inalienable ingredient of the 
Colombian economy. Instead, capital mobility is conditioned on its contribution to 
macroeconomic growth and stability. Once excessive capital inflows enter into tension 
or conflict with overall economic stability, Colombian policymakers do not hesitate to 
restrict them. Their actions, in turn, are informed by the tradition of pragmatism that 
extends to the business community. 
Taken together, I argue that domestic informal institutions – supported by 
specific state-business relations – are a key variable in explaining the variation of 
capital account policy in Latin America. The transformation of informal institutions 
governing economic policymaking is a necessary condition for the durability of capital 
account openness. If pre-liberalization informal institutions survive the initial economic 
opening phase largely unscathed, their continued importance for macroeconomic 
policymaking prevents the domestic institutionalization of capital account openness. In 
other words, collectively shared understandings and social practices act as a prism for 
domestic and international actors pushing and pulling for capital account liberalization. 
Domestic informal institutions can either enable and reinforce, or constrain and paralyze 
the effect of international norms and ideas on capital account policy outcomes. The 
specific impact of informal institutions, in turn, depends on their transformation during 
the initial phase of economic liberalization. Capital account openness only becomes a 
sustained policy if the social rules, understandings, and practices governing economic 
policymaking during the pre-liberalization period are fundamentally transformed so that 
capital controls are considered illegitimate instruments of macroeconomic 
management. 
 
1.6. Outline of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation is structured in six chapters that follow this introductory 
chapter. Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the economics of financial liberalization 
generally, and capital account liberalization specifically, and describes the 
methodological approach used to explain the variation of capital account policy. The 
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chapter briefly lays out what the capital account is, what its liberalization entails, and 
how capital account liberalization can be measured empirically. It justifies the chosen 
qualitative methodology based on a comparative case study design in conjunction with 
process-tracing against the limits of large-N, quantitative studies. 
Chapter 3 introduces a tridimensional matrix in order to review the state of the 
literature. Three distinct ontological frameworks – interests, institutions, and ideas – are 
linked to three distinct levels of analysis – individual, domestic, and international. Each 
possible combination between the two categories provides for a specific explanation of 
capital account policy. I briefly describe each possible explanation and assess its 
relative explanatory in terms of the sustainability of capital account liberalization. I 
especially focus on ‘outside-in’ explanations that analyze the impact of international 
forces on domestic capital account policy, highlighting two factors in particular: the role 
of the International Monetary Fund and neoliberal epistemic communities. I discuss 
their overall analytical purchase in light of theoretical and methodological 
considerations. I conclude that the literature has largely neglected the role of domestic 
informal institutions that refract the impact of international forces and thus lead to 
contingent outcomes in capital account policy despite uniform global and regional push 
and pull factors for openness. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the (changing) discourse of the International Monetary Fund 
on capital account management. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the IMF emerged as 
a major norm entrepreneur for capital account freedom. The chapter traces the evolution 
of the IMF’s thinking from that time to the present day, emphasizing the critical 
juncture of the 1998 Asian financial crisis. I argue that the general commitment to 
capital account openness has been a constant in the Fund’s discourse during the past 
twenty years. However, the Asian crisis introduced important nuances and 
qualifications regarding the theoretical justification and practical implementation of the 
norm. Most importantly, the Asian crisis led to an internal reflection within the Fund; as 
a result of which its credibility and effectiveness as an international norm entrepreneur 
for the cause of capital account freedom in developing countries severely suffered. 
Notwithstanding the current debate inside and outside the Fund, the normative change 
of the IMF in favor of capital account openness is here to stay. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are dedicated to case studies on Peru and Colombia. Each 
chapter traces the evolution of capital account policy in the country over the last twenty 
years. In addition, each chapter assesses the explanatory power of ‘outside-in’ 
explanations. The analysis shows that both causal mechanisms found in ‘outside-in’ 
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approaches – the role of the IMF and of the neoliberal epistemic community – are 
insufficient to account for capital account policy outcomes in Peru and Colombia. I 
proceed to highlight the particular shape and impact of socially shared rules and 
understandings about legitimate economic policies in each country. The Peruvian case 
study identifies a clear and decisive rupture with previous informal institutions 
legitimizing capital account policy. A commitment to capital account freedom was 
socially constructed as one of the critical lessons from the 1980s economic crisis. 
Coupled with changes in state-business relations providing privileged political access 
for sectors with a preference for capital mobility over exchange-rate stability and 
competitiveness, the sustainability of capital account openness in Peru is inextricably 
linked with the transformation of pre-liberalization informal institutions governing 
economic policymaking. 
On the other hand, the survival of informal institutions shaping economic 
policymaking throughout the liberalization process has ensured that capital account 
openness has not been an enduring policy in Colombia. More specifically, the domestic 
tradition of pragmatism has continued to inform decisions on capital account 
management, leading to a policy with frequent changes between opening and closing. 
Chapter 7 puts the two case studies in a comparative perspective, assessing the 
relative merit of alternative explanations of capital account policy. International forces 
highlighted in ‘outside-in’ explanations provide the structural context for changes 
towards the liberalization of capital account management in Latin America. However, 
international factors have not produced homogenously liberal capital account policies. 
National and international agents pushing and pulling for capital account freedom only 
find a fertile ground for their norm campaign if the informal institutions that 
underpinned and legitimized previous economic policies give way to a new 
understanding and practice of policymaking where capital controls no longer have a 
home. 
As a result, the domestic institutionalization of capital account openness is 
inextricably linked with the durable transformation of socially shared rules and 
understandings about legitimate economic policies. The dynamic interaction between 
the domestic social context and international norms and ideas leads to contingent 
economic policies. National variation amidst a global and regional trend towards greater 
capital account openness shapes the current era of financial globalization. 
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Chapter 2: The Economics of Capital Account Policy 
 
Before discussing the politics of capital account policy, a short discussion of its 
technical foundations is in order. In this chapter, I provide brief introductions to: (i) the 
capital account and its transactions; (ii) restrictions or controls on capital account 
transactions; (iii) capital account liberalization; and (iv) measuring capital account 
openness. In addition, I discuss the methodological approach of the dissertation in light 
of the achievements and shortcomings of existing empirical studies on capital account 
policy. 
 
2.1. What is the Capital Account and What are Capital Account Transactions? 
 
The capital account refers to a country’s international investment flows and is 
the part of a nation’s balance of payments used to register international capital flows. 
International capital flows are all transnational transactions with assets other than 
official reserves – the latter being the prerogative of governments for the sole purpose of 
bringing the country’s payments position into balance. Capital account transactions or 
trade in assets are thus undertaken by residents of a country for normal business 
purposes. 
There are three ways to distinguish international capital flows: (i) between 
inflows and outflows; (ii) by type of capital; and (iii) by intended purpose. Capital 
inflows entail foreign purchases of domestic assets – such as stocks, government bonds, 
land, or factories – or foreign loans to domestic residents. Conversely, capital outflows 
entail domestic purchases of foreign assets or loans to foreign residents by domestic 
residents. A country experiencing capital outflow or a capital account deficit is 
accumulating net claims on the rest of the world by purchasing more assets and/or 
making more loans to the rest of the world than it is receiving. 
Net capital inflows appear in the fundamental identity of a country’s balance of 
payments: net capital inflows + current account surplus + official reserves = 0. As a 
result, a current account deficit, i.e., savings lower than investments, can be financed 
either by capital inflows or by a reduction in official reserves. 
Capital account transactions refer to the purchase or sale of financial assets. An 
asset – real or financial – is simply a means to hold wealth, such as money, stocks, 
bonds, production facilities, public debt, or real estate (Krugman and Obstfeld 2009: 
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302). Three types of financial assets or capital can be distinguished: (a) direct 
investments; (b) securities; and (c) debt flows. Each type can be considered as an inflow 
or outflow of capital for a specific country. In addition, the three types of capital have 
different duration periods or volatility profiles. Direct investments refer to the purchase 
or sale of shares or some equivalent title of ownership sufficient to exercise managerial 
control over an enterprise, the purchase or sale of real estate, or substantial equity 
investment.7 Direct investment transactions are usually considered long-term (over a 
year) capital flows, less subject to volatility risks given that selling real assets such as 
production facilities is more difficult than securities. The sale or purchase of securities, 
such as stocks, bonds and equities in amounts that do not confer managerial control – 
also known as portfolio investments – are considered medium-term capital flows. 
Purchases of foreign securities by local residents involve outward movements of capital. 
Lastly, the purchase or sale of debt instruments, e.g., bank loans, derivatives, and 
various forms of credit (commercial, financial, guarantees) across countries is 
considered the most volatile or short-term form of capital flows. Borrowing by national 
residents from foreign financial entities involves an inflow of capital; lending, an 
outflow. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish between the uses of capital transactions. 
One form of financial transactions is related to the import and export of goods and 
services. Payments made or received for these transactions are registered in the current 
account of the balance of payments. On the other hand, all other not trade or service-
related financial transactions, i.e., for investment or speculation, are registered in the 
capital account. As a result, liberalizing controls on current-account transactions allows 
increased ability of local residents to convert domestic currency into foreign exchange 
in order to import, or vice versa for the export of goods and services. In other words, 
current-account convertibility allows residents to make and receive trade-related 
payments - receive dollars (or any other foreign currency) for the export of goods and 
services and pay dollars for the import of goods and services, make remittances, access 
foreign currency for travel, studies abroad, medical treatment and gifts, etc. Lifting 
restrictions on all other forms of financial transactions, in particular transactions such as 
investment and loans, refers to capital account convertibility. 
 
 
                                               
7 Equity investment is considered direct investments when it exceeds ten percent of the market 
capitalization of a firm. 
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2.2. What are Capital Controls? 
 
In the context of ‘embedded liberalism’ in Western countries after the Second 
World War, governments maintained a host of restrictions on international capital 
movements. Having learned the lessons from the two decades of the interwar period and 
in line with the then dominating Keynesian thinking, controls were intended to shield 
national economies from the distortionary effects of volatile capital flows. In fact, 
capital controls worked rather well in the context of the Bretton Woods System 
(Eichengreen 2008: 92). They provided governments with enough breathing space for 
the application of independent monetary policy during the Bretton Woods era of fixed-
exchange rates. They could cope with balance-of-payments difficulties without the need 
to apply expenditure-switching policies or undermining fundamental policy goals such 
as full employment and economic growth. Capital controls fulfilled an essential 
function for the overall stability of the Bretton Woods System. 
Seeking to promote international trade, in 1959 IMF member states committed 
themselves to lifting restrictions on current-account convertibility under Article VIII of 
the Articles of Agreement. As mentioned earlier, current account convertibility allows 
free capital inflows and outflows for the import and export of goods and services. Yet 
while countries progressively relaxed their national restrictions on current-account 
transactions in line with IMF obligations, they maintained their statutory restrictions on 
the majority of capital account transactions. 
Governments pursue various purposes with different forms of capital controls 
(Johnston and Tamirisa 1998). As with international trade flows, there have historically 
been few limits to the ingenuity of governments to invent and impose restrictions on 
capital flows, both on inflows and outflows. In most developing countries, controls on 
capital outflows have been used to generate revenue for governments or to permit them 
to allocate credit domestically without risking capital flight. Typical examples of 
restrictions on capital-account convertibility still in use today include: 
 
• Limits on the possession and availability of foreign exchange; 
• Limitations on the external asset and liability positions of domestic financial 
institutions; 
• Limitations on residents firms’ and individuals’ foreign portfolio assets, real estate 
holdings, and direct investment; 
• Reserve requirements for short-term capital inflows. 
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In general terms, controls have taken the form of (a) price or market-based 
mechanisms, and (b) quantity limits. Both types of controls can be applied to capital 
inflows and outflows. Outright bans on long-term capital flows often reflect political 
sensitivity to foreign ownership of domestic assets. An example is Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution limiting foreign investment in Mexican domestic assets, 
especially natural resources. As a result, the article prevents the government from 
authorizing concessions and contracts to foreign residents or companies for the 
exploitation of Mexican petroleum. 
Price controls may take the form of special taxes on returns to international 
investment, taxes on certain types of transactions – such as the ‘Tobin tax’ on short-
term capital flows – or a mandatory reserve requirement that functions as a graduated 
tax, as used for short-term capital inflows in Chile and Colombia during the 1990s. 
Quantity restrictions on capital flows may include rules mandating ceilings or requiring 
special authorization for new or existing borrowing from foreign residents. Other forms 
are administrative controls on cross-border capital movements in which a government 
agency must approve transactions for certain types of assets. In terms of quantitatively 
restricting capital outflows, forbidding or requiring special permission for the 
repatriation of profits by foreign enterprises operating domestically used to be a popular 
policy instrument in many developing countries. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish capital controls from prudential regulations, 
even though sometimes the exact difference lies in the eye of the beholder. Measures of 
prudential supervision and regulation of the domestic financial system are designed to 
limit the scope and incentives of financial market participants to take on excessive risk, 
in particular regarding the dependence on short-term foreign currency debts. A variety 
of capital, liquidity, reserve, and open position requirements have been devised in order 
to deal with the systemic-risk implications of the assets and liabilities of bank and 
nonbank firms’ balance sheets (Eichengreen et al. 1998: 23-28). The imposition of 
prudential regulations and controls on capital inflows have often been justified with the 
same arguments. Some price-based controls on inflows indeed have a prudential 
objective. However, one cannot conclude that all or even most capital controls have 
been imposed due to prudential reasons. In fact, many of them have traditionally been 
imposed for other reasons, usually related to political expediency or in order to 
reconcile otherwise incompatible internal and external macroeconomic objectives.8 
                                               
8 The question of what counts as prudential regulation or as capital control still occupies the economic 
literature. For example, Mishkin (2006) argues that the risks associated with capital account liberalization 
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2.3. What is Capital Account Liberalization? 
 
The freeing of international capital flows, also known as international financial 
liberalization, capital-account convertibility or capital account openness, is a subset of 
financial liberalization. As a whole it refers to the “process of giving the market the 
authority to determine who gets and grants credit and at what price” (Williamson and 
Mahar 1998: 2).  
 
According to Williamson and Mahar (1998), financial liberalization encompasses 
six dimensions: 
 
1. The elimination of credit controls; 
2. The deregulation of interest rates; 
3. The free entry into the banking sector or financial-service industry; 
4. Bank autonomy; 
5. The private ownership of banks; and 
6. The liberalization of international capital flows. 
 
Unfortunately, no positive or precise definition of capital mobility is readily 
available. Capital account convertibility is usually defined through its opposite - the 
existence of restrictions on international capital movements. In general terms, capital 
account convertibility refers to the freedom to convert local financial assets into foreign 
financial assets and vice versa. Put simply, it allows firms and households to freely 
convert domestic currency into foreign exchange and back, regardless of the duration or 
purpose of the underlying financial transaction. As the result of full capital account 
convertibility, capital can enter and leave the country at will. The liberalization of 
international capital flows is distinct from the other five types of financial liberalization, 
even though they often occur in conjunction. For example, the permission for foreign 
banks or other financial intermediaries to enter the domestic financial industry does not 
count as part of capital account liberalization. Both processes follow a separate, albeit 
somewhat connected economic logic. Allowing capital to freely move in and out of the 
                                                                                                                                         
need to be dealt with through prior appropriate prudential regulation of the financial system and other 
policy reforms. In other words, prudential regulation is the prerequisite for capital account liberalization. 
The corollary is that there should be no capital controls beyond their justification as prudential 
regulations. However, the devil lies in the details: exactly which measures prevent excessive – however 
defined – risk-taking by domestic financial intermediaries and which serve other purposes? As a result, 
what some observers call – usually pejoratively – capital controls, others consider appropriate prudential 
regulations in a world of global finance. 
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country does not require the free establishment of financial firms. In fact, domestic 
financial intermediaries might support capital account openness on the condition that 
certain legal regulations limit the free entry of foreign banks into the domestic financial 
sector (Pepinsky 2009a). 
 
2.4. How to Measure Capital Account Openness? 
 
Since there is no formal definition of capital-account convertibility, measuring 
the removal of national restrictions on international capital movements is not a 
straightforward empirical exercise. In fact, the search for better, i.e., more detailed or 
precise indexes of capital account restrictions has been a long-standing occupation for 
macroeconomists (Eichengreen 2001). Miniane states the fundamental problem for the 
construction of comparable cross-country indexes of capital account openness: 
 
Capital controls can take many different forms, making it time-consuming to 
track all changes in restrictions within a single country. Moreover, the 
construction of any capital controls index raises the problem of aggregation. By 
how much should a measure drop if a country relaxes one of its many 
restrictions? Last but not least, the effectiveness of capital controls depends 
crucially on the government’s willingness and ability to enforce them. Assuming 
one has qualitative evidence on enforceability, how should it be weighted in the 
index? (Miniane 2004: 277) 
 
 
Researchers have constructed two different categories of time-series analyses of 
capital account openness: (a) rules-based, qualitative or de jure and (b) quantitative or 
de facto indicators.9 Various indices have been constructed in order to directly measure 
global capital mobility. They use a variety of indicators such as the ratio of total market 
capitalization of equities available for purchase by foreign investors over total market 
capitalization (Edison and Warnock 2003), the ratio of a country’s external capital 
stock, i.e., portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities, as a share of GDP (Lane 
and Milesi-Feretti 2007), the national savings rate over the national investment rate with 
the correlation between the two series taken as an indicator of impediments to capital 
mobility (Feldstein and Horioka 1980), or the estimated stocks of gross foreign assets 
and liabilities as a ratio of GDP (Edison et al. 2004).  
                                               
9 A similar distinction between de jure and de facto regimes exists for exchange rates. The first is based 
on official data reported by governments to the IMF and the latter is inferred from the actual behavior of 
the currency and policies towards it. Similar to the comparison for capital account openness, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) find substantial differences between the measures for each regime type. 
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Qualitative or de jure measures of capital account openness take a political-legalistic 
view. They focus on statutory country regulations reported in government publications 
and are indexed annually in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). From 1967 until 1996, the AREAER used a 0-1 
single dummy variable in order to measure restrictions on capital account transactions. 
Since 1996, the AREAER uses a disaggregated, binary coding scheme based on a wide 
range of subcategories of capital account transactions: 
 
• Capital market securities 
• Money market instruments 
• Collective investment securities 
• Derivatives and other instruments 
• Commercial credits 
• Financial credits 
• Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities 
• Direct investment 
• Liquidation of direct investment 
• Real estate transactions 
• Personal capital movements 
 
While being a substantial improvement over its earlier, cruder, measure of capital 
account openness, the revised AREAER index still has some inherent limits. It records 
the mere existence of controls in several sub-categories of the capital account but not 
their intensity, type (direct versus portfolio investments or capital inflows versus 
outflows), or relative effectiveness. As a result, misleading assessments based on the 
IMF coding scheme have been rather frequent. For example, Chile, Mexico and Brazil 
were coded as having a closed capital account between 1992 and 1994 despite the fact 
that the three cases are very different. While Chile had restrictions only on short-term 
inflows, Brazil maintained a wide array of restrictions on inflows and outflows, and 
Mexico was virtually open to all types of capital flows (Edwards 2007: 78).  
The fundamental trade-off involved in the construction of de jure indices of capital 
account openness is between fine-grained measures of capital account transactions and 
the coverage in terms of years and countries. In other words, most comprehensive 
measures of capital account restrictions are only available for a handful of – usually 
developed – countries and limited time periods (Quinn 1997; Miniane 2004; Schindler 
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2009). The most recent attempts to develop fine-grained indices of de jure capital 
account openness are all based on IMF original data but seek to widen their 
measurement precision, above all in terms of the intensity of capital account restrictions, 
in the context of a substantially improved coverage across time and countries (Brune 
2006; Edwards 2007). 
De facto indexes tend to find a substantially higher level of capital account 
openness compared to the ones reported in de jure indexes. In other words, capital is 
actually more mobile across borders as stipulated in legal regulations. This is especially 
the case in countries with severe legal impediments to capital mobility, including 
banning international capital movements altogether. Ample historical evidence suggests 
that the private sector has traditionally resorted to over-invoicing of imports and under-
invoicing of exports, i.e., channelling capital transactions through the current account, 
in order to sidestep legal controls on capital flows (Eichengreen 2008: 92). However, 
the limitation of de facto indices of capital account openness is that these measures may 
be correlated with other factors that trended together during the same period of analysis, 
but which have nothing to do with capital account openness. In other words, high 
capital mobility might indicate volatility in the investment climate rather than openness 
to cross-border movements (Frankel 1993). 
The most commonly used measure of de jure capital account openness was 
developed by Chinn and Ito using information gleaned from the AREAER.10 The latest 
version of their Financial Openness Index (KAOPEN) covers 182 countries between 
1970 and 2007 (Chinn and Ito 2008). Their index includes four major categories of 
restrictions on external accounts, for all of which binary dummy variables exist: (i) 
existence of multiple exchange rates, (ii) restrictions on capital and (iii) current account 
transactions, and (iv) requirements of surrender of export proceeds. In addition, for 
capital account transactions after 1997 they use the sub-categories introduced in the 
1996 AREAER. For each of the four categories Chinn and Ito consider the average 
measure of the first standardized principal component. The index is constructed such 
that the series has a mean of zero. The index has a higher value for countries that are 
more open to cross-border financial transactions. Country values range from 2.603 to -
1.767. 
 
                                               
10 A newer and more fine-grained index using the AREAER was developed by Brune (2006). It reports 
IMF country data on twelve different categories of capital flows. The dataset is based on a 0-9 index, 
where higher numbers denote a greater level of financial openness. It covers 187 countries between 1965 
and 2003. It is constructed as the sum of all 0-1 dummies over the different categories of capital flows. 
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However, there are several problems with the Chinn-Ito index that render its 
usefulness as a measure of the dependent variable in quantitative or regression studies 
on the causes of capital account policy rather problematic. First, the inclusion of 
information on capital account policies over the past five years overstates the causal 
effects of variables that change in response to capital account policy and underestimates 
the importance of variables that contribute to large changes in capital account policy 
(Karcher and Steinberg 2010). Second, the Chinn-Ito index does not distinguish 
between controls on inflows and outflows of capital. Third, the index contains measures 
of other, i.e., not capital account-related, policy choices that governments make. In 
other words, the index measures the extensity of capital controls since it analyzes the 
existence of different types of restrictions, but it does not directly refer to the stringency 
of capital movement restrictions. As a result, the Chinn-Ito index is problematic because 
of the high risk of endogeneity between financial liberalization and other policy 
measures (Brune and Guisinger 2007). 
Notwithstanding its inherent problems as an adequate measure of capital account 
openness, the Chinn-Ito index has become the standard reference point for measuring 
capital account openness in the political science literature. While being aware of the 
significant limits of the index, I have used it in order to describe the global and regional 
trends of capital account policy after the end of the Bretton Woods System in Chapter 1. 
I have done so for purely illustrative purposes, not with the intention to employ the 
index within a quantitative analysis of the causes of capital account policy. 
 
2.5. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
 
2.5.1. Achievements and limitations of large- quantitative studies 
 
The literature on the political economy of capital account policy is dominated by 
large-N quantitative studies based on global or regional samples of countries. As a 
result, the frequently used path for aspiring researchers is to assemble a database of 
quantitative indicators for their preferred explanatory factor(s) and a host of control 
variables and test them against a numerical measure of capital account openness. The 
usual end result of this exercise is that one causal factor somehow ‘wins’ over its 
competitors by way of a more significant statistical correlation with the values of the 
dependent variable. In other words, causality is adjudicated through the statistical 
covariation between the numerical values of indicators of competing independent 
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variables and the numerical measure of capital account openness. This has been the 
standard methodological approach in the literature. 
However, empirical results based on this approach have been ambiguous. On the 
one hand, they allow for the simultaneous consideration of a wide range of possible 
causal factors based on a relatively large sample of countries. Quantitatively-oriented 
researchers have made substantial progress in the construction of numerical indicators 
for independent variables thought to influence capital account policy. They have 
become increasingly sophisticated in tackling methodological problems associated with 
the operationalization of key theoretical concepts and have devised innovative ways to 
identify and analyze interaction effects between distinct causal factors on different 
levels of analysis.11 In addition, they use increasingly fine-grained measures of capital 
account openness as their dependent variable. 
On the other hand, methodological sophistication in quantitative analyses has not 
done away with the plethora of causal factors, all of which have received some form of 
empirical confirmation in large-N studies. The – still rather limited – integration of 
separate levels of analysis is restricted to only one ontological perspective, the “open-
economy politics” framework that links interest- and (formal) institutions-based 
explanations of economic policies. 
Quantitative studies of capital account policy have overwhelmingly focused on 
developed countries and are based on a rationalist-materialist epistemology. As a result, 
they have failed to consider social drivers of economic policies, most importantly 
cognitive and normative factors on the international and domestic level, mainly due to 
the difficulty to integrate them in a quantitative research design. In fact, some 
explanatory variables based on ideational and institutional accounts might not be 
susceptible to numerical measurement at all. As Eichengreen observed, “as is the case 
all too often in empirical economics, there may have been a tendency to focus on factors 
that are readily measured and quantified to the neglect of those that are more difficult to 
capture” (Eichengreen 2001: 351). Quantitatively-oriented scholars should also be 
aware that despite their best attempts to operationalize explanatory variables in order to 
enable their comparative assessment within a positivist research methodology, the 
                                               
11 See, for example, the study by Mukherjee and Singer 2010 that tests the interaction between 
international and domestic drivers of capital account liberalization and addresses the endogenous nature 
of country participation in IMF programs. 
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concomitant costs in terms of the external validity of the resulting indicators are often 
substantial.12 
In sum, not all causal factors identified in the literature are susceptible to 
empirical testing in a large-N, quantitative methodology. To be more precise, only a 
qualitative methodology based on in-depth analysis of individual, strategically selected 
cases allows me to include socially shared rules and understandings at the domestic 
level – informal institutions – in my analytical framework. On the other hand, the costs 
of such an approach compared with statistical studies lie in the limited capacity to 
generalize the research findings beyond the analyzed cases. However, since I am less 
interested in contributing to a general theory of capital account policy and more 
interested in explaining the national variation of capital account policy between 
countries, the focus on a few, illustrative cases is justified. In this sense, my dissertation 
is more oriented towards the explanation of individual cases than proving that a specific 
casual variable is a necessary or sufficient condition for determining capital account 
policy at the general, theoretical level. 
 
2.5.2. Process-tracing in a comparative case study design 
 
The explanation of capital account policy can be approached from different 
analytical angles (see Chapter 3). Each of them is based on distinct ontological and/or 
epistemological perspectives and offers a distinct causal mechanism for the explanation 
of capital account policy. Each mechanism, in turn, is related to an underlying driver. 
These drivers can either be specific actors or structures at the domestic and international 
level. 
In order to account for both agency and structure as determinants of capital 
account policy, I first consider the international context for domestic policy choices. 
This is done through an analysis of the IMF’s discourse on capital account policy, 
which establishes the international parameters for domestic-level economic policies. I 
show the interaction between internal norm entrepreneurs for the case of capital account 
liberalization and the subsequent policy discourse of the IMF. For this purpose, I have 
                                               
12 Examples for the questionable operationalization of key variables to explain capital account policy 
include (i) using the size of specific sectors in the national economy as a measure to determine the 
influence of interest groups over economic policy outcomes; (ii) determining the influence of 
international actors such as the IMF on domestic policy decisions to the size or frequency of lending 
programs without analyzing the causal mechanisms leading to the domestic demand for these programs; 
and (iii) determining the policy preferences of foreign-trained economists without considering the 
possibility that economic ideas acquired abroad are subsequently transformed by the specific local 
context. 
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used official documents from the IMF, minutes of executive board meetings provided 
by the IMF Archives, and semi-structured, open-ended interviews with IMF officials 
and third-party observers. 
I then turn to the domestic level of analysis. I focus on specific domestic and 
international actors and their influence on national capital account policy against the 
systemic context of a movement towards increased capital mobility. Purely structural 
accounts of domestic policy choices predict homogeneity given similar incentives and 
constraints at the global level. Only an agency-focused approach helps to account for 
the persisting national variation of capital account policy. 
In order to assess the explanatory power of different clusters within a unified 
methodological framework, I apply a comparative or paired case study design in 
conjunction with the method of process-tracing (Tarrow 2010). Process-tracing aims at 
uncovering the causal mechanism connecting the explanatory and the outcome variables 
(George and Bennett 2005: 205-232; Gerring 2007: 172-185; Bennett 2008; Caporaso 
2009). It analyzes or traces the process by which certain outcomes are produced, 
specifying alternative theoretical accounts or causal mechanisms of the decision-making 
process upfront, which are then interrogated against the empirical data. Based on 
extensive field research, tracing the process of how decisions on economic policies are 
taken provides a longitudinal analysis of the unfolding of political outcomes. 
The principal advantage of in-depth, in situ qualitative research over large-N, 
statistical analyses of the causes of capital account policy is its ability to directly 
analyze and reconstruct the process of decision-making. In contrast to “data-set 
observations” – the basis of quantitative or regression analysis – process-tracing directly 
engages the empirical material with the aim to unearth causal mechanisms at play, 
rather than numeric correlations between variables (Brady and Collier 2004). Process-
tracing seeks a historical explanation of individual cases with the goal to document 
whether the sequence of events or processes within a particular case fits the predictions 
by alternative theories (Mahoney et al. 2009). Last but not least, instead of a 
‘gladiatorial battle’ where one theory ‘defeats’ its competitors, process-tracing allows 
for the simultaneous operation, observation and evaluation of different causal 
mechanisms producing a specific outcome or decision. 
Each explanatory cluster makes unique predictions on what or who determines 
capital account policy. As a result, one can derive specific expectations in terms of 
observable implications from each cluster. Using these different expectations as the 
baseline, I ask which of them is able – either alone or in conjunction with other causal 
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factors – to account for the decision-making process on capital account policy in each of 
the selected cases. This approach allows to eliminate possible causal factors as 
irrelevant for the explanation of the process leading to political decisions on capital 
account policy, and to take the interaction or co-determination between different causal 
factors into account. 
I focus on the following three agents as possible determinants of capital account 
policy: 
 
1. The International Monetary Fund; 
2. Domestic economic interest groups; 
3. The domestic community of economists. 
 
Each of them reflects a specific mechanism or process linking cause and effect in 
capital account policy. First, capital account policy is a function of the influence of 
international actors, in particular the IMF, over domestic policymaking, using both 
‘hard’ (coercion) and ‘soft’ (persuasion) means of power. Second, cleavages and power 
struggles between domestic economic interest groups define capital account 
management as a salient policy issue. The ‘winning’ coalition of private economic 
interests is somehow able to ‘capture’ government decisions on capital account policy. 
And third, capital account policy is the result of a specific ideas-driven community of 
domestic-level economists that have gained access to high-ranking government 
positions. I consider the explanatory power of each causal mechanism, represented by a 
specific actor or group of actors, in my case studies on Peru and Colombia.  
The empirical evidence or data used to assess the power of alternative explanations 
of capital account policy are based on more than fifty semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews with domestic and international policymakers and outside observers (see 
Appendix 1), the analysis of primary and secondary documents, press articles, surveys 
of economists in policy-relevant positions in order to probe their views on capital 
account management (see Appendix 2), and archival research. In each of the analyzed 
cases it is asked whether a specific causal mechanism, represented by a specific agent, is 
able to explain the decision-making process leading to a specific outcome in capital 
account policy. Table 2.1 summarizes the alternative causal mechanisms, the 
expectations regarding observable implications, and data sources used in order to 
evaluate their explanatory power. 
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Yet as Marx’s famous adage has it, individuals do not make their own history 
under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances already existing, given and 
transmitted from the past. National agents are situated in an institutional context, both 
internationally and domestically. As a result, purely agency-based or voluntaristic 
accounts are insufficient explanations for capital account policy. The behavior of actors 
has to be contextualized with the help of formal and informal institutions. The mutual 
interaction between institutions and agents, not their separate effects, determines the 
process leading to specific outcomes in capital account policy. 
 
Table 2.1  Alternative causal mechanisms 
Causal mechanism / 
Driver 
Observable implications Data sources 
Domestic interest groups Policy outcomes reflect the 
material self-interest or 
distributive preferences of 
specific economic groups 
Interviews 
IMF Policy outcomes reflect IMF 
preferences or demands 
Press coverage; 
interviews with 
policymakers; IMF 
Archives 
Community of economists Policy outcomes reflect 
position of a specific 
epistemic community 
Press coverage; surveys; 
interviews 
 
The literature has made substantial progress in order to account for the impact of 
formal political and economic institutions on capital account policy. Existing analyses 
highlight the close connection between specific formal institutional arrangements, e.g., 
political partisanship and legislative fragmentation, and capital account policy. The 
relatively easy identification and numerical measurement of formal institutions have 
facilitated large-N, quantitative studies of their direct or indirect effects on economic 
policies. 
However, how do we account for the existence and power over agent behavior 
of informal institutions? Whereas formal institutions and their effects can be observed 
directly, no such straightforward identification and measurement is feasible for informal 
institutions. Or as Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 733) put it, “a country's constitution can 
tell us whether it has a presidential or parliamentary system of government, but it cannot 
tell us about the pervasiveness of clientelism or kinship network”. Only a qualitative, 
case-based methodology allows demonstrating the existence and impact of informal 
institutions at the domestic level. 
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2.5.3. Selection of case studies 
 
Peru and Colombia are suitable cases for a paired comparison to show the 
explanatory power of alternative causal mechanisms for capital account policy. Both 
countries have historically taken different trajectories in capital account management, 
the outcome to be explained (see Figure 2.1 below). Peru’s capital account policy 
between 1970 and the early 1990s resembles a rollercoaster ride. Episodes of rapid 
liberalization were followed by equally drastic closednesss of the capital account, most 
notoriously during the second half of the 1980s with the full onslaught of the debt crisis 
and the application of heterodox economic policies during the (first) García 
administration. However, once the capital account was again liberalized in 1991 under 
the Fujimori government, apart from a brief interval of backlash in the mid-1990s, no 
major changes to the steady trend upwards occurred. Since 1997, Peru has consistently 
maintained the highest level of capital account openness among the bigger-sized 
countries in Latin America. 
Now consider Colombia. Before 1990, Colombia was a stark contrast to Peru’s 
erratic capital account policy. Long-term stability at a low level of capital account 
openness prevailed over frequent rollercoaster rides. In fact, the country’s openness 
measure did not move at all for twenty years – an exceptional trend within Latin 
America. Both Peru and Colombia coincided in their initial opening process in 1991 and 
1992. However, immediately afterwards the picture changes dramatically. While Peru 
continued with its rapid liberalization pace, Colombia first wavered and then slightly 
backtracked. To be sure, Colombia’s overall trend was also upward, yet at a much 
slower speed than Peru and with frequent policy changes – something in common, 
albeit less dramatically, with Peru’s trend before 1990. 
The case studies address two questions in particular detail: (1) why has 
Colombia historically lagged behind Peru in capital account openness, in particular 
after 1990; and (2) what explains the contrast between both countries after 1990 in 
terms of the sustainability of capital account liberalization? Whereas Peru has sustained 
capital account openness until the present time, Colombia’s initial opening of the capital 
account has been characterized by several reversals. Why is capital account 
liberalization sustained in Peru, but not in Colombia? 
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Figure 2.1  Capital account openness in Peru and Colombia, 1970-2007 
 
Source: Chinn and Ito 2008. 
 
Comparing economic policymaking in Colombia and Peru has a long academic 
tradition. Scholars were intrigued by the relative stability of economic policies in 
Colombia, compared with the frequent changes in economic paradigm and their 
resulting policies in Peru. Differences have been attributed to a variety of political-
institutional factors related to the form and functioning of the political system, the 
organization of state-business relations, and the long-term influence of technocratic 
elites on economic policymaking (Thorp 1991; Thorp and Durand 1997). While useful 
to understand the different trajectories up until 1990, these studies are less helpful to 
answer the two questions posed above. Stability and continuity became an attribute of 
Peruvian, not Colombian, capital account policy in the recent past.13 
A paired comparison requires the strategic selection of cases in order to reduce the 
high level of complexity surrounding social and political phenomena. Put simply, the 
selection of case studies cannot be done at will but must be justified in terms of 
methodological criteria. According to a most-similar research design, also called the 
“method of difference” after its initial proponent John Stuart Mill, cases with similar 
general characteristics and different values on the outcome variable are chosen (Van 
                                               
13 However, capital account policy might be the exception to the general rule that “public policies in Peru 
have been made arbitrarily, they have often been volatile, and they tend to be easily reversed” (Morón and 
Sanborn 2006: 22). Given this background, it is even more puzzling why capital account openness has 
been a stable, inflexible policy. 
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Evera 1997: 57-58; George and Bennett 2005: 153-160; Gerring 2007: 131-139; 
Gerring 2008: 668-671). The justification is to control for the effect of third variables 
that are not considered in the research design. Cases that are broadly similar in their 
political and historic characteristics but reflect different values or outcomes in terms of 
the phenomenon to be explained, facilitate the identification of the mechanism(s) 
connecting cause and effect. In other words, controlling for the possible effect of third 
variables in terms of the dependent variable is achieved through the selection of broadly 
similar cases. 
Empirical analysis of capital account policy and its drivers is conducted within a 
paired comparison in order to trace the decision-making process on capital account 
management, thereby assessing the explanatory power of alternative causal 
mechanisms. Both Colombia and Peru are located in the same geographic region, which 
establishes an area of homogeneity with similar historical, political, social, economic, 
and cultural characteristics.14 Given these overall commonalities, it will be easier to zero 
in on the remaining differences between the two countries – such as the depth and 
severity of the economic crisis affecting both countries in the late 1980s, state-business 
relations, and the form and long-term stability of formal and informal institutions – in 
order to assess their causal impact on capital account policy. 
For the period under consideration, Colombia and Peru share a host of political and 
economic characteristics, which correspond to the first requirement of the method of 
difference: 
 
• The status as medium-sized, middle-income countries;  
• A high dependence on the export of primary commodities (oil in the case of 
Colombia and copper in the case of Peru); 
• A fragmented political system with a high concentration of power in the executive 
and a weak legislature; 
• The personalist exercise of power by the president; 
• A center-right government with a broadly defined liberal orientation in economic 
policy15; 
                                               
14 Weyland (2002a: 8) summarizes these similarities with the following list: “Iberian colonization, 
predominance of Catholicism, significant import-substitution industrialization, advanced ‘social 
mobilization’ […], serious problems of debt and dependency, similar constitutional structures (for 
instance, presidential systems), and exposure to common ideational trends (for instance, the temporary 
attraction and later rejection of heterodox recipes)”.  
15 In recent times some left-wing governments in Latin America such as Venezuela have radically 
reversed course in capital account policy, re-introducing traditional administrative capital and exchange 
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• Central Bank independent from executive interference; 
• A floating exchange rate regime combined with inflation targeting16. 
 
The second requirement of the most-similar research design is variance of the 
dependent variable, allowing the remaining differences between the cases to 
demonstrate their causal impact. As discussed earlier, capital account policy in 
Colombia and Peru has reflected different trajectories, thereby assuming different 
values on the outcome variable. In particular, the macroeconomic situation of both 
countries during the initial adoption of capital account liberalization in the early 1990s 
was fundamentally different. Whereas Peru was treated as a pariah country in the 
aftermath of the heterodox economic policies applied by the García administration, 
Colombia emerged largely unscathed from the region-wide debt crisis of the 1980s. In 
other words, the context conditions at the beginning of the period under consideration 
were radically different. However, this fact alone cannot account for the divergent paths 
of capital account policy over time in both countries. Only the simultaneous 
consideration of other domestic-level factors as well as their interaction effects allows 
for the explanation of the long-term variation of capital account policy in Colombia and 
Peru. 
In fact, both countries faced similar macroeconomic challenges after they 
initially liberalized the capital account in the early 1990s, in particular how to respond 
to real exchange rate appreciation and its negative consequences for economic growth. 
However, the strategy in terms of capital account management in response to the 
dilemma between inflation control and economic growth in the aftermath of economic 
liberalization followed fundamentally different paths. I posit that a focus on the change 
and continuity of domestically shared beliefs about legitimate economic policies is 
crucial in order to account for this difference. Capital controls became an illegitimate 
instrument of macroeconomic policymaking in Peru due to the reconfiguration of state-
business relations privileging the interests of the financial and mining sectors over those 
                                                                                                                                         
controls in order to defend a tenuous fixed exchange rate regime. This policy reversal can clearly be 
attributed to their ideological, ‘anti-neoliberal’ stance. In other words, a fundamental political-ideological 
change of the national government leads to subsequent radical changes in capital account and other 
economic policies. 
16 The Fujimori government in Peru adopted a (managed) floating exchange rate regime as part of the 
initial economic stabilization plan in August 1990. Colombia changed the crawling peg exchange rate 
regime in place since 1967 in favor of an exchange rate band in 1991 before introducing a managed 
floating exchange rate regime in 1999. Both countries adopted inflation targeting in the early 2000s. 
While the Peruvian Central Bank thereafter shifted to “pure” floating, its Colombian counterpart 
continued to pursue managed floating aimed at maintaining real exchange-rate stability at a competitive 
level (Frenkel and Rapetti 2010). 
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of the export-oriented part of the economy. The latter group is critically concerned 
about exchange-rate stability and thus prone to demand restrictions on capital inflows in 
order to reduce appreciation pressure on the local currency. However, having lost its 
political leverage in the context of the economic opening process, exporters’ interests 
have had no influence on capital account policy in Peru after 1990. As a result, capital 
account openness could be sustained over time.   
Conversely, the export-oriented sector has been able to preserve its political 
influence in Colombia during the process of economic liberalization. The traditionally 
close and consensus-seeking nature of state-business relations based on a culture of 
pragmatism has survived the opening of the economy and informs capital account 
policy until the present time. Pragmatism – combined with the political influence of 
exporters – forms the backbone of capital account policy in Colombia and thus helps to 
explain the fragility of capital account openness. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have laid out the technical dimensions of capital account policy 
and explained that the capital account is part of the balance-of-payments, where 
international capital flows are registered. Such flows have traditionally experienced a 
host of administrative or de jure restrictions – referred to as capital controls. Lifting 
these legal barriers to international capital flows forms part of comprehensive financial 
liberalization programs, which most Latin American countries implemented during the 
early 1990s. The Chinn-Ito index of financial openness provides the best available 
measurement of national capital account openness on a comparable country level. 
 Second, I have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of existing quantitative 
studies to explain capital account policy and argued that a large-N, quantitative 
methodology cannot adequately capture or measure the impact of the causal factor that I 
am interested in: informal institutions at the domestic level. Even though Peru and 
Colombia share macroeconomic challenges and formal political and economic 
institutions, they illustrate two different paths of capital account policy after the 
initiation of capital account openness in the early 1990s. The case studies provide an in-
depth analysis of the countries’ different trajectories based on the method of process-
tracing. Tracing the political decision-making process allows to assess the explanatory 
power of alternative theories of capital account policy in a structured fashion. The 
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following chapter provides a detailed overview of the existing theoretical approaches to 
explain capital account policy. 
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Chapter 3: Three Analytical Frameworks for the Explanation 
of Capital Account Policy. Interests, Institutions, and Ideas 
 
The purpose of the present chapter is three-fold. First, I review the existing 
literature in political science regarding the explanation of national capital account policy 
with a view to (i) creating a typology based on broad analytical perspectives, and (ii) to 
signal an important lacuna with respect to domestic informal institutions that will be 
filled in the case studies on Peru and Colombia. Second, I provide a brief assessment of 
the major insights as well as the theoretical and/or empirical limitations of the existing 
explanatory approaches. Third, I show how different ontological foundations lead 
existing explanations to focus on different levels of analysis, key actors, or causal 
mechanisms driving capital account policy. 
Given the dramatic upsurge in capital account liberalization since 1970, first in 
industrial countries and after 1990 also in developing countries, the literature has 
addressed this question with reference to three distinct ontological frameworks – 
interests, institutions, and ideas – operating at three distinct levels of analysis – 
individual, domestic, and systemic-international. This chapter introduces the different 
analytical categories and the main findings of the most relevant empirical studies in 
each cluster in terms of the determinants of capital account policy.17 As a result of the 
review of the mostly quantitatively-oriented literature18, nine possible explanatory 
clusters for what determines capital account policy are derived. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the different causal mechanisms which can then be applied to the 
empirical material presented in the case studies. 
Existing studies on the causes of capital account policy fall in one of three 
distinct analytical categories, each of them predicated upon specific ontological and 
corresponding epistemological premises.19 Each of the three ontological positions can 
be linked to three broad levels of analysis, i.e., each can detect the main driver of capital 
account policy on the individual, the domestic, or the systemic-international stage. Both 
typologies are widely used in comparative politics and international relations theory 
                                               
17 Note that I do not pretend to include all existing empirical studies on capital account policy into my 
analytical structure. What follows is a deliberately selective review of the literature in order to produce an 
indicative list highlighting the main drivers behind capital account policy. 
18 My decision to focus on the findings of large-N, quantitative studies is owed to their explicit intention 
to generalize, which in turn makes it straightforward to subject them to a qualitative assessment. 
19 In an overview article, Cohen (2002: 437-38) only uses the level-of-analysis distinction in order to 
identify different schools of thought in terms of the causes of financial liberalization. Conversely, Deeg 
and O’Sullivan 2009 only use the interests-institutions-ideas typology for a review of the recent literature 
on the causal forces shaping the political economy of global finance. 
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(Waltz 1959; Blyth 2009), but are usually not combined in the same matrix. Interest-
based explanations focus on rational choice assumptions about the determinants of 
economic policies. Institutionalist explanations emphasize the role of specific 
restrictions on autonomous agent behavior. Ideational explanations refer to the 
normative or sociological basis of economic policy decisions. 
It should be said at the outset that the three analytical frameworks and levels of 
analysis are not mutually exclusive. Although they are based on different ontological 
and concomitant epistemological positions, more often than not their insights are 
complementary, not incompatible or contradictory. In other words, the shortcomings of 
one framework usually constitute the relative strength of another. 
 
3.1. Interest-based Explanations 
 
The first ontological framework refers to explanations of capital account policy 
based on interests. For many scholars, the interests of individuals and groups are the 
basic category for social science research. According to them, interests constitute the 
starting point for empirical analyses of political and social outcomes. Interests form the 
central element of the rational choice or expected utility framework. They enter the 
explanation of political phenomena as variables which determine the ranking of 
preferences over outcomes within strategic interactions. The actual formation of 
interests and preferences remains exogenous to the subsequent analysis. Their content is 
taken as given, in a somehow primordial fashion, and held constant during at least one 
round of interaction. Agents are usually attributed with so-called “thick rationality”, i.e., 
assumptions about the specific content of their goals such as wealth-maximization or 
power-aggregation.20 
Virtually all interest-based explanations of capital account policy follow the 
logic of “thick rationality”. They ascribe materially-defined goals to social agents – 
individuals and groups – which, in turn, motivate their behavior. Put simply, individuals 
and the interest groups that represent them always prefer economic policies that raise 
their incomes to policies that reduce their incomes. 
                                               
20 Conversely, thin rationalists abstain from such judgments and take an agnostic point of view 
concerning the content of actor preferences. In their interpretation, agents are motivated by a variety of 
factors which can, at least theoretically, include altruistic goals such as justice or equality (Ferejohn 
1991). What unites thin and thick rationalists, however, is the assumption that actors pursue their given 
goals in an instrumental, means-ends fashion with contextual factors influencing the costs and benefits 
associated with different behavioral options. 
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For the sake of parsimony – a criterion to which all rational choice theories 
aspire – interests are assumed to be objectively given and relatively stable over time. In 
addition, actors encounter no substantive or procedural difficulties in knowing where 
their (materially-defined) interests lie and in drawing the ‘right’ conclusions for acting 
upon them in strategic interactions. The necessary abstraction from reality for the 
purpose of parsimonious theory-building is openly acknowledged: “This (the given-ness 
of preferences) is not meant as a description of reality but as an analytically useful 
bounding of the problem to be examined” (Frieden 1999: 44). In other words, the 
aspiration to “ruthlessly prune extraneous complexity” (Geddes 2003: 192) for the sake 
of “abstraction, simplification, analytical rigor, and an insistence on clean lines of 
analysis from basic axioms to analytical propositions to empirical implications” 
(Shepsle 2006: 32) is a characteristic trademark of interest-based explanations of 
economic policy. 
 
3.1.1. Interests at the individual level 
 
Many empirical studies of capital account policy are based on ontological and 
epistemological premises predicated upon material self-interest. However, they differ in 
their chosen level of analysis, i.e., which are the main actors or processes determining 
capital account policy. Let me begin with the first category – the individual level. Here 
the focus is on domestic policymakers. Their principal interest is defined in terms of the 
desire to stay in power and/or to capture economic rents. In addition, governments are 
supposed to act in relative independence from special interest group pressure. In other 
words, capital account policy choices reflect the government’s autonomy vis-à-vis the 
domestic and international society. The question then is why and under what conditions 
a government pursues an open or a closed capital account. 
Early empirical studies focused on the causes for the governments’ preference 
for financial repression or capital controls based on rent-seeking motivations. Alesina, 
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) argue that governments impose capital controls in order 
to limit the ability of individuals to avoid the inflation tax and to facilitate the 
imposition of administrative measures designed to keep domestic interest rates 
artificially low. Government interest in seigniorage revenue from high inflation 
becomes the central motive behind the imposition of capital controls. Leblang (1997: 
440) comes to a similar conclusion: “When governments repress the financial sector in 
an attempt to recycle debt, generate revenue, or distribute tax burdens, they are also 
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likely to implement capital controls”. In other words, capital controls provide a lifeline 
for economically struggling governments in order to stay afloat and an important source 
for patronage and state autonomy. 
A more recent contribution that falls into the government-focused category is the 
“transitional cost” approach to capital account liberalization by Brooks (2004). She asks 
why developing countries have systematically stayed behind developed countries in 
opening up their capital accounts. Her answer points to greater transitional costs of 
international financial liberalization in those countries: 
 
leaders in developing nations under certain circumstances confront potentially 
greater short-term risks of economic disruption and systemic financial crisis: if 
they liberalize capital flows in the context of weak or repressed domestic 
financial sectors or if their governments possess inadequate resources with 
which to defend their currency, rescue banks, or alleviate the social costs of 
liberalization (Brooks 2004: 391). 
  
In other words, governments everywhere weigh the macroeconomic costs of 
capital account liberalization against their benefits and subsequently choose the course 
of action that promises the country as a whole the highest return. A related expectation 
is that, 
 
political leaders (…) should advance capital account opening where 
macroeconomic fundamentals are positive rather than negative, in order to 
reduce the risk of economic calamity in the event of sudden reversals of capital 
flows, and thus to avoid as well the potential political backlash associated with 
such a crisis (Brooks and Kurtz 2007: 709).21 
 
The principal problem with this sort of explanation is a striking empirical 
anomaly: countries that according to the transitional cost approach were best prepared to 
undertake financial liberalization moved rather cautiously in this direction, while 
countries that were institutionally and politically least prepared to shoulder the 
transitional costs, did move rapidly towards full capital account openness. The contrast 
between Argentina and Chile during the 1990s illustrates this point. Chile went through 
a dramatic liberalization period during the late 1970s and experienced the consequences 
of the rapid opening of the capital account without having the necessary institutional 
regulations of the domestic financial sector in place. Only after the establishment of 
these prudential regulations did Chile undertake capital account liberalization again 
                                               
21 Mukherjee and Singer 2010 confirm Brooks’ argument that capital account liberalization is conditional 
on the capacity of governments to off-set the negative distributional consequences of financial openness. 
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after 1990. In contrast, Argentina’s policymakers embarked on a full-scale liberalization 
program in 1990 without much regard for prudential requirements. In their hurry to 
leave high inflation and capital scarcity as a result of the 1980s debt crisis behind them, 
Argentine policymakers were hardly concerned with the “transitional costs” of capital 
account openness. In their mind, if such costs existed at all, they would be far inferior to 
the costs of not pursuing the radical opening of the capital account in times of economic 
dire straits. Brooks’ approach presupposes a careful balancing of the benefits and costs 
of open capital accounts before governments take decisions regarding capital account 
liberalization. However, this is not a realistic assumption in most cases of capital 
account liberalization in Latin America during the 1990s. The rational calculation of the 
costs and benefits of capital account openness does not seem to be the only or perhaps 
not even the most important consideration for policymakers when contemplating 
fundamental policy changes. 
 
3.1.2. Interests at the domestic level 
 
According to interest-based explanations, policymakers have conflicting 
preferences vis-à-vis capital account policy. What has then turned the balance towards 
liberalization over the last thirty years, including in developing countries? Empirical 
studies addressing this question have turned to the wider domestic context. They posit 
that policymakers agree to capital account liberalization if they lack the capacity to 
resist societal pressure for financial opening. For example, Li and Smith argue that 
partisan governments lean towards financial liberalization if their core societal 
constituency increasingly supports it – skilled labor for left-wing governments, 
multinational corporations and commercial banks for right-wing governments. Skilled 
labor, multinational companies, and commercial banks may also influence capital 
account policy, regardless of whether ‘its’ political party is in power, if the group has 
broad national significance and captures government policymaking (Li and Smith 
2002). 
By far the most sophisticated interest-based framework operating primarily at 
the domestic level of analysis is the so-called “Open-Economy Politics” (OEP)22 
perspective. It subscribes to a pluralist or conflictive notion of the political process. 
Government policy is seen as the outcome of domestic power struggles and strategic 
interactions between state actors and societal groups. In other words, governments are 
                                               
22 The term was coined by Bates 1997. 
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merely the vicarious agent of societal interests and do not possess significant policy 
autonomy. As a result, agency is predominately ascribed to societal groups and the 
outcome of their battles to influence government decisions in their favor: “Politics, in 
this view, is primarily competition among various sectors of the economy” (Frieden 
1991: 438). The crucial battle line runs between “integrationist” and “anti-
integrationist” forces in the domestic political economy (Frieden 1991: 442).23 
The chain of deductive reasoning used in OEP is captured in a three-stage 
process: 
 
OEP begins with firms, sectors, or factors of production as the units of analysis, 
derives their interests over economic policy from each unit’s position within the 
international economy, conceives of institutions as mechanisms that aggregate 
interests (with more or less bias) and condition the bargaining of competing 
societal interests, and finally, introduces when necessary bargaining at the 
international level between states with different societally-produced interests 
(Lake 2004: 11-12). 
 
As the first step, then, the political analyst identifies the relevant actors in the 
domestic economy according to sectoral cleavages, e.g., owners of capital, owners and 
workers in specific sectors, producers of traded and nontraded goods, as well as 
international investors, e.g., multinational corporations and foreign commercial banks. 
It is a central feature of all economic policies that some socio-economic groups will 
materially benefit while other groups will be negatively affected by them. Preferences 
over the outcomes of political processes can be assigned to actors and groups according 
to their position in the economy and how they are affected by the expected 
distributional consequences of policy measures. Their interests simply reflect the 
answer to the question of which policy decision would enhance their utility, as 
measured in increases in wealth or income, based on their position in the domestic 
economy. 
According to interest-based explanations, interest groups face no substantial 
cognitive problems perceiving the implications of specific policies and hence 
ascertaining their concomitant costs and benefits in terms of the group’s material utility. 
As a result, the formation of group preferences vis-à-vis specific policies is a 
straightforward process of calculating the distributive consequences of specific 
economic policies. The subsequent behavior of interest groups promoting or rejecting 
these policies is simply the reflection of their material position in the market. No other 
                                               
23 See Schamis 1999 and Treisman 2004 for applications of this approach in order to explain economic 
reform policies in Latin America during the 1990s. 
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elements are needed in order to derive, i.e., to assume their policy preferences, and to 
predict their behavior. Cognitive uncertainty or confusion about one’s interests and 
policy preferences are not foreseen in this elegant framework built on parsimonious, yet 
mostly untested ‘as if’ assumptions about actor interests (Blyth 1997, 2003). 
Based on the differentiation of socio-economic interest groups in society, 
linkages are established between changes in the international economic arena, e.g., the 
rise in international capital mobility, and changes in domestic politics leading to a 
greater exposure of the national economy to global goods and capital markets (Frieden 
and Rogowski 1996). The operating logic follows the analytic tradition of the ‘second 
image reversed’ (Gourevitch 1978), i.e., events on the level of the international system 
have repercussions for the content and conduct of national policies. Greater capital 
mobility in the international financial system favors domestic economic groups with 
specific characteristics or assets (Frieden 1991). 
As the last step, interest groups must be able to form powerful coalitions in order 
to overcome entrenched institutional arrangements favoring status quo politics. Whether 
they succeed in influencing the policymaking process is measured by the extent to 
which policy outcomes reflect their deductively derived, i.e., independent of observable 
behavior, interests. Following this logic, economic policy reforms are the result of a 
coalition-building process among self-interested participants. The successful initiation 
and stability of economic reforms depend on the degree to which the policy receives 
political support from key economic groups. 
According to the OEP framework, financial internationalization has pronounced 
distributional consequences and is thus politically salient. On the one hand, groups that 
will be negatively affected by capital account liberalization include low-skilled, lower-
income workers since they are less able to take advantage of expanded investment 
options to hedge against new risks attendant on financial openness. In addition, capital 
outflows in response to economic shocks can put wages at risk (Rodrik 1997). On the 
other hand, capital owners will increase their gains if the government decides to lower 
formal restrictions on international capital flows for it provides them with more 
investment opportunities. 
However, given the opaque technical nature of capital account policy and 
substantial collective actions problems, it is unlikely that broad, class-based coalitions 
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form and clash over this issue.24 A cleavage between holders of specific assets in the 
economy whose income is directly and visibly affected by international capital flows is 
more likely (Frieden 1991; Haggard and Maxfield 1996). Owners of fixed assets 
generally, and competitive export sectors specifically, initially stand to benefit from 
increased capital mobility for it provides access to new, cheaper sources of credit from 
abroad to fund their economic activities. However, since capital account and trade 
liberalization usually occur in conjunction in developing countries, the exchange rate 
experiences a dramatic nominal appreciation induced by the rise of imports and foreign 
capital flows into the country. As a result, export-oriented sectors are negatively 
affected by increased capital mobility in the medium and long run in terms of their 
external competitiveness. 
On the other hand, large financial intermediaries such as banks (both inside and 
outside the country), owners of mobile assets, institutional investors, and domestically-
oriented corporate borrowers stand to benefit from capital account liberalization for it 
provides them with access to cheap(er) foreign capital without having to worry very 
much about exchange rate implications.25 Hence, the central cleavage in terms of the 
sustainability of capital account openness runs between these two coalitions of 
economic interest groups: export-oriented sectors versus the financial industry. 
According to the domestic interest-group perspective, the balance of power between 
these two sectors determines capital account policy over the medium and long run. As a 
result, according to the interest-based perspective, capital account policy is a direct 
function of the influence of each interest group coalition over government policy. 
To empirically demonstrate the influence of specific interest groups over 
economic policies, particularly on a cross-national level, has been a perennial problem 
for interest-based theories. The standard approach in large-N statistical analyses has 
been to use aggregate economic features such as national sector size as a proxy for the 
political importance or influence of business groups. This is a highly problematic 
indicator and more often than not distorts the facts on the ground. For example, the 
financial service sector represented around 10% of Colombian GDP in 2007, roughly 
identical to the size of the agricultural sector (Cárdenas 2009: 36), the most important 
traditional export sector of the country. However, the latter has apparently been more 
                                               
24 Political mobilization is unlikely to form around capital account policy since the costs of capital 
account liberalization for the mass public – in contrast to other, redistributive policy areas – are widely 
distributed, uncertain, and (when they appear) often very delayed. 
25 However, while domestic financial intermediaries support capital account openness for its reduced cost 
of capital, at the same time they oppose the entry of foreign competitors into the domestic financial 
market. In other words, domestic banks want the access to foreign capital but without the entry of foreign 
competitors (Pepinsky 2009a). 
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successful in terms of influencing government decisions on capital account 
management. In other words, using sector size as an indicator leads to indeterminate, 
inaccurate, or even wrong conclusions in terms of the leverage of interest groups over 
economic policymaking.26 
 
3.1.3 Interests at the systemic-international level 
 
The final level of analysis on the horizontal axis focuses on systemic factors. 
According to this perspective, the causes of capital account policy lie outside specific 
countries. Either actors at the international level determine domestic policy, or systemic 
dynamics propel domestic actors pursuing their material self-interest to adopt and 
sustain specific economic policies. 
In contrast to individual and domestic explanations of capital account policy, 
systemic approaches tend to be more sensitive to the specific situation of developing 
countries which traditionally have been exposed to asymmetric interactions with 
international public and private agents. They highlight the role of globally active 
economic actors such as large financial intermediaries or institutional investors, foreign 
governments, and international financial institutions. 
The literature on the global diffusion of political and economic liberalism 
distinguishes between several causal mechanisms, each based on a common 
epistemological – rational choice – position and located on the same – international – 
level of analysis: coercion, competition, and learning. The effect of each mechanism 
leads to largely identical economic policies on a global scale (Simmons et al. 2008). 
 
Coercion 
 
The first mechanism refers to coercive power or the forceful external imposition 
of policies exploiting power asymmetries between actors. In other words, national 
policies and institutions are imposed by international agents through threat or use of 
physical force. As a result, national policymakers respond to material pressure from the 
outside in their specific policy decisions. In the case of international financial 
liberalization, especially in developing countries, the main actors in this regard are the 
International Monetary Fund and powerful states in the international economic system, 
                                               
26 Another example is the power of the agricultural sector over policymaking in the European Union. 
Despite its small size and contribution to GDP, the agricultural sector exercises a disproportionally high 
leverage over policymaking in the EU. 
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in particular the United States. They have applied forceful measures in order to pressure 
national policymakers into liberalizing the capital account, mostly against the will of the 
latter. The aggressive push for financial opening in developing countries pursued by the 
US government and the IMF follows the logic of a like-minded vicarious agent for the 
specific interests of economic groups in industrial countries, in the particular the 
internationally-oriented financial sector (Bhagwati 1998; Wade 2001a; Stiglitz 2002, 
2004).  
The central instrument of coercive pressure is conditionality, i.e., reform 
conditions included as an integral part of IMF lending agreements with national 
governments. Economic conditionality gained prominence as part of the rapidly 
increasing number of structural adjustment programs during the Latin American debt 
crisis in the 1980s (Stallings 1992).27 Proponents of the coercion mechanism emphasize 
how developed countries and the international financial institutions under their control 
have compelled developing countries to pursue liberal policies in trade and finance. 
 However, there are several analytical and methodological problems with the 
operationalization and efficacy of coercive power as seen through the eyes of IMF 
conditionality vis-à-vis developing countries. First, a country’s decision to participate in 
an IMF program is based on ‘nonrandom selection’, i.e., the circumstances of countries 
that participate in IMF programs differ systematically from the circumstances of 
countries that do not. As a result, the challenge in ascertaining the influence of the IMF 
on a government’s policy choices is that an IMF program itself may be epiphenomenal: 
that is, the factors that lead a country to select into an IMF program may also determine 
its subsequent policy behavior.  
In fact, for a variety of political reasons countries may self-select themselves 
into IMF programs because they want conditions externally imposed on them, rather 
than the other way around (Vreeland 2003). For example, rather than being imposed as 
conditions by the IMF in loan negotiations, governments voluntarily commit themselves 
to economic reforms in the so-called ‘Letters of Intent’ (LOIs)28 in order to use the 
political cover of the IMF to enact domestically unpopular reforms or to overcome 
internal divisions within the state apparatus (Remmer 1986; Woods 2005). 
So it comes as no surprise that formal IMF conditionality – which is understood 
to mean prior actions, performance criteria, or structural benchmarks – rarely included 
                                               
27 For earlier, descriptive studies on the relationship between the international financial institutions and 
Latin American countries, see Payer 1969 and Kofas 2002. 
28 LOIs are statements of the national authorities’ policy intention and do not constitute conditionality that 
links compliance with disbursements of funds. 
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capital account liberalization (Quinn and Toyoda 2008: 178). On the other hand, aspects 
of it were often included in the authorities’ overall policy package presented to the IMF. 
A number of IMF-supported programs included references to aspects of capital account 
liberalization in the LOIs or accompanying policy memorandums (IEO 2005: 31). Put 
differently, capital account liberalization makes an appearance not as part of official 
IMF conditionality imposed on countries but as a voluntary commitment device sought 
by reform-oriented governments in order to overcome domestic resistance (Mukherjee 
and Singer 2010).29 
In addition, the political and economic priorities of large IMF member countries 
shape the details, including the conditionalities, of IMF programs to a much larger 
degree than any objective criteria rooted in the economic situation of the country at 
hand (Stone 2002, 2008; Dreher et al. 2009; Pop-Eleches 2009; Copelovitch 2010). As a 
result, the traditional operationalization of IMF ‘hard power’ in quantitative studies in 
terms of the size and/or the frequency of disbursed loans has come under attack. The 
loans and their concomitant conditionalities are found to be in need of explanation 
before using them as an indicator for the Fund’s power over developing countries. 
Second, a number of empirical studies about loan conditionality have lent little 
support to the widespread assumption that coercive power enables international 
financial institutions (IFIs) to force their preferred economic policies down the throats 
of recalcitrant developing country governments. Regarding the adoption of policy 
reforms, these studies have consistently failed to establish a statistically significant 
association between the conditions set by the IMF for financial support and the 
economic policies of developing countries (Remmer 1986; Killick 1995; Dollar and 
Svensson 2000; Bird 2003: 92-124; Vreeland 2006).  
Thus, it is not surprising that large-N studies do not find any positive 
relationship between capital account openness in developing countries and ‘hard’ IFI 
influence as measured by the size of obligations owed to the IMF and the World Bank 
or the weight of IMF or World Bank loan flows as a share of country GDP (Brune and 
Guisinger 2003; Brooks and Kurtz 2007). As it turns out, the use of IMF credits is 
actually associated with restrictions rather than the liberalization of the capital account 
(Simmons and Elkins 2004: 186).30 However, this finding most likely reflects the 
                                               
29 However, see Wade (2001b) and Woods (2006: 125-128) for examples of the imposition of capital 
account liberalization by the IMF against the wishes of the national government. 
30 Rodrik explains why that might be the case: “external resources reduce the costs both of reform and of 
doing nothing – that is, avoiding reform. In addition, the prospect of aid can actually exacerbate the delay 
in stabilization, by inducing groups to postpone making sacrifices until aid actually materializes. The 
effect on reform is consequently ambiguous” (Rodrik 1996: 30). 
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conditions that caused the country to seek IMF assistance in the first place rather than 
the influence of the IMF itself. 
Yet it would be a premature assessment to conclude that 
 
it is difficult to sustain the argument that the waves of liberalization and 
restriction in these policy areas (capital account, current account, exchange rate 
regime) have been systematically influenced by direct or organizationally 
mediated hegemonic pressure (Simmons and Elkins 2004: 186). 
 
For instance, the mere existence of an IMF financing arrangement with a 
specific developing country is positively related with the decision to open the capital 
account (Chwieroth 2005; Brune and Guisinger 2007; Brooks and Kurtz 2009; 
Chwieroth et al. 2009). This, in turn, indicates the importance of an institutionalized 
channel of communication and frequent interaction between national policymakers and 
representatives from the IMF as a condition for the adoption of externally desired 
policies (Broome 2010). I will return to this point when I discuss other, ‘softer’ ways of 
IMF influence on capital account policy. 
 
Competition 
 
The second diffusion mechanism refers to competitive pressure coming from the 
international level. National actors change policies and institutions due to economic 
peer pressure. In an effort not to lose out against key economic competitors and to 
preserve their countries as an attractive place for global investment, governments face 
strong incentives to choose ‘market friendly’ policies tailored to lure international 
investors (back). Once an economic competitor has adopted capital account 
liberalization, countries have strong incentives to respond in kind in order to prevent the 
diversion of capital flows to the competing nation. 
Mosley (2003) argues that developing countries are particularly affected by this 
mechanism. Whereas developed countries are able to preserve significant wiggle room 
in terms of economic policies vis-à-vis capital market constraints, in developing 
countries the influence of financial markets on government policy autonomy is both 
strong and broad. The risk of default makes international market participants willing to 
consider a range of government policies in their investment decisions. As a result, in 
order to remain attractive as an international investment location, developing countries 
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are forced to engage in ‘competitive deregulation’, including capital account 
liberalization. In turn, open capital accounts place substantial restrictions on the 
viability of heterodox economic policies or the ability to engage in expansionary fiscal 
policies. 
In a large-N study, Simmons and Elkins (2004) find strong evidence that 
economic policies adopted by competitors for the same pool of global capital, in 
particular foreign direct investment, are quickly replicated by other countries with 
similar levels of education and infrastructure. However, using a different indicator for 
capital account openness, Brune and Guisinger (2007) find no support for the 
competition-for-capital hypothesis as the causal mechanism behind capital account 
opening. Similarly, Quinn and Toyoda (2008) find no evidence of competitive effects in 
their large-N, longitudinal study of international financial liberalization. Finally, 
Chwieroth et al. (2009), using competition in trade as the causal link, find no effect for 
capital account policy decisions in Latin America. 
Yet the study periods, regional coverage and indicator of a country’s competitors 
as well as the capital account openness measure of these three studies differ sharply 
from Simmons and Elkins (2004). The divergent findings regarding the ‘competition 
effect’ highlight the fact that different measures or specifications of the independent 
(competition) and dependent variable (capital account openness) employed in large-N 
studies can lead to dramatically different conclusions about the importance of specific 
causal mechanisms driving capital account policy. 
 
Learning 
 
The third mechanism emphasizes rational or Bayesian learning. National 
policymakers observe and interpret successful policy and institutional innovations in 
other countries and subsequently adopt these models in their own countries. As a result, 
they make optimal use of available information, update their prior knowledge and 
beliefs and revise their behavior accordingly. According to this perspective, capital 
account openness becomes a uniform policy choice across countries since it is 
increasingly perceived as a superior economic policy due to the salience of its apparent 
success. Thus, having learned the ‘right’ lessons from its own or other countries’ 
experience with a specific policy, countries proceed to adopt and maintain it. 
However, rational learning explanations for capital account policy face serious 
empirical problems. Meseguer (2009) finds that rational learning – about the global, 
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regional and local consequences of capital freedom in terms of economic growth – had 
little influence on the decision to adopt capital account liberalization.31 As she put it, 
 
a high variability in observed performance under an open capital account was 
not a deterrent to adopting this policy. In fact, it is related to a greater likelihood 
of opening. […] This behavior (…) hints at nonrational behavior related to 
unfounded expectations about performance under capital account openness 
(Meseguer 2009: 164-5; emphasis added). 
 
Governments generally rushed to open the capital account without giving much 
thought to the previous experience of their own or other countries. To illustrate this 
point, consider the Latin American context during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
dramatic upsurge of capital account openness during that time could hardly be called a 
superior or consensual policy according to the academic literature at that time. Financial 
liberalization on a larger scale was tried before in some South American countries in the 
late 1970s – in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay – with rather disastrous consequences 
(Díaz-Alejandro 1985). As a result, the high costs associated with capital account 
openness were well known in the region. Drawing the right lessons from this negative 
experience should have cautioned countries against the rapid adoption of capital 
account liberalization. With the possible exception of Chile, virtually no Latin 
American country in the early 1990s was prepared to assume the significant 
‘transitional costs’ involved in opening the capital account (Brooks 2004). Yet many 
went ahead regardless – a conundrum for rational learning models (Meseguer 2009: 
178). 
An additional limitation of rational learning models is that rather than on a 
global basis, learning is more likely to occur among groups of peers who share 
information and whose experiences are more relevant to each other. As a result, similar 
policies are usually adopted in a regional context or between neighboring countries, 
with which close channels of information and communication exist (Quinn 2003; Brune 
and Guisinger 2007; Weyland 2007; Brooks and Kurtz 2009). Instead of rational 
learning based on fully available information about their costs and benefits, the 
spontaneous emulation of economic policies prevalent in a specific geographic region 
and based on incomplete information might be the driving force for diffusion. I will 
                                               
31 However, rational learning seems to matter for sustaining an open capital account. Countries did pay 
heed to the experience of others in terms of the relative volatility of economic growth and especially 
regarding  the impact of financial crises when contemplating the continuation of capital account openness 
(Meseguer 2009: 166). 
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return to this analytically distinct causal mechanism when discussing the cognitive roots 
of capital account policy. 
In sum, interest-based explanations of capital account policy operate at all three 
levels of analysis. Their common feature is that agent behavior is based on the rational 
pursuit of material self-interest. Within such a framework, each level of analysis 
emphasizes different drivers or causal mechanisms at work. The individual level focuses 
strictly on government actions; the domestic level broadens the horizon to include 
(coalitions of) economic interest groups and their influence over government policies. 
Finally, the systemic level introduces agents and dynamics outside the national context 
which drive national economic policies in a specific direction. 
On the individual level, policymakers are the primary focus group. They make 
decisions on capital account policy based on their orientation toward national welfare, 
capturing economic rents, or political expediency. Yet policymakers do not make 
decisions based solely on their own volition. Instead, their decisions on economic 
policies generally, and capital account policy specifically, are shaped by other domestic 
and international actors. A domestic-level focus puts economic interest groups front and 
center in the analysis. Coalitions of domestic interest groups are expected to determine 
which capital account policy the government pursues. A focus on the systemic-
international level locates the cause of domestic economic policy in forces or actors 
outside the country determining domestic policy choices. According to the three causal 
mechanisms – coercion, competition, and learning – the principal international actors 
are the IMF, economic competitor countries, or neighboring countries, respectively. 
 
Table 3.1  Interest-based explanations of capital account policy 
Individual Domestic Systemic-International 
• Orientation of 
government (welfare 
vs. rent-seeking) 
• Balance of power 
between trade and 
financial sectors 
• Coercion (though IMF) 
• Economic competition 
• Rational learning 
 
 
3.2. Institutionalist Explanations 
 
Institutions are common referred to as the humanly devised rules of the games 
that govern social interactions (North 1990: 3). They are more formally defined as 
 
a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of 
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turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences 
and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances (March and 
Olsen 2006: 3). 
 
Their function is to prescribe appropriate behavior for specific actors in specific 
situations based on the assumption that institutions create elements of order and 
predictability. As such they have a partly autonomous role from agency in political life.  
Institutions come in different forms and sizes. They can range from 
bureaucracies and markets to kinship systems and religions. Besides formal institutions, 
informal systems of rules and procedures guide individual or group behavior and 
thereby shape social and political outcomes. However, what unites all forms of 
institutions is their capacity to fashion, enable, and constrain individual or group 
autonomous actions. In other words, they stand between human agency and social or 
political outcomes. As a result, institutions are rather static entities; they guarantee the 
stability and persistence of established patterns of interaction and impose a high, inertial 
cost for changing them. 
At a general level, institutions are conceived of as multifaceted, exogenous and 
endogenous constraints on agents’ range of autonomous actions. These barriers for 
individual or group actions can take several forms according to each level of analysis. 
On the individual level, cognitive constraints restrict the application of full rationality 
assumptions in terms of actor behavior. Cognitive filters channel the behavior of 
policymakers in directions which are not congruent with rational expectations. On the 
domestic level, institutions establish the formal rules governing the political process. 
These institutions constitute the filter between actors’ interests and political outcomes. 
On the systemic level, institutions refer to structural constraints imposed by the specific 
position or integration of a country in the international economy. 
 
3.2.1. Institutions at the individual level 
 
Individual actors face important cognitive barriers that constrain the application 
of perfect rationality assumptions to economic policymaking (Odell 2002; Walter 
2005). Bounded rationality explanations of political decision-making inquire into the 
role of cognitive shortcuts and heuristics applied by individual decision-makers as well 
as the broader public. For them, the explanatory variable is the perception of risk by the 
chief government executive and public opinion. According to the most important insight 
of behavioral economics – prospect theory – actors faced with significant losses show a 
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tendency for risk-taking, whereas they behave cautiously when faced with potential 
gains from their actions. In other words, long periods of economic deterioration shift 
people’s propensity for assuming risk toward a demand for and acceptance of radical 
economic policies. Given a supply of such policy blueprints, rapid institutional change 
is expected (Weyland 2008). 
Applying the insights of prospect theory, Weyland (2002a) relates the severity of 
the economic crisis in many Latin American countries in the 1990s together with the 
accession of new leaders to power to the adoption of drastic neoliberal reforms, 
including capital account liberalization. The crises put national leaders and the public at 
large in the domain of material losses and so exponentially increased their risk 
acceptance with regard to unorthodox policy measures. Hence, in this perspective 
economic reforms were not introduced due to rational cost-benefit calculations by 
governments or due to the pressure of economic interest groups but rather as a result of 
cognitive heuristics of policymakers. In other words, the adoption of neoliberal reforms 
was not the outcome of a thorough assessment of their fit with specific requirements 
and needs of a country but instead ‘taken off the shelf’ from prevailing policy 
prescriptions. Seen from this vantage point, prospect theory can provide a 
microfoundation for the interpretation of an economic crisis as a necessary variable for 
economic reforms through “people’s situationally defined propensity toward risk” 
(Weyland 2002a: 45). 
Prospect theory also sheds light on the sustainability of economic reforms. 
Market-based reforms are ‘threatened by their own success’. While macroeconomic 
stabilization put state leaders in the domain of material gains, they became more 
cautious and risk-averse in its aftermath, “and therefore shied away from completing the 
program of drastic reforms recommended by their neoliberal advisers and the 
international financial institutions” (Weyland 2002a: 6). In other words, capital account 
opening gets stuck at a certain point when leaders and the broader public feel that they 
have left the domain of losses and are no longer willing to accept undue risks or the 
high costs associated with radical economic policies. 
Cognitive-psychological explanations of economic policy choices have their 
inherent limitations, too. First, they encounter an empirical problem to account for cases 
where economic reforms took place without the prior occurrence of a profound 
economic crisis. Second, they have difficulties to explain where the cognitive shortcuts 
suggesting the details of a neoliberal reform package come from in the first place or 
who inserted these blueprints and how into the domestic political context. Weyland’s 
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sophisticated approach remains wedded to an individualistic-materialist account of 
political decision-making, emphasizing only cognitive constraints on policymakers. 
However, he fails to consider other types of institutional restrictions beyond the 
individual level for actor behavior. 
 
3.2.2. Institutions at the domestic level 
 
As mentioned before, there is a strong overlap between explanations which 
emphasize domestic interests and those which emphasize formal domestic institutions, 
at least in the “Open Economy Politics” framework. In essence, rational choice 
institutionalism is the extension of the interest-based approach. OEP maintains that 
political outcomes and processes cannot be explained solely on the basis of the actions 
of diverse, self-interested individuals and their influence on government decisions. 
Instead, institutional differences between countries and sectors determine distinctive 
patterns of economic policy, even when they are faced with similar challenges from 
international processes and domestic interest group pressure (Garrett and Lange 1996). 
As a result, OEP interprets formal or what Shepsle calls “structured” institutions 
(Shepsle 2006) as the intermediary variable between the influence of interest-group 
coalitions and policy outcomes. Faced with societal pressure to implement specific 
economic policies, the outcome of the strategic interaction between governments and 
domestic interest groups is determined by certain executive characteristics such as 
political orientation (left-right) and the concomitant dependence on certain 
constituencies as well as specific features of the political system affecting the state’s 
capacity to act autonomously vis-à-vis the domestic society (Katzenstein 1977). The 
crucial insight is that political outcomes can be varied by altering the procedures of 
interest aggregation through institutions. Policy choices are thus a function of pre-
existing institutional arrangements. 
OEP scholars have primarily focused on formal public or political institutions 
such as regime type, the constitutional powers of the president, electoral rules, as well 
as the composition, fractionalization and strength of the political party system (Haggard 
and Webb 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Haggard and McCubbins 2001). These 
institutions are “equilibrium ways of doing things” in the political game (Shepsle 206: 
26). They are supposed to filter or reconcile competing societal interests and transform 
them into collective choices. 
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Several quantitative studies have emphasized the role of domestic political and 
economic institutions as determinants of capital account policy, albeit many empirical 
findings have been derived from analyzing a subset of developed countries only. Five 
formal institutions are regarded as particularly relevant for changes towards liberalizing 
the capital account: (i) the fragmentation of the party system; (ii) central bank 
independence; (iii) a floating exchange-rate regime; (iv) right-wing governments in 
power; and (v) the absence of sophisticated inward-oriented development strategies. 
An empirical study based on several OECD countries found that states with a 
higher number of veto-player parties in government enact fewer capital controls policy 
changes (Kastner and Rector 2003). Similarly, Brooks and Kurtz (2007) find that Latin 
American governments are most likely to pursue financial openness in countries where 
political authority in the legislature is fragmented. The reason is that ex post political 
responsibility for capital account reform enactment can be widely spread should an 
economic downturn emerge. 
With the worldwide movement towards granting the central bank political 
autonomy from the executive, capital controls have been concomitantly reduced (Grilli 
and Milesi-Ferretti 1995; Quinn and Inclán 1997). The same trend occurred with the 
shift from fixed to (more) flexible exchange-rate regimes in Latin America (Frenkel and 
Rapetti 2010). According to the logic of the “Impossible Trinity”32, governments in the 
developing world generally, and in Latin America specifically, increasingly preferred 
capital mobility and autonomous monetary policy over fixing their exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor (Eichengreen 2008: 178-183). 
Quinn and Inclán (1997) show that societal demands, expressed through 
government partisanship, interact with resource endowments to shape capital account 
policy. Left-wing governments, representing labor, tended to maintain capital controls 
unless they were in countries with an advantage in skilled labor. Conversely, right-wing 
governments are more likely to enact capital account liberalization (Quinn and Inclán 
1997; Leblang 1999; Li and Smith 2002; Brooks 2004; Kastner and Rector 2005) and, 
more importantly for my research question, function as the principal institutional 
guarantor for its sustainability (Brune and Guisinger 2007). 
Finally, the legacies of post-World War II inward-oriented development 
strategies such as Import-Substitution Industrialization among Latin American countries 
                                               
32 The term “Impossible Trinity” was coined by Cohen (1996). It refers to the policy implications of the 
Mundell-Fleming model of a small open economy. According to the model, governments can only 
simultaneously pursue two out of the following three macroeconomic policies: (i) a fixed exchange rate 
regime; (ii) an independent monetary policy; and (iii) free capital mobility. 
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condition the adoption and sustainability of neoliberal economic policies. Countries 
such as Brazil that have pursued “advanced ISI” are less likely to institutionalize an 
open capital account since it would undermine the ‘developmentalist’ bias of their 
overall macroeconomic strategy (Kurtz and Brooks 2008; Brooks and Kurtz 2009). 
Yet the cases of Peru and Colombia show a somewhat different pattern. They 
both have had fragmented legislatures, right-wing governments and central bank 
independence after 1990, yet show important differences in their capital account 
policies. This policy contrast despite formal institutional similarity emphasizes the need 
to delve deeper into the domestic context of the countries, in particular regarding the 
importance of ‘unstructured’ or informal institutions for policy outcomes, which the 
OEP approach tends to ignore. 
The rational-choice perspective only focuses on formal rules that shape actor 
behavior (Weyland 2002b). However, in order to fully comprehend the actions of 
political and economic actors, one must be cognizant of the existence and evolution of 
unwritten, collective understandings, assumptions, rules, and norms in the domestic 
context (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Unfortunately, the existing literature on capital 
account policy pays insufficient attention to domestically shared beliefs about legitimate 
economic policies. However, “social facts” not only exist at the global level where ideas 
and norms shape actor interests and behavior but also on the domestic level. Like global 
norms and ideas, intersubjective beliefs and rules among the national policymaking and 
business elites exist independent of individual beliefs and have the potential to influence 
the subsequent behavior of an individual through “a power of coercion, by reason of 
which they control [sic] him” (Durkheim, quoted in Chwieroth and Sinclair 2008: 10). 
In my dissertation, I seek to fill the analytical lacuna in the literature on capital account 
policy regarding the role of informal institutions at the domestic level. 
 
3.2.3. Institutions at the systemic-international level 
 
Various institutional constraints are imposed from the systemic-international 
level for the policy autonomy of national actors. In what specific forms do systemic-
international rules of the game shape capital account policy in developing countries? 
And how can structural-level explanations account for the variation of capital account 
policy? I describe two different answers to these questions, drawn from rational-choice 
and sociological institutionalism, respectively. 
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Material constraints for national policy 
 
In the context of increasing economic globalization, rationalist scholars 
emphasize material constraints on governments such as advances in communications 
and information technologies, increasing economic interdependence, and the rise of 
international capital mobility. They interpret these structural changes during the late 
twentieth century as unmovable, exogenous factors on the systemic level that affect all 
national governments in broadly similar ways. They refer to the increased mobility of 
capital brought on by the deregulation of national financial markets in the wake of the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970s (Helleiner 1994). The ease 
with which capital can be moved across national borders, these scholars suggest, has 
made it more difficult for governments to maintain traditional economic policies and 
institutions (Strange 1996). As a result, governments are left with little room for 
maneuver but to embark on financial liberalization (Andrews 1994). In addition, 
systemic forces privilege the interests and actions of certain domestic actors (Goodman 
and Pauly 1993). Given structural pressures from the international level, changing 
course drastically and abolishing capital controls is portrayed as an inevitable policy 
choice for national governments. 
In the case of Latin American countries, these external constraints are related to 
the traditional dependence on foreign capital, related to historically low national savings 
rates and heightened by the aftermath of the 1980s debt crisis and the resulting balance-
of-payments problems in many countries. Mahon (1996) interprets recurrent capital 
outflows in Latin America in the context of foreign debt crises as the impersonal, 
structural force for ensuing neoliberal reforms, including capital account liberalization. 
The exposure and vulnerability to often rapid changes in world capital markets has 
substantially reduced the room for policy maneuver at the domestic level, transforming 
orthodox economic policies into the only game in town. 
However, policy convergence is not a foregone conclusion, even in dire 
circumstances. In fact, national variation in capital account openness persists. Empirical 
studies based on rational-choice institutionalism refer to the specific position of a 
country in the international economic hierarchy in order to account for policy variance. 
Even though economic globalization generally, and global capital mobility specifically 
are usually associated with uniform constraints on national economic policy, some 
countries are ostensibly better equipped to resist international financial market pressures 
than others. Whereas the structural forces driving increased capital mobility travel the 
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globe in uniform patterns, national responses vary according to the specific form and 
depth of integration of each country into the international economy. This, in turn, 
constitutes an institutional filter generating path-dependent trajectories of capital 
account policy. 
Haggard and Maxfield (1996) explain the differences in capital account policy 
across developing countries with reference to the ease of their access to international 
credit and foreign exchange markets. Countries with competitive export sectors, 
particularly in a commodity price boom, can resist international market pressure. Those 
countries do not need to cater to the interests of foreign investors and financial firms 
and can therefore allow themselves the ‘luxury’ of maintaining (some) capital controls.  
Similarly, Lukauskas and Minushkin (2000) explain the variation in capital 
account policy despite uniform structural forces with reference to national economic 
conditions and the need for external funds. Both factors determine a government’s 
bargaining power vis-à-vis international actors and domestic interest groups. 
Governments with low bargaining position due to poor economic conditions and/or a 
high need for external funds are forced to open their financial markets completely in 
order to attract or retain capital. Conversely, governments with high bargaining power 
vis-à-vis these groups are able to retain some forms of capital controls without losing 
access to foreign capital. 
In sum, rational-choice institutionalist accounts operating on the systemic-
international level delineate the macroeconomic scope conditions for autonomous 
government behavior. Countries with certain economic conditions, e.g., a large 
domestic market or limited needs for external funds, are better equipped to withstand 
the siren song of international financial liberalization. While structural forces at the 
international level, such as increased global capital mobility, push all countries towards 
liberalization, their particular rate and form of integration in the international economy 
determines the degree to which they need to pay heed to systemic forces. 
 
Social constraints for national policy 
 
Due to the widespread neglect of informal rules and norms in rationalist and 
historical versions of institutionalism, the study of social institutions has become the 
domain of sociological institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March and Olsen 
1989). Sociological institutionalism provides a different conception and interpretation 
of institutions. It applies the core insight of sociology – that individuals behave 
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according to scripts that are tied to social roles – to explain economic behavior (Dobbin 
2004; Granovetter 2005; Smelser and Swedberg 2005). International monetary relations 
are not only an arena for power, material self-interest, and formal institutions (Kirshner 
2000). Social processes operate also in the context of monetary policy or what is 
traditionally considered to be a rational-materialist world. As a result, sociological 
institutionalism assigns a central role to factors such as beliefs, norms, values, and 
culture. 
The so-called World Polity school33 is the leading protagonist of sociological 
institutionalism. It starts from the observation that similar institutional and political 
arrangements exist across countries in various policy areas. It locates the root cause for 
these similarities in the states’ inclusion into a single world system that creates strong 
incentives for the homogeneity of institutional forms and policies. Adopting the same 
institutional structures is interpreted as a (collectively) rational decision in order to 
secure the state’s existence in a capitalist world system. As a result, nation-states are 
understood as “constructions of a common wider culture, rather than as self-directed 
actors responding rationally to internal and external contingencies” (Meyer et al. 1997: 
152). Instead of being the reflection of (aggregated) individual utility calculations of 
states, institutional homogeneity is the result of a symbolic attempt to attain 
international legitimacy. Importing foreign institutions and policies into the domestic 
environment regardless of actual functional needs and requirements for these policies 
and institutions is meant to demonstrate efficiency and modernity to the world (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; Finnemore 1993).34 
In other words, according to the World Polity school, liberalizing the capital 
account is not the result of political agency, neither on the domestic nor the international 
level, but structurally driven by a universal normative pressure that no policymaker can 
escape. Along with other liberal political and economic reforms, capital account 
openness becomes a signifier of modernity and is meant to provide developing countries 
with the symbolic legitimacy to become part of the league of modern nations. 
However, sociological institutionalism suffers from several problems. First, 
based on methodological collectivism, it presents an “oversocialized” view of society 
and politics, which lacks sufficient room for political agency (Finnemore 1996a: 343). 
As a result, sociological institutionalism usually underestimates the significance of the 
                                               
33 Also called world culture or world society theory. 
34 In their overview of causal mechanisms for the diffusion of liberal economic policies operating at the 
international level, Simmons et al. (2008) calls this social emulation and relate it to constructivism. 
However, they mainly emphasize cognitive, not normative factors driving the global emulation of liberal 
policies and institutions. 
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domestic realm as a key battleground for political and social change. Political agents are 
treated as ‘institutional dummies’ unable to escape the constraints of formal and 
informal rules in world society. The structural perspective of sociological 
institutionalists prevents them from exploring the independent role of individual and 
collective actors. 
 
Rapid global changes across dissimilar units suggest structure-level rather than 
agent-level causes. They do not, however, prove them. One also needs to specify 
the mechanism of change and show the common source of the new preference 
and behavior. (Finnemore 1996b: 22)  
 
 
Second, the major methodological tool of sociological institutionalism has been 
macro-quantitative analyses which grossly simplify or misspecify the multiple micro-
mechanisms of international socialization as well as their failure (Finnemore 1996a: 
339-340; Schimmelfennig 2003: 410-411). The result of these shortcomings of 
sociological institutionalism is its inability to explain significant cross-country 
variations of policies and institutions. 
In spite of its shortcomings, sociological institutionalism makes clear that 
policymakers and domestic societies do not function in isolation from the world around 
them. Institutional constraints exist not only on the individual-cognitive or domestic-
formal but also on the international-normative stage. Domestic economic policies are 
also shaped by informal institutional processes on the systemic level. The challenge, 
however, is to empirically demonstrate how social, non-material forces such as norms 
and ideas get translated into domestic policies and institutions. 
In sum, institutions function as constraints on autonomous actor behavior. At the 
individual level, cognitive restrictions filter the economic policy decisions of political 
leaders. They only undertake significant changes to existing capital account policy if 
they perceive to be in the domain of losses, which stimulates risk-taking behavior. Once 
this perception subsides, ‘business as usual’ takes over again and dramatic policy 
changes are abandoned. On the domestic level, institutional restrictions are imposed by 
formal political institutions that condition the political game and thus shape the content 
of economic policies. Partisan politics and the degree of fragmentation of legislatures 
exert an inertial effect on capital account policy. Finally, on the systemic-international 
level, institutional constraints come in two forms. First, a country’s specific integration 
in the international economy defines the range of economic policy options available to 
governments. Second, national policymakers are influenced by non-material, social 
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forces at the international level that provide them with templates or scripts for economic 
policies. 
 
Table 3.2  Institutionalist explanations of capital account policy 
Individual Domestic Systemic-International 
• Gain-loss perception 
of political leaders 
• Fragmentation of 
legislature (high-low) 
• Partisanship (left-right) 
• Dependence on foreign 
capital (low-high) 
• Emulation of templates 
 
 
3.3. Ideational Explanations 
 
Ideas-based explanations seek to demonstrate that policy and institutional 
change cannot be explained without explicit reference to some sort of change in the 
ideas undergirding existing policies and institutions. They take their cue from Keynes’ 
famous statement in the conclusion of the General Theory that 
 
the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their 
frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power 
of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with gradual encroachment of 
ideas (…) it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil 
(Keynes 1973: 383-4). 
 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993) define ideas in increasing order of malleability or 
regarding their propensity to change in three distinct, yet interconnected, categories35: 
 
1. World views include the major religions and political ideologies. In terms of 
economic policy, neoclassical economics or Marxism could be labeled a world 
view. 
2. Principled beliefs are “normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right 
from wrong and just from unjust” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 9). In terms of 
                                               
35 Schmidt (2008: 306) proposes a related, three-category typology of ideas. At the most specific level 
ideas are policies. Programs, paradigms or frames of reference that underpin policy ideas encompass the 
second, intermediate level. At the most general level ideas are philosophies that undergird policies and 
programs with organizing ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and society. All three categories of 
ideas can be further distinguished between cognitive (‘what is and what to do’) and normative ideas 
(‘what one ought to do’). For the latter point, see also Rueschemeyer 2006. 
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economic policy, the efficient distribution of resources in an unfettered market could 
be labeled a principled belief (within neoclassical economics).  
3. Causal beliefs are “beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority 
from the shared consensus of recognized elites” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 10). 
In terms of economic policy, the positive link between international capital mobility 
and economic growth could be labeled a causal belief (within neoclassical 
economics). 
 
In contrast to interest-based and institutionalist accounts, relatively few ideational 
explanations of specific economic policies exist. Scholars have grappled with the 
perennial methodological problems for the operationalization of ideas in any sort of 
causal research design (Yee 1996; Hall 1997: 185). What is more, there is still a 
widespread disregard for ideas as significant explanatory factors in mainstream political 
analysis. At best they are regarded as epiphenomenal, residual or functional variables, 
relegated to the supporting cast rather than the main protagonists in most analyses of 
economic policy reforms.36 
For the typology of ideas-based explanations of capital account policy, I limit my 
discussion to only two levels of analysis: individual and systemic-international. Ideas 
exist in the minds of individuals but can only become politically relevant when adopted 
by a larger group of politically influential people at the same time. Individual 
explanations focus on how specific groups of people who share a particular economic 
idea, e.g., Keynesian or neoclassical economics, rise to the top of the political hierarchy 
and are thus able to determine economic policies according to their preferred ideology. 
In other words, the emphasis is on the fate of the individual carriers of ideas – not the 
ideas themselves. The more powerful the promoters of specific economic ideas become 
in the political hierarchy, the more likely it is that these ideas are enacted in 
international or domestic arenas (Sikkink 1991; Goldstein 1993; Berman 1998; 
McNamara 1998; Parsons 2003; Schonhardt-Bailey 2006; Darden 2009; Wedel 2009). 
Ideational scholars critical of the purely individualistic, ‘Weberian’ perspective on 
ideas have demanded to take ideas, i.e., their actual content, seriously and not only 
consider their usefulness to connect diverse interest groups for the purpose of a common 
political goal. They argue for a truly independent category of analysis for ideas – fully 
                                               
36 If considered in rationalist empirical analyses at all, ideas are usually depicted as “the hooks on which 
politicians hang their objectives and by which they further their interests” (Shepsle, quoted in Schonhardt-
Bailey 2006: 25). In other words, what matters is their strategic use to advance given material interests, 
not their independent or causal effects on actor behavior (Krasner 1993; Jacobsen 1995, 2003). 
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transcending functionalism and methodological individualism – in the explanation of 
political, economic and institutional change (Blyth 2002; Campbell 2002; Hay 2006; 
Schmidt 2008, 2010; Béland and Cox forthcoming). As a consequence, systemic-
international explanations start their analysis at the socially-defined structural level, 
emphasizing the constitutive role of norms in the international state system. They then 
seek to trace the impact of international norms on specific domestic policies. This 
perspective is usually associated with social constructivism in international relations 
theory (Wendt 1999). Constructivists argue that ideas or norms, not immutable ‘material 
facts’, determine actor behavior. Political and economic interests are not automatically 
given by ‘objective’ circumstances but rather the result of a process of social 
construction, where ideas play a crucial role. 
The two forms of ideational explanation often overlap in empirical analysis. 
International norms and economic ideas enter the domestic realm through a variety of 
formal and informal channels. The main difference between the two perspectives is 
whether they focus on the “political power of economic ideas” (Hall 1989), or more 
precisely of their carriers, within the domestic context, or on the power of international 
norms to generate compliance on part of individual states. The first perspective is 
located within the disciplinary background of Comparative Politics or Comparative 
Political Economy, whereas the latter stems from International Relations. 
 
3.3.1. Ideas at the individual level: the epistemic community theory 
 
Several studies of changes in economic policies have alluded to the crucial role 
of individual reformers with specific principled and causal beliefs about economic 
policy.  The rise of foreign-trained economists (‘technocrats’) and economic teams, the 
so-called “technopols” (Dominguez 1997), to top-level positions within the state 
bureaucracy has been regarded as a necessary condition for the implementation of 
neoliberal economic reforms in many developing countries (Williamson and Haggard 
1994: 594). It is through their activities that a common “cosmological heritage” based 
on a liberal international economic order can be established in the domestic context (Lal 
2001: 241).37 
                                               
37 Thirty years ago, Evans coined the term “compradors” in order to describe the domestic allies of 
external actors, e.g., foreign banks, neoliberal US think-tanks, other states, or the international financial 
institutions (Evans 1979). During the debt crisis of the 1980s combined with a more prominent role of the 
international financial institutions in domestic affairs, their role became even more pronounced in Latin 
American politics (Haggard 1986). 
 81
The meteoric rise of a new generation of economists to powerful government 
positions has indeed been a common feature of many Latin American countries during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Markoff and Montecinos 1993; Montecinos 1997; Centeno and 
Silva 1998). Beginning in the late 1970s, ‘técnicos’ have increasingly replaced 
‘políticos’ in important political positions for the management of economic affairs 
(Grindle 1977; Grindle and Thomas 1991). Mostly trained abroad at US graduate 
programs in economics, they have formed a closely-knit community with shared world 
views as well as principled and causal beliefs about ‘good’ or ‘correct’ economic 
policies which they implemented as soon as they reached politically influential positions 
in government. In other words, foreign-trained economists turned politicians became the 
central transmitters of the neoliberal economic doctrine for domestic policymaking 
(Drake 2005). 
The literature on epistemic communities illuminates the supply-side of the 
economic ideas-policies link. Epistemic communities are domestic and transnational 
networks of knowledge-based experts with a similar set of principled (normative) and 
causal beliefs and access to the political decision-making process (Haas 1992). They 
have also been called the “cognitive baggage handlers of constructivist analyses of 
politics and ideas“ (Haas 2001: 11579). Peter Haas, the main protagonist of the concept 
in international relations theory, points out that epistemic communities can serve as 
better conduits for policymakers compared with traditional interest groups in politics 
since their knowledge is 
politically untainted, and thus more likely to ‘work’, in the political sense that it 
will be embraced and followed by political authorities concerned about the need 
for appearing impartial, and also technically (Haas 2001: 11580). 
 
A number of country and cross-country qualitative studies have tried to parse out 
the independent role of specific economic ideas, primarily neoclassical economics, for 
economic policy outcomes in Latin America by analyzing the fate of their 
representatives – professional economists – within the political machinery (Hira 1998; 
Babb 2001; Teichman 2001; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Biglaiser 2002a).38 
Based on their shared beliefs about economic policies, these individuals initially form 
an epistemic community amongst themselves or what Hira calls “living social 
communities of like-minded professionals” (Hira 1998: 13). Upon being parachuted into 
                                               
38 Chile, Argentina, and Mexico have received particular attention in this regard (Silva 1991, 2008; 
Valdés 1995; Silva 1998; Biglaiser 2002b; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Williams 2002; Estrada Álvarez 
2005a). 
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the political establishment, they go on to build “international policy networks” with 
powerful, like-minded outsiders such as members of the national business community 
and international actors such as the IMF and the World Bank (Teichman 2001, 2004; 
Woods 2006: 65-69). Usually brought into the state bureaucracy by political leaders 
looking for ‘fixers’ in dire economic circumstances, neoliberal technocrats quickly 
become important mobilizers of policy reform, acting in relative political insulation 
from parliamentary or societal oversight or influence. In other words, economic policy 
reforms, including capital account liberalization, are the result of ideas-driven 
individuals who shape political outcomes according to their intrinsic beliefs, not as 
vicarious agents of powerful economic interests. 
In addition, these studies emphasize the link between economic ideas, their 
inherent characteristics and their fit into the national or structural context. Put 
differently, the availability of a receptive institutional and intellectual environment in 
the target countries and the suitability of ideas for strategic use by domestic actors in 
their struggle for power and influence against opponents are seen as important 
conditions for their impact on domestic policy (Kingdon 1995; Hall 1989; Sikkink 
1991; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Gourevitch 2005: 25-30). 
Chwieroth (2007a) uses a large-N, quantitative approach to analyze the influence 
of neoliberal economists turned technopols on capital account policy in emerging 
market countries. He posits that individual preferences in terms of economic policy are 
determined by professional training in graduate schools. In other words, the preference 
of future policymakers for an open capital account is established during their graduate 
studies at “neoliberal” US universities.39 Upon re-insertion into the domestic context 
and forming a “coherent economic team of like-minded economists” able to shape 
government policy, this domestic-level community of neoliberal economists rapidly 
moved capital account policy towards openness.40 
                                               
39 The survey findings reported in Colander 2007 seem to corroborate the assumption that students in elite 
US graduate programs in economics become (a) politically more conservative, and (b) economically more 
inclined towards neoliberalism as a result of their training. However, Klein and Stern 2007 find that only 
a small percentage (8%) of members of the American Economic Association actually hold free-market 
policy views.    
40 Kogut and Macpherson 2008 make a similar argument for the decision to privatize. They posit that the 
number of American-trained economists generally and University of Chicago-trained specifically among 
the overall population of national economists raises the likelihood that privatization is adopted in a 
specific country. However, their study suffers from serious methodological shortcomings. First, they only 
include members of the American Economic Association in their survey sample. Second, no measure of 
policy access for American-trained economists is provided in their analysis. Their sheer number is 
regarded as proxy for political influence and considered sufficient to determine economic policy decisions 
at the national level. 
 83
In other words, not only the specific professional background of policymakers 
per se but also the place of their studies is assumed to make a difference for their 
behavior in economic policy. Imbued with the dominant paradigm of the location of 
their postgraduate training in economics, decision-makers will favor economic policies 
that correspond to the prescriptions internalized during their professional studies.41 
Biglaiser puts this relationship in general terms: 
 
(T)o predict which policies economic policymakers favor, we need to evaluate the 
training of policymakers. If most economic policy makers earned degrees at 
virtually the same schools and share similar beliefs with regard to economic policy, 
we can establish a close connection between the ideas of policy makers and the 
policies they initiate (Biglaiser 2002a: 181-2). 
 
However, the nascent quantitative literature on domestic-level neoliberal epistemic 
communities suffers from important analytical and methodological shortcomings: 
 
 Neoliberalism is a broad church and often fails to capture important nuances of 
economic policies (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). Policymakers do not have to 
subscribe to the entire array of neoliberal policy prescriptions despite having earned 
their postgraduate degrees at Chicago and other ‘neoliberal’ US universities. For 
instance, Chile’s capital account policy during the 1980s and 1990s reflects a clear 
deviation from the teachings of the ‘Chicago School’ despite the fact that the 
country has otherwise been the poster-child of neoliberalism in Latin America 
mainly due to the influence of the ‘Chicago boys’ during the Pinochet regime 
(Valdés 1995). In addition, which economic doctrine prevails over others might 
depend on the specific institutional location within the state, rather than the 
professional training of the people in charge of the institution. In other words, 
neoliberal thinking has not necessarily penetrated all state institutions after 1990. In 
fact, neoliberalism might co-exist with heterodox thinking within different state 
institutions in the same country in Latin America (FitzGerald 2005). As a result, the 
notion of a uniform, tightly-knit neoliberal hegemony, e.g., in Marxist or neo-
Gramscian analyses, is certainly overblown and too stark to capture the complex 
reality of policymaking in an era of economic globalization (Gill 1995; Estrada 
Álvarez 2005a). 
                                               
41 MacKenzie et al. 2007 analyze the “performativity of economics”, i.e., how the discipline of economics 
actually produces the phenomena it seeks to analyze. It does so by presenting a stylized view of the 
economy generally, and financial markets specifically that, once internalized by students of economics or 
market participants, become self-fulfilling. 
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 University graduates might adopt a specific economic world view well before or 
even after attending foreign universities. This is related to the problem of reverse 
causation or self-selection: “…although some adjusting to the school view does 
occur in graduate school, unless the changes occur in the first year, the predominant 
factor in determining the beliefs of a graduate school student is self-selection. 
Graduate schools modify those beliefs somewhat, but often reinforce previously 
existing views” (Klamer and Colander 1990: 25).42 The available quantitative 
studies ignore the possibility of self-selection into graduate programs at specific 
schools and might therefore exaggerate the educational socialization mechanism or 
‘Chicago effect’.43 
 More often than not there is a substantial time lag between the professional 
education and the accession to the higher levels of the domestic political 
bureaucracy. As a result, foreign-trained economists might adopt a more 
‘politicized’ view on the content and execution of economic policy, which does not 
necessarily reflect the orthodox perspective that they developed during their 
professional training. In other words, “an international consensus may prevail on 
‘best practice’ but local political realities may mean that this consensus cannot take 
root in policy development (…) In short, there may be transfer of policy knowledge 
but not a transfer of policy practice” (Stone 2004: 549). 
 
In sum, explanations of capital account policy located at the individual level 
emphasize the carriers of specific economic ideas in the domestic context. They detect 
the origins of economic ideas in the professional training received abroad and trace their 
subsequent ascent toward the upper echelons of the national political bureaucracy. In 
such a perspective, a coherent team of neoliberal economists given sufficient access to 
and autonomy in political decision-making is behind the recent move towards capital 
account liberalization in developing countries. However, the epistemic community 
theory overstates the causal effect of foreign training on economic policy decisions. It 
only considers changes in government personnel and from that deduces the likelihood 
                                               
42 In a re-run of the 1985 survey among economics PhD students at elite US universities, Colander (again) 
found that the large majority of students (78%) did not change their political views in graduate school.  
However, in terms of economic perspectives, more students (+7% overall) found themselves believing 
that neoclassical economics had become more relevant compared with their view before entering graduate 
school (Colander 2007: 32). 
43 See, for example, Biglaiser’s bold assertion that: “(h)aving spent 2 years in courses that stressed the 
benefits of free market economics, and having had many occasions to interact with professors in formal 
and informal settings on the importance of free trade policies and private ownership, most of these 
[Chilean] students became devout monetarists” (Biglaiser 2002b: 275). That implies that students’ 
attitudes before their professional training are unimportant or easily malleable. 
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of capital account liberalization. Epistemic communities-based arguments neglect the 
wider domestic context, in particular the social beliefs and practices governing 
economic policymaking and the specific nature of state-business relations, in which 
decisions on capital account policy are situated. 
The epistemic community theory is able to shine some new light on the overall trend 
towards capital account liberalization in developing countries, but fails to account for 
the variation of capital account policy. Whether capital account openness is a durable 
domestic policy goes beyond differences in the educational profile of policymakers or 
the direct political influence of foreign-trained neoliberal economists. 
 
3.3.2. Ideas at the systemic-international level: the power of international norms 
 
The literature about the effect of international norms on domestic policies is 
vast. Rather than studying the power of ideas as encapsulated in individuals on the 
domestic level, social constructivism in international relations theory represents a 
structural perspective similar to the ‘world polity school’ within sociological 
institutionalism. Ideas must become codified at the international level, serving as 
cognitive filters through which actors or states come to interpret their environment and 
derive standards of appropriate behavior. In other words, ideas must harden into norms 
on the systemic level in order to affect a wide range of states and their policies 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1999). 
Norms shape the range of possible, appropriate, acceptable, or legitimate 
actions, thus ‘constituting’ them in the first place. They provide the yardstick to which 
actors refer to when trying to legitimize or justify their behavior. For example, the 
legitimacy and usefulness of controls on international capital movements receive a 
different treatment within the framework of neoclassical economic theory as opposed to 
the concept of “embedded liberalism” rooted in Keynesian economics (Ruggie 1983). 
As more and more policymakers in industrial countries adopted the former framework 
as a reference point for national economic policy, their views on the legitimacy and 
usefulness of capital controls changed accordingly (Best 2004; Widmaier 2004; Abdelal 
2007). 
The main vehicles for the emergence, worldwide diffusion and subsequent 
institutionalization of norms about financial liberalization are international 
organizations. Individual norm entrepreneurs inside and outside international 
organizations (IOs) are crucial for the adoption of specific ideas as norms within IOs 
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(Park and Vetterlein forthcoming). Once the organization as such subscribes to the idea 
and transforms it into an emergent norm circumscribing ‘appropriate’ state behavior, the 
diffusion process follows suit. 
The capital mobility norm cascade started in Western Europe and the OECD 
(Helleiner 1994). Those organizations are tasked to monitor the compliance of members 
with the new norm, thereby helping to regulate and constrain their behavior. In the 
context of the IMF, while capital account openness was never codified as a norm, the 
organization nonetheless influenced the social context of the international financial 
system by fixing the meanings of ‘appropriate’ capital account policy, thus defining for 
its members the range of legitimate policies at specific points in time, globally 
disseminating the reigning financial orthodoxy with a view to institutionalizing it in 
member-states. 
Constructivist scholars substantially diverge from the ontological conception of 
IOs in interest-based approaches. IOs exert power not only or primarily through 
coercive means but also through their normative authority vis-à-vis national 
governments (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). States emerge as eager followers of 
international trends that are actively promoted by IOs without these ideas necessarily 
being forced upon them. As a result, the mechanism of persuasion better captures 
compliance with international norms rather than overt coercion. The IMF exercises this 
kind of ‘soft’, ‘discursive’, or ‘normative’ power through regular policy consultations 
with and the technical training of national economic elites. ‘Soft power’44 can 
supplement or even supplant the coercive instruments in the hands of the IMF (James 
1995: 775-6; Killick 1996: 226). 
The so-called policy dialogue with state authorities is regarded as the most 
important instrument of World Bank and IMF soft power vis-à-vis developing countries 
(Nelson 1996: 1553-1558; Killick 1998: 180-181).45 Policy dialogue or advice usually 
takes place in the context of IMF surveillance or so-called Article IV missions to 
member countries, normally on an annual basis. Unfortunately, there has been no 
systematic attempt to study the conditions under which the ‘soft power’ of the IMF can 
bring about policy change. While various scholars stress the importance of the IMF’s 
policy influence for the start of economic reforms in developing countries (Ikenberry 
1990: 103; Nelson 1990: 27; Kahler 1992: 123), they concede that this concept is 
                                               
44 The term ‘soft power’ was popularized by Nye. He succinctly defines it as the ability to “getting others 
to want the outcomes that you want, co-opting people rather than coercing them” (Nye 2004: 5). 
45 Other instruments may include stints of future national policymakers within the organization and the 
technical training of staff from finance ministries and central banks at the IMF training institute (Killick 
1998: 184). 
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slippery and hard to measure with the positivist methodological toolkit.46 As a result, it 
is usually excluded from consideration by empirical studies of IMF influence over 
domestic policy decisions. The only exception is Chwieroth (2006). However, his 
quantitative analysis of IMF ‘soft power’ using various channels of direct (“teaching”) 
and indirect influence (“cheerleading”) shows only limited evidence for the 
organization’s influence on capital account policy in developing countries.47 
In sum, ideational systemic-domestic explanations see international norms as the 
drivers of capital account policy. Norms first emerge within international organizations 
and are then diffused to its member states using ‘soft’ or discursive channels of 
influence. The principal agent is the IMF, yet with a radically different conception of its 
power vis-à-vis national policymakers. Rather than coercing states into compliance, the 
IMF engages in a discursive process aimed at persuading national policymakers to 
adopt globally legitimate or ‘appropriate’ standards for capital account management. 
 
Table 3.3  Ideational explanations of capital account policy 
Individual Systemic-International 
• Coherent epistemic community of 
economists with access to political 
power 
• Existence of international norms 
• IMF ‘soft power’ and its domestic 
institutional scope conditions 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The literature on the drivers of capital account policy presents a highly 
heterogeneous picture. Interest-based and formal institutionalist approaches largely 
dominate the explanatory scene. However, almost all the potential causal factors 
discussed earlier have received some empirical confirmation in the existing literature. 
No causal explanation has been completely rejected. As a result, we are confronted with 
                                               
46 For example, in a quantitative study on the causes of pension privatization, Madrid 2005 uses the 
number of World Bank missions a country has received in order to measure the ideational or discursive 
influence of the Bank on local pension policy (which turns out to be statistically significant) – a 
questionable approach since more ‘talking’ does not necessarily amount to increased influence over the 
counterpart. 
47 He does, however, find that the IMF’s indirect influence (“cheerleading”) as a channel of information 
and technical support for reform-oriented domestic policymakers has been a significant factor for capital 
account liberalization in Latin America. Similarly, in a case study on Mexico, Woods 2005 argues that the 
influence of the IMF and the World Bank is related to an ideational contest expressed in domestic 
bureaucratic battles. International organizations can empower certain bureaucratic groups, aligned with 
their own economic ideas, using ‘soft’ power instruments. Cheerleading is probably the apt term to 
describe this role. 
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the apparent overdetermination of the dependent variable. Almost all causal factors 
point in the same direction towards capital account liberalization. 
Table 3.4 provides a summary of the causal mechanisms according to each 
ontological framework and level of analysis. While they focus on different dynamics as 
drivers of capital account policy, there is some overlap in terms of the specific actors to 
be analyzed. 
While blending analytical approaches is certainly a desirable path in order to 
fully grasp the reality of economic policymaking, the challenge has been defined as 
showing the relative weight of different causal forces in influencing actor behavior 
(Deeg and O’Sullivan 2009). Unfortunately, the available methodological approaches 
and instruments to separate causal forces in terms of their impact on capital account 
policy are under-developed at best and unviable at worst. It is the interaction or 
complementarity between causal mechanisms, not their artificial separation by assigning 
indicators of relative weight that fundamentally drives capital account policy over the 
long run. 
In addition, the significant national variation in capital account policy – both 
between developed and developing countries and within the developing world – has 
been insufficiently addressed in the literature. Systemic-international explanations only 
consider structural forces pushing and pulling countries in the same policy direction. 
They are certainly important but insufficient accounts of domestic-level policy 
outcomes. 
In the context of the global financial crisis of 2008-9, a behaviorally informed 
Keynesianism – or what Cassidy calls “reality-based economics” as opposed to “utopian 
economics” (Cassidy 2009) – has made a strong comeback. Instead of rational, self-
interested, utility-maximizing actors, powerful social-psychological forces, including 
social identities and norms, drive the economy as a whole and financial markets in 
particular (Akerlof and Shiller 2009; Akerlof and Kranton 2010). As a result, scholars 
increasingly doubt the ontological and epistemological foundations of interest-based 
explanations – the ‘Holy Trinity’ of rationalism, materialism, and perfect information. 
The dominating epistemological – positivism – and methodological approaches 
– large-N, quantitative studies – to explain capital account policy have intrinsic 
problems to operationalize analytical concepts derived from non-rationalist approaches. 
As a result, there is a dearth of empirical studies based on cognitive and normative 
factors to explain capital account policy, often plagued by their own methodological 
problems. The well-known trade-off between theoretical parsimony and analytical rigor 
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on the one hand, and understanding the actions of ‘real people’ imbued with both 
material and social motifs on the other, rears its head in this regard. 
 
Table 3.4  Summary of analytical categories to explain capital account policy 
Level of Analysis/ 
Ontological 
Framework 
Interests Institutions Ideas 
Individual • Orientation of 
government 
(welfare vs. 
rent-seeking) 
• Gain-loss 
perception of 
political leaders 
• Coherent 
epistemic 
community of 
economists 
with access to 
political power 
Domestic • Balance of 
power between 
trade and 
financial sector 
• Fragmentation of 
legislature (high-
low)  
• Partisanship (left-
right) 
• Informal 
institutions 
based on 
widely shared 
rules and 
understandings 
Systemic-
International 
• Coercion 
(through IMF) 
• Economic 
competition 
• Rational 
learning 
• Dependence on 
foreign capital 
(low-high) 
• Emulation of 
templates 
 
• Existence of 
international 
norms   
• IMF ‘soft 
power’ and its 
domestic 
institutional 
scope 
conditions 
 
A particularly glaring lacuna in the existing literature concerns informal 
institutions at the domestic level – see the shaded cluster in Table 3.4. In contrast to 
formal institutions as well as global norms and ideas, the role of domestically shared 
rules and understandings has largely been neglected. Yet intersubjective beliefs and 
rules about ‘appropriate’ economic policies and policy instruments are a crucial factor 
determining the longevity of capital account openness. 
The analysis of informal institutions such as clientelism, corruption and 
neopatrimonialism has a long pedigree in comparative politics generally, and in Latin 
America specifically, emphasizing their negative or distortionary effects for the 
democratic political process (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). However, informal 
institutions can also have positive, stabilizing consequences for the domestic economy, 
increasing the margins of maneuver for policymakers, as I demonstrate in the case study 
on Colombia (see Chapter 6). 
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No explanation of domestic policy can satisfactorily work without taking the 
systemic-international level into account. I thus start the empirical analysis at this level. 
The next chapter tries to answer the question how a certain view on capital account 
policy appeared on the international agenda in the late 1980s, seeking to convert the 
idea of capital mobility into an international norm. The analysis is focused on the 
internal dynamics in the IMF – the key international norm entrepreneur for the cause of 
capital account freedom. 
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Chapter 4: The International Monetary Fund and Capital 
Account Liberalization. A Case of Failed orm 
Institutionalization
48
 
 
National capital account policy is situated in an international context. When 
making choices on capital account policy, governments pay homage to the prevailing 
international discourse on ‘adequate’ capital account management. The International 
Monetary Fund is the leading institution establishing the international discourse on 
capital account policy. It is incumbent upon national policymakers to take the IMF’s 
thinking into account when considering their choices on capital account management, 
even when their decisions diverge from the IMF’s teachings or recommendations. 
Scholars who ignore the international social environment for domestic choices on 
capital account policy do so at their peril. The discursive boundaries defined by the IMF 
are key to understanding the interaction between external and internal forces driving 
capital account policy. Tracing the evolution of the IMF’s thinking on capital account 
policy and understanding its main drivers thus becomes an essential first step to analyze 
the international context in which national policymakers operate. 
While virtually all elements of the original agenda of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ have become global norms over the course of the last twenty years, the case 
of free capital mobility stands out as an outlier. In his original formulation of the ‘To-
Do-List’ for economic reformers, Williamson deliberately did not include capital 
account liberalization; he felt that no consensus could be reached in the late 1980s 
regarding its inclusion in the neoliberal reform package for developing countries 
(Williamson 2003).49 Yet capital account liberalization did become associated with the 
‘Washington Consensus’ and reached the stage of norm emergence. A major driving 
force behind making capital mobility a global norm was the International Monetary 
Fund. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink’s “norm life cycle”, a critical mass of 
actors needs to agree on and support a norm in order to put the life cycle into motion. 
So-called norm entrepreneurs trying to convince other state and non-state actors to 
embrace a new norm play a crucial role at the initial stage of emergence. After the norm 
                                               
48 This chapter is based on co-authored work with Manuela Moschella. See Leiteritz and Moschella 2010. 
49 In his path-breaking article from 1990 Williamson wrote that “there is relatively little support for the 
notion that liberalization of international capital flows is a priority objective for a country that should be a 
capital importer and ought to be retaining its own savings for domestic investment” (Williamson 1990: 
14). 
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cascades through the international system with more and more states adopting it, the 
final stage is described as internalization, where norms “acquire a taken-for-granted 
quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate” (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1999: 255).  
Despite strong support among international financial institutions and major 
powers in the global economic system, the unrestricted movement of international 
capital failed to leave the stage of emergence and become an established norm in the 
international financial system. The vivid expression of the aborted institutionalization of 
capital account openness was the failure of the project to change the Fund’s Articles of 
Agreement to give the organization the formal mandate and legal jurisdiction over 
member-states’ capital account policies. 
In order to account for the failed institutionalization of capital account openness 
as a global norm, Manuela Moschella and I trace the evolution of the IMF’s thinking on 
capital account policy from the mid-1980s to the present day (Leiteritz and Moschella 
2010). While the principal support for capital account openness has been a constant 
feature of the Fund’s discourse, its theoretical justification and the Fund’s advocacy role 
vis-à-vis its member-states have shifted over time. The Fund’s initial defense of capital 
account liberalization was defined in terms of enabling economic growth and imposing 
market discipline, combined with an active advocacy of open capital accounts in 
developing countries. Only in the context of the Asian financial crisis during the late 
1990s, the Fund entertained the thought that capital account liberalization may also be 
associated with negative consequences for developing countries. More recently, it has 
turned to highlighting ‘indirect’ as opposed to direct benefits of capital mobility and 
specified a range of necessary conditions before developing countries should move to a 
completely open capital account. Yet the Fund still views capital account openness as a 
desirable economic policy for all countries in the long run. 
The Fund’s advocacy role for open capital accounts became less credible after 
revising its initial upbeat statements about the benefits of capital account openness. As a 
result, after 1998-99 the Fund has largely refrained from actively advocating capital 
account openness as a ‘fast track’ to economic welfare in developing countries. 
Analyzing the evolution in the Fund’s thinking, we draw attention to the 
reciprocal interaction of two sets of mechanisms – outside-in and inside-out – that 
trigger ideational and normative change. Specifically, we argue that both organizational 
culture based on the neoliberal economic paradigm inside the Fund and the level of 
acceptance of specific economic ideas and policies outside the Fund are crucial 
 93
mechanisms in order to understand the rise of the capital account openness norm and its 
failed institutionalization.50 
This chapter proceeds as follows: in section two, I describe and discuss 
alternative explanations for the emergence and transformation of the capital account 
liberalization discourse within the IMF before outlining a framework that combines 
both outside-in and inside-out mechanisms based on the concept of social legitimation. 
Section three tells the story of how the IMF came to view capital account liberalization 
as a desirable policy for developing countries in line with its bureaucratic culture based 
on neoclassical economics. In section four, I highlight the main changes in the Fund’s 
thinking that occurred after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, focusing both on 
internal and external drivers. Section five concludes with some reflections on the 
current place of capital account liberalization in the IMF’s discourse and its implications 
for developing countries. The ongoing quest for finding universally acceptable 
empirical foundations for the benefits of international capital mobility has substantially 
undermined the Fund’s role as a key promoter of capital account openness in the post-
Asian crisis world. 
 
4.1. Towards an Explanation of the Rise and Fall of the Capital Account Freedom 
orm
51 
 
The ‘Washington Consensus’ granted the liberalization of trade and capital 
flows pride of place in the list of required policies to achieve economic growth; the 
dominating discourse within the IMF led the organization to embrace a favorable view 
of capital account liberalization. Judged at the level of general policy documents and 
public statements of leading staff members during the beginning of the 1990s, the Fund 
endorsed the view that capital account liberalization is welfare-enhancing and that 
capital controls are both ineffective and harmful.52 By the end of the decade, the focus 
shifted from a sole emphasis on the benefits towards discussing them alongside the 
                                               
50 On the intrinsic “contestedness” of norms, see Wiener 2007, 2009. 
51 This section draws on Leiteritz 2005 and Moschella 2009, 2010. 
52 It is important to point out that our interpretation of the IMF’s thinking on capital account policy is 
based on organizational documents of a general, policy-oriented nature as well as interviews with IMF 
staff and outside observers.  As Chwieroth 2010 demonstrates, several theoretical subcultures have 
existed within the organization that provided nuances on specific aspects of capital account policy, most 
importantly how to proceed towards capital account liberalization, i.e., the pace and sequencing of 
reforms (gradualism vs. big-bang). In addition, IMF staff working in operational functions directly 
dealing with national authorities may have provided somewhat heterogeneous policy advice to their 
clients (IEO 2005). However, there can be little doubt that the organization as a whole came to favor 
capital account openness over its closedness during the past thirty years. 
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costs that financial liberalization entails for developing countries. The result has been a 
qualified defense of capital account liberalization predicated upon a number of domestic 
institutional requirements and a tolerance for temporary, market-based controls as a 
“legitimate part of the toolkit to manage capital inflows in certain circumstances” 
(Ostry et al. 2010: 15; emphasis added). 
What were the actors and their discursive strategies through which the idea of 
capital mobility emerged within the organization? Through which channels did it evolve 
on its way towards internal institutionalization? Two broad sets of explanations may be 
of help to answer these questions: the external sponsorship explanation on the one hand, 
and the bureaucratic culture explanation on the other. 
 
4.1.1. Outside-in: external imposition 
 
Rationalist-materialist theories of international political economy explain the 
behavior and change of international organizations in terms of (dominant) state action. 
Since states create international institutions in the first place, they are supposed to be 
able to change them later once political circumstances or their interests require that. For 
example, pluralist approaches apply insights from principal-agent theory to explain 
policy outcomes in international organizations on the basis of information asymmetries 
between shareholders and management (Nielson and Tierney 2003). Realist theory, on 
the other hand, emphasizes the structural role of the most powerful members of the 
international system, particularly the United States, in determining organizational 
outcomes (Krasner 1985; Gilpin 2001). Once powerful member states are committed to 
a certain course of action given their material self-interest, international organizations as 
their dependents are expected to follow suit. 
Some scholars have referred to the rise of the so-called Wall Street-Treasury 
Complex in the domestic political economy of the US in order to highlight the critical 
role that the interests and power of member-states play for policy and institutional 
change of the IMF (Wade and Veneroso 1998; Gowan 1999). The early 1990s not only 
saw the rising dominance of private capital market actors in the domestic financial 
system of the US but also a high-ranking representation of norm entrepreneurs devoted 
to the cause of free international capital movement in and out of the so-called emerging 
market countries. This meeting of minds and interests between the private and public 
sectors was symbolized by the leadership team at the US Treasury during the second 
half of the 1990s - Robert Rubin, a former managing director at the investment bank 
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Goldman Sachs, and Lawrence Summers, a former economics professor and later 
President of Harvard University. The result was a unique political constellation 
reflecting both material self-interest and ideological commitment to aggressively push 
for capital account liberalization in emerging market economies. According to 
prominent economist and outspoken free trade advocate Jagdish Bhagwati, the Wall 
Street-Treasury Complex describes an alliance hiding behind the assertion of social 
purpose and cemented through personnel exchanges between both worlds: 
 
a definite networking of like-minded luminaries […] unable to look much 
beyond the interest of Wall Street, which it equates with the good of the world 
(Bhagwati 1998: 11-12). 
 
Rubin and Summers shared a strong belief in the superiority of market-based or 
private sector solutions to macroeconomic issues and were openly hostile to regulatory 
or what they labeled dirigiste models of economic policymaking. As a result, a big bang 
approach to domestic financial liberalization figured prominently in their foreign 
economic policy agenda. In the political doctrine of the Treasury, 
 
[t]here was a hope that by forcing the pace of financial liberalization, 
(developing) countries might be compelled to more quickly upgrade their 
domestic regulations and institutions. Conversely, encouraging them to open 
only after the requisite domestic reforms were well advanced applied no pressure 
for reform; it was a road map to a destination that might never be reached 
(DeLong and Eichengreen 2002: 251). 
 
In sum, the United States became a ‘norm leader’ during the Clinton 
administration vigorously promoting free capital mobility in various international 
forums through a combination of coercive and rhetorical means aimed at the 
delegitimation of capital controls. The campaign unabashedly reflected material 
objectives and, at the ‘norm cascade’ stage, included a substantial arsenal of material 
levers to achieve normative change (Wade 2001a). 
At the same time, the IMF willingly and enthusiastically forced the agenda of 
free capital mobility down the throats of recalcitrant developing country governments 
following the bidding of the US government. As Woods argues, capital account 
liberalization became “an article of faith” within the Fund because the policy was “high 
on the agenda of the United States” (Woods 2006: 136). As a result, the Fund’s 
discourse and subsequent policy towards the capital account were determined from 
outside the organization. 
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If we accept this explanation, we should expect to know which ideas will prevail 
within the Fund and when they will be endorsed in its operational practice by simply 
mapping the interests of its most powerful member-states, that is, the group of 
industrialized countries, and the United States in particular. Yet contrary to the external 
imposition thesis, the IMF pursued capital account liberalization as a policy strategy for 
developing countries before this powerful alliance of private and public interests in the 
US made the organization a prime target for the implementation of its agenda. An IMF 
paper noted in 1995: 
 
[t]raditionally, the IMF’s technical assistance in the area of foreign exchange 
systems focused on efforts to facilitate current account convertibility in its 
member countries; however, from the mid-1980s the focus shifted toward 
encouraging the adoption of full current and capital account convertibility 
(Quirk et al. 1995: 6, emphasis added). 
 
Manuel Guitián, the director of the Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department 
at the IMF during the 1990s, publicly declared as early as 1992: 
 
[economic] logic advocates the dismantling of capital controls; developments in 
the world economy make them undesirable and ineffective; and a strong case 
can be made in support of rapid and decisive liberalization of capital 
transactions. All these considerations underwrite strongly a code of conduct that 
eschews resort to capital controls as an acceptable course of action for economic 
policy (Guitián 1995: 86, emphasis added). 
 
 
Pressure from industrial countries is not always critical for the Fund’s mission 
and operational practice. In moments of high uncertainty or cognitive dissonance, 
industrial countries do not always show a unified front and tend to rely on IMF staff 
expertise and advice (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 45-72). While it is unlikely that the 
Fund undertakes policy initiatives against the explicit will of powerful member-states, it 
is not simply the handmaiden of member-states’ interests or the willful puppet of 
influential countries. As several recent studies have shown (IEO 2005; Abdelal 2007: 
123-161; Chwieroth 2010: 155-159, 192-194), the IMF pursued capital account 
liberalization by proposing an amendment to its Articles of Agreement in the absence of 
open support or encouragement from the US government or the private financial 
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community.53 As a result, external pressure was not the determining force behind the 
Fund’s drive for international capital freedom. 
 
4.1.2. Inside-out: normative change from within 
 
The Fund possesses the authority – via intellectual leadership – to advocate 
economic norms and ideas without expressly being ordered to do so by its member-
states. What outside explanations tend to ignore is an appreciation of the social context 
in which international organizations operate and produce outcomes. This context is 
above and beyond simple strategic calculations about the material benefits and costs of 
specific actions. International organizations are no less social entities than their 
equivalents in the domestic arena. As a result, they are imbued with shared norms, 
identities, values, routines, and the like. These informal social institutions are a crucial 
element for an adequate understanding of organizational behavior and change.  
Bureaucratic culture consists of social practices driven by ideologies, norms and 
routines which govern the expectations and behavior of organizational staff members 
(Argyris and Schön 1978; Brunsson 1989; Schein 1992). It can reasonably be argued 
that only these informal arrangements and ideological convictions make a large public 
organization function properly. In addition, they exert a path-dependent effect on 
organizational change, limiting the extent to which reform initiators are able to go 
beyond modifications in the formal structure and rules to disrupt the underlying 
informal values and incentives needed to incite meaningful and sustainable changes in 
organizational behavior. 
The IMF’s organizational culture is shaped by a shared belief among its staff in 
a macroeconomic paradigm, that is, an “integrated set of theoretical and methodological 
propositions” (Evans and Finnemore 2001: 19) squarely rooted in neoclassical 
economic theory (Boughton 2004: 17). A strong anti-inflationary bias combined with 
fiscal conservatism has shaped the Fund’s intellectual framework from its very 
beginning (Babb 2003: 20-22). The results have been frequent attempts to dodge the 
norms and principles making up the post-war order of “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 
1983) through policy and institutional changes – without the member-states necessarily 
devising or pushing them onto the organization in the first place. As Barnett and 
                                               
53 For instance, one of the findings of Abdelal’s work on the IMF’s role in the promotion of global capital 
mobility is that “none of the most influential bankers and investors in the United States were consulted 
when the amendment was first proposed, and, upon learning of the proposal, they opposed it altogether” 
(Abdelal 2007: 130). See also Chwieroth (2010: 159). 
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Finnemore (2004: 45-72) demonstrate, the expansion of the Fund’s mission from its 
original narrow focus on solving balance-of-payments problems to include fiscal 
policies, domestic market structures, income policies and banking structure did not stem 
from member-states’ demands. 
The specific organizational culture, its ethos as a technocratic institution 
providing ‘objective’, quantified knowledge, constitutes an essential yet often 
overlooked element of the IMF’s autonomy from member-states’ control and oversight. 
Moreover, the claim to unrivalled “expert authority” allows the organization to even 
diverge from the formal ‘rules of the game’ enshrined in its own charter (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005). 
Organizational culture is usually treated as a constraint on the successful 
implementation of reform initiatives mandated by the organization’s authorizing 
environment and/or its leadership (Weaver and Leiteritz 2005; Weaver 2008). However, 
it can also enable institutional change in the absence of strong outside pressure. This is 
what happened with capital account liberalization at the IMF. 
Structural changes in the global economy during the 1980s privileging private 
capital flows at the expense of public flows and a creative extension of the emerging 
‘Washington Consensus’ to include capital account liberalization opened up a window 
of opportunity for norm advocacy from within the institution aimed at outlawing capital 
controls in the international monetary system. This internal campaign proved to be 
successful partly because capital account liberalization perfectly corresponded with the 
intellectual mindset of Fund staff and management stressing the fundamental superiority 
of market-based solutions to economic problems facing developing countries at the end 
of the 1980s. 
According to the “normative change from within” approach, IMF staff trained at 
neoliberal economics departments at US universities pushed their shared set of beliefs 
about the benefits of capital account liberalization onto the organization, replacing the 
previously reigning Keynesian interpretation of international capital flows (Chwieroth 
2007b, 2008, 2010). The ideas of economic neoliberalism quickly penetrated the 
organizational culture of the Fund, transforming it into a global advocate for the cause 
of capital freedom before influential IMF member-states jumped on the liberalization 
bandwagon. In other words, the bureaucratic culture argument posits that the Fund’s 
discourse and subsequent policy towards the capital account can be explained by factors 
and actors inside the organization. 
 99
However, this internal account has problems to explain the failure of the capital 
account amendment to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. In the absence of a personnel 
realignment changing the intellectual composition of Fund staff and given the lack of 
overwhelming evidence disconfirming prior beliefs about the desirability and feasibility 
of capital account liberalization, the IMF did nonetheless qualify – not abandon to be 
sure – its approach to capital account policy in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis. In other words, by focusing on professional training and administrative 
recruitment patterns, the bureaucratic culture argument downplays the influence of 
external actors and processes on the capital account discourse of the organization. 
 
4.1.3. Combining outside and inside mechanisms: the importance of social legitimation 
 
The limitations of existing explanations lead us to question the practice of 
opposing member-countries’ material self-interest to IMF staff ideas to explain the fate 
of the capital account liberalization norm. In an attempt to provide a more adequate 
explanation and in order to identify the mechanisms through which policy norms evolve 
within the Fund, we propose to combine both explanations by acknowledging that 
interests and ideas are not separate, but rather interdependent entities (Blyth 2002: 18; 
Steinmo 2003: 229). As a result, the interaction between staff ideas and countries’ 
interests determines the success or failure of an economic idea in terms of its acceptance 
and resilience over time. Specifically, we argue that both bureaucratic culture centered 
around the reigning neoliberal economic paradigm inside the Fund and the level of 
acceptance of an economic idea outside the Fund are crucial factors to understand the 
fate of the capital account liberalization norm. 
This is not to deny the various formal and informal channels of interaction 
between the organization and powerful member-states (Woods 2003). The IMF does not 
exist in a political vacuum and its thinking and activities are undoubtedly connected to 
the wider social context outside the organization. Due to the permeable borders between 
the Fund and its authorizing environment, mutually reinforcing interests and discourses 
focused on capital account liberalization emerged. 
We argue that economic ideas held by IMF staff need to be socially recognized 
by member-states as well as relevant external stakeholders in order to become 
institutionalized as policy norms and so endure over time (Seabrooke 2007). While 
organizational culture is the main filter through which an idea gains acceptance and 
subsequent dominance within the Fund, the main mechanism for the institutionalization 
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of specific ideas as policy norms lies in their low degree of contestation and in an 
external environment favorable to normative change. It is the continuous interaction 
between inside-out knowledge production within international organizations and 
outside-in social legitimation by external stakeholders that transform economic ideas 
into durable, institutionalized global policy norms. 
As a result, the consensus around capital mobility that developed inside the Fund 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and which was endorsed by its membership cannot be 
adequately understood without embedding it into the historical context of the time.54 
Specifically, not only did the consensus reflect the theoretical assumptions that the IMF 
staff made in favor of capital account liberalization, it also reflected the choice of 
member-countries to advance the cause of international financial integration, assigning 
priority to capital mobility in their economic policy. For industrial countries, that choice 
meant consolidating and expanding global economic integration. For developing 
countries generally and Latin American countries specifically, liberalizing the capital 
account held the promise to overcome the legacies of the debt crisis through attracting 
private capital looking for profitable investment opportunities and thus being able to 
supplement domestic savings, raise domestic investment and eventually reaching the 
income levels enjoyed by the advanced economies in less time. Given this sentiment in 
favor of capital mobility, authorities in both industrial and a number of developing 
countries started to open up their capital accounts and did not oppose the IMF’s 
campaign for making capital account liberalization a global norm. 
 
4.2. Transforming the Idea of Capital Account Liberalization into a Global orm 
 
4.2.1. Rewriting the Bretton Woods consensus 
 
According to the Fund’s Articles of Agreement drawn up in 1944, each member 
state has the right to maintain controls on international capital movements, provided 
only that these controls do not restrict international trade (Article VI, Section 3). This 
provision was directly related to the fact that capital controls constituted one important 
cornerstone of the ‘embedded liberalism’ compromise established after World War II. 
According to Keynesian thinking, capital controls were regarded as an important 
instrument of national policymaking. Controls helped to preserve the political 
independence of countries faced with the consequences of a liberalized international 
                                               
54 About the importance of ‘historical embeddedness’ for the understanding of politics, see Kratochwil 
2006. 
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trade regime and within a system of fixed exchange rates (Kirshner 1999). In the 
presence of a strong need for full employment and growth and in the absence of a 
conventional adjustment mechanism, such as expenditure-reducing policies, for national 
economies following the war, the maintenance of capital controls was a critical part of 
the emerging social contract (Eichengreen 1996: 95). In fact, the IMF could even 
require the imposition of capital controls in the event of large or sustained capital 
outflows and declare the member state ineligible to use the Fund’s resources if it failed 
to comply (Article VI, Section 1a). 
In reality, however, the IMF has never invoked the provisions of Article VI that 
enable it to impose capital controls. Quite the contrary, IMF country bailout occurred 
without imposing capital controls as early as the 1950s, and has been taken for granted 
ever since (James 1996: 133-139, 161-165). As former IMF chief economist Jacques 
Polak put it, 
 
the Fund has wholeheartedly embraced capital account liberalization in its 
surveillance, financing, and technical-assistance activities without being 
hindered by a lack of mandate or from the dated provisions of Article VI (Polak 
1998: 50). 
 
4.2.2. Justifying the need for a policy norm of capital mobility 
 
The support for sweeping economic reforms in many parts of the developing 
world was at its height after the end of the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America and the 
demise of the planned economies in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
Following the failed experiences with heterodox economic stabilization programs in 
many countries in Latin America and Africa, new classical economics became the 
baseline in development thinking and led to what James Boughton has called the “silent 
revolution in policymaking” (Boughton 2001). This normative framework includes a 
couple of principles such as a negative view on government intervention in the economy 
and the unqualified support for policy reforms that remove obstacles to the operation of 
free markets. In this framework, capital controls are regarded as a phenomenon that 
harks back to an earlier era in the history of the international financial system linked to 
extensive state interventionism. Based on its focus on economic efficiency rather than 
national autonomy, neoclassical economics espouses strong hostility to formal 
restrictions placed on the flow of private capital across national borders (Dornbusch 
1998). 
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Despite long-standing controversy in the academic literature55, the public stance 
of the IMF in the early 1990s leaves few doubts that capital account liberalization was 
given pride of place in the list of desirable economic policy reforms. Seen from 19th 
Street in Washington DC, the benefits of financial liberalization in terms of economic 
growth and market discipline were perceived as substantial: “The globalization of 
financial markets is a very positive development,” former Managing Director Michel 
Camdessus (1995) forcefully and repeatedly argued, depicting capital flows as “one of 
the driving forces of global growth in recent years”. The IMF’s operational policies 
were also informed by the principle that capital mobility is a desirable policy choice for 
developed as well as developing countries (IEO 2005). The Fund “tended […] to 
welcome members’ actions taken to liberalize capital account transactions” (IMF 
Archives 1995a: 8, 9)56, while it “generally discouraged” the tightening of capital 
controls (IMF Archives 1995a: 10). 
In order to make the case for officially outlawing capital controls on a global 
scale, several lines of attack were mounted by IMF staff to demonstrate – at a minimum 
– the redundancy, and – at a maximum – the damage done by capital controls for the 
success of economic policy and to generally portray restrictions on international capital 
movements as a hindrance for economic growth in developing countries.57 First, their 
effectiveness was questioned given the dramatic advances in information processing 
technologies rendering existing government regulations putatively unenforceable. 
Following the establishment of current-account convertibility in many developing 
countries at the end of the 1980s, market actors have been equipped with sophisticated 
tools to circumvent capital controls such as over-and under-invoicing of imports and 
exports, and otherwise channeling capital transactions through the current account 
Second, it was widely assumed that financial liberalization is somewhat a 
latecomer compared with trade and current account liberalization and that extending the 
economic logic from one arena to the other was not only natural, but unproblematic. For 
example, Manuel Guitián, the director of the Monetary and Exchange Affairs 
Department at the IMF during the 1990s, saw no difference between liberalizing trade 
                                               
55 On the one hand, defenders of capital account liberalization, based on neoclassical economic theory, 
have argued that it allows for an efficient allocation of capital and the diversification of risk boosting 
investment and economic growth (Obstfeld 1998). On the other hand, Neo-Keynesian scholars have 
argued that capital flows are inherently volatile and that opening the capital account may thus lead to 
instability and does not promote economic growth (Stiglitz 2000). 
56 For more details on the Fund’s treatment of capital account liberalization in its surveillance activity, see 
IMF Archives 1997. 
57 See, for example, Mathieson and Rojas-Suárez 1993, and Schadler et al. 1993. 
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and financial flows portraying them as equal in their fundamental opposition to closed 
economic systems (Guitián 1996: 176). The well-known discourse about rent-seeking 
behavior in national trade policies was transposed to the realm of monetary policy 
where capital controls were seen as a protectionist instrument sheltering special interests 
in the domestic economy, thereby hampering the efficient allocation of resources in 
order to achieve economic growth, and encouraging the pursuit of “inconsistent 
macroeconomic policies”. Chile-type controls on capital inflows were regarded as 
merely delaying “adjustments to fundamental macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal 
policy and exchange rate policy” and contributing to “distortions and inefficiency“ 
(Quirk et al. 1995: 20). The Fund’s preferred solution in the case of large capital inflows 
in the early 1990s was the opposite of imposing controls: the rapid transition to full 
capital account convertibility “motivated by the openness of the economy in the context 
of limited administrative capacity” (Quirk et al. 1995: 24). 
 
4.2.3. Making capital mobility an obligation: the capital account amendment 
 
Having undermined the case for capital controls with the help of neoclassical 
economics, the conclusion was that international financial opening was an unstoppable 
force driven by immutable, exogenous factors beyond the control of national 
governments. Managing Director Camdessus thus called the trend towards capital 
account convertibility “irreversible” (IMF 1998a: 82). Instead of trying in vain to reign 
in the forces of the global capital market, developing countries were advised to embrace 
its blessings wholeheartedly. The preferred outcome involved a strategy similar to the 
‘big bang’ or ‘shock therapy’ implemented in some Eastern European and Latin 
American countries. 
However, pursuing capital account convertibility, in contrast to the current 
account, was not legally recognized as a task for the IMF – quite the opposite, in fact (as 
noted earlier, the Articles of Agreement sanctioned closed capital accounts in IMF 
member-states). As a consequence, the battle cry for staff and management, mostly 
located in the Monetary and Exchange Affairs and the Policy Development and Review 
Departments, was to bring the lack of formal validity and the reality of organizational 
conduct into alignment by way of a change of the IMF statute. Similar to the goal of 
current account convertibility, the liberalization of international capital movements was 
to become an official mandate for the Fund along with an extended jurisdiction in what 
would have been the fifth amendment to its Articles of Agreement. Acknowledging that 
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the IMF “has in some cases encouraged developing countries to open their economies to 
foreign capital inflows and to liberalize restrictions on capital account transactions“ 
(Quirk et al. 1995: 6) under the so-called Article IV surveillance consultations, 
financing arrangements, and technical-assistance programs to develop foreign exchange 
markets, the main goal of the proposed amendment was to provide formal validity and 
enforceability for lending decisions and policy advice, which had hitherto been given in 
a legal grey zone. The sympathy for capital account liberalization coming from the US 
Treasury and many other Fund shareholders reassured the proponents of the amendment 
within the IMF and enabled the management to launch a public campaign for the formal 
institutionalization of the emerging norm. 
The context for tabling the capital account amendment occurred during the run-up 
to the Fund’s Annual Meeting in 1997. The statement issued by the IMF’s Interim 
Committee on September 21, 1997 regarding the liberalization of capital movements 
emphatically captures the prevailing sentiment during the first half of the 1990s: 
 
It is time to add a new chapter to the Bretton Woods agreement. Private 
capital flows have become much more important to the international 
monetary system, and an increasingly open and liberal system has proved 
to be highly beneficial to the world economy (...) Provided that it is 
introduced in an orderly manner, and backed both by adequate national 
policies and a solid multilateral system for surveillance and financial 
support, the liberalization of capital flows is an essential element of an 
efficient international monetary system in this age of globalization. The 
IMF’s central role in the international monetary system, and its near 
universal membership, make it uniquely placed to help this process (IMF 
1997). 
 
The underlying goal of the amendment was clear: to formally validate the 
emerging policy norm of unrestricted global capital movements. Making capital account 
liberalization a central purpose of the IMF as well as extending its jurisdiction into this 
area represented a dramatic shift from what the founders of the organization had in mind 
some fifty years earlier. Following the example of current account convertibility, the 
intention according to then IMF First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer was to 
establish 
 
a universally applied code of good behavior in the application of capital 
controls, enabling the Fund to determine when macroeconomic, structural, 
and balance of payments considerations require adherence to – or permit 
exemptions from – obligations relating to capital account liberalization 
(Fischer 1997: 13).  
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Fischer’s reasoning is telling. He openly acknowledged that “there is no 
established body of analysis on capital controls – what works and what does not – and a 
host of questions needs to be examined” (IMF 1998a: 84). Yet rather than suggesting 
postponing the decision on changing the IMF charter until unambiguous answers to 
these questions were found, he believed that “a capital account amendment of the IMF’s 
Articles would provide an appropriate context in which such an analysis could be 
conducted” (ibid.). Not only was the amendment to enhance the legal ambit of the Fund 
vis-à-vis its members, the simultaneously proposed increase in its capital base could 
conveniently be justified with the need to finance balance of payments problems caused 
by capital outflows in the wake of financial liberalization. 
Following the official green light granted by the IMF Interim Committee at the 
1997 Annual Meetings, Camdessus proceeded to submit a draft of the proposed 
amendment to the Executive Board in March 1998 (IMF Archives 1998a). The proposal 
did not include specific language for changes other than to include capital account 
liberalization in the mandate of the Fund (Article I). 
Initially, there was strong support for the amendment both among industrial and 
developing countries: “We can all agree,” the Saudi Executive Director stated back in 
1995, “that capital account convertibility is both desirable and welfare enhancing for an 
individual country as well as for the world economy as a whole”, a principle shared by 
the Director for the African constituency, who went on to say that the liberalization of 
the capital account “is an integral part of the reform of a country’s financial system“  
(IMF Archives 1995b: 21, 56). Even as late as April 1998, i.e., in the midst of the Asian 
crisis, one of the multi-constituency Executive Directors concluded that, “[c]hanging 
Article I of the Fund’s charter [...] is now more an issue of legislative technique than of 
political consensus building” (IMF Archives 1998b: 14). 
Clearly, the norm of an open capital account policy did enjoy wide acceptance and 
legitimacy, both among industrial and developing country governments as well as 
among influential mainstream economists, all the way up to and beyond the outbreak of 
the Asian financial crisis. The benefits derived from the liberalization of international 
capital flows were widely acknowledged and the corresponding policy at the domestic 
level, helped or regulated by the IMF, was simply considered a matter of technicalities. 
In other words, the capital mobility policy norm was not challenged in terms of its 
social recognition and technical application. This consensus emboldened the IMF’s 
management to propose the amendment in the first place and paved the way for its 
approval by the Fund’s member-states. It took a dramatic change in the ‘outside world’ 
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to shift the views of prominent economists on capital controls and a loss of member 
countries’ confidence in the IMF to undermine this consensus and derail the 
amendment. 
 
4.3. The Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis 
 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis during the late 1990s, the IMF’s 
focus shifted from the benefits to the costs that financial liberalization entails and from 
‘distaste’ to ‘qualified acceptance’ of temporary market-based capital controls. At the 
same time, the emphasis was much more explicitly placed on the sequence of the 
economic liberalization process. While this shift in thinking was by no means 
revolutionary, it was nonetheless substantial compared to the consensus that reigned in 
the first part of the 1990s. 
Nowhere is this shift in thinking more evident than in the failure of the proposal 
to amend the Articles of Agreement. As a matter of fact, by the end of 1998, the 
amendment disappeared from the IMF’s books and was never even presented to the 
Executive Board for approval – even though it had been high on the Fund’s agenda 
during the previous three years. The amendment failed in the absence of a dramatic 
change in industrial countries’ preferences for capital freedom and in the absence of 
Fund staff turnover. Indeed, some representatives of industrial countries continued 
advocating for the benefits of capital mobility (Summers 1998) and IMF management 
and senior staff kept battling to include capital account liberalization within the mandate 
of the IMF (IMF 2000). Instead, developments inside the Fund’s Executive Board and 
in the external context provided the ‘kiss of death’ for the amendment. As a 
consequence, the pursuit of capital freedom though the IMF lost social legitimation – 
both inside and outside the organization. In such a political and intellectual climate, the 
capital account amendment was doomed. 
“Everything changed with the Asian crisis”. This statement was repeated in 
virtually every interview that I conducted with IMF staff, Executive Board members, 
and outside observers. Yet external shocks do not usually impose only one ‘correct’ 
policy response. Agents try to make sense out of the event and arrive at different 
implications for actions. Thus, as constructivists point out, the political response to 
exogenous shocks is socially constructed, not somehow automatically given. Competing 
interpretations of the repercussions of the Asian crisis for the agenda of financial 
liberalization were advanced suggesting different strategies with respect to the proposed 
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amendment. Which of those strategies ultimately prevailed over the others is not simply 
a matter of the existing distribution of power. Crisis narrations provide fertile grounds 
for studying how proposed actions in response to an external shock reflect shared or 
competing understandings about the functioning of global financial markets and the role 
of the IMF in the international monetary system. 
 
4.3.1. The inside story: the discussion in the Executive Board 
 
In this section, I analyze the statements made by Executive Directors (EDs) 
concerning the capital account amendment as proposed by the Fund’s management in 
the aftermath of the Hong Kong declaration.58 Based on the unchanged interests of 
major state actors and the power constellation in the Executive Board, rational scholars 
would expect that the supporters of the amendment were able to deploy their 
overwhelming material and ideological power resources in the service of their strategic 
goals. Similar to the situation after the Mexican crisis three years earlier, the dominant 
discourse should be able to prevail, blaming the Asian crisis on domestic institutional 
deficiencies (‘crony capitalism’) and grave policy mistakes on part of the affected 
countries (Camdessus 1995; Hall 2003). 
Camdessus submitted the draft of the proposed amendment to the Executive 
Board in March 1998 – at the time when the Asian crisis had just reached its climax. 
The proposal did not include specific language for changes other than to include capital 
account liberalization in the mandate of the Fund (Article I). However, it stated as the 
overall objective that “[t]he amendment will establish the general rule that members are 
prohibited from imposing restrictions on international capital movements without Fund 
approval” with an exception made for “the right to impose restrictions on inward direct 
investment” (IMF Archives 1998a).  
The minutes of the Executive Board session discussing the proposed amendment 
on April 2, 1998 reflect the positions taken by various country representatives vis-à-vis 
the proposal. Whereas the ongoing Asian crisis had apparently not seriously affected the 
general commitment to the goal of global financial openness, it did help undermine the 
case for providing the Fund with the corresponding jurisdictional power vis-à-vis its 
members. Three broad positions emerged during the discussion about how to implement 
the change in the Fund’s purpose. 
 
                                               
58 The access to the minutes of the Executive Board meetings was provided by the IMF Archives after a 
special permission for disclosure granted by the Executive Board on November 3, 2003.  
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The ‘gung-ho’ hardliner 
The first one is represented by the statements from the Executive Director for the 
US, along with the British and Scandinavian Directors, as well as Camdessus. Based on 
the assumption that capital account liberalization is “driven by autonomous forces, 
rather than policy” (IMF Archives 1998b: 9), the protagonists of this position were 
unconvinced that the Asian crisis required any sort of rethinking of earlier assumptions 
and proposals. In fact, they said that the Asian crisis reinforced the need to hand legal 
authority over to the IMF in order to ensure the so-called ‘orderly liberalization of 
international capital flows.’ According to their interpretation, the causes of the Asian 
crisis were rooted in the “poorly implemented liberalization and volatile capital flows” 
(IMF Archives 1998b: 10). Therefore, bringing in the IMF was warranted not only in 
light of its “overarching responsibility for smoothing the functioning of the international 
monetary system” but also because of the “very large-scale demand for financial 
support from the Fund” (IMF Archives 1998b: 10). Any changes to the mandate of the 
Fund were regarded as inextricably linked to relevant changes in its jurisdiction. The 
hardliners rejected the confinement of the Fund to an advocacy role by arguing that 
advocacy must be backed up with the appropriate authority to enforce international 
standards and rules. The imposition of unilateral capital and exchange restrictions by 
countries in financial crisis was regarded not only as “the biggest threat to financial 
market stability” but also constituted a “disorderly reversal of market opening” (IMF 
Archives 1998b: 11). Such a purported breach of international norms must be reined in 
with the legal power of the IMF. While paying lip service to the need for a sequential 
approach to capital account liberalization, this position remained committed to the 
principal assumption in the earlier ‘big bang’ strategy, namely that “appropriate 
sequencing should not mean that the liberalization of capital movements should wait for 
all reforms to be completed. […] In economics, as in life, there is no reward without 
risk” (IMF Archives 1998b: 23). 
 
The naysayer 
Somewhat surprisingly given the relatively strong reliance on capital controls in 
the largest developing countries such as China and India, only the ED representing 
Brazil and some smaller South American and Caribbean countries recorded a negative 
view on changing the mandate and the jurisdiction of the Fund during the meeting. He 
openly questioned “whether we actually need an amendment” (IMF Archives 1998b: 
24). While willing to give in on changing the purpose of the Fund in light of a majority 
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in the Executive Board, the Brazilian ED vehemently rejected the need for Fund 
jurisdiction over capital account restrictions. This view expressed most clearly the 
prerogatives of national sovereignty vis-à-vis the construction of an international norm 
effectively outlawing capital controls. The ED articulated his principled belief in the 
virtues of controls on international capital flows: “[r]estrictions on inward direct 
investment can serve numerous essential purposes, and we would like the freedom to 
impose such restrictions should they prove necessary” (IMF Archives 1998b: 25). In 
addition, he was eager to distinguish between capital controls on the one hand, and 
prudential and national security measures on the other. The latter were regarded as 
being outside of the IMF’s purview. 
 
The cautious 
Several constituencies from developed (Western Europe, Canada, and Japan) 
and developing countries argued that the Asian crisis had in fact undermined the 
previous beliefs and assumptions regarding the scope of the amendment. They insisted 
that things had changed over the previous few months requiring the rethinking of the 
plan to institutionalize capital account liberalization on a global scale. According to this 
interpretation, the Asian crisis highlighted the need to “consider clearly the detailed 
prerequisites of liberalization – a strong regulatory framework, a sound banking system, 
an adequate supervisory structure – as well as the appropriate sequencing of 
liberalization measures” (IMF Archives 1998b: 8). There was also some sympathy for 
allowing controls on inward foreign direct investment on more than a temporary basis in 
order to prevent financial crises from occurring in the first place (IMF Archives 1998b: 
19). 
As a result, several EDs suggested postponing the discussion on the extension of 
the Fund’s jurisdiction through an amendment. As mentioned earlier, this position was 
not confined to developing countries. Several representatives of industrial countries 
were now more cautious than before. For instance, substantially modifying his earlier 
position, the Japanese ED stated that in light of the events in Asia “the Fund could not 
say that no reversals of capital account liberalization were appropriate” (IMF Archives 
1998e: 14). 
While agreeing to move forward on the change to the Fund’s mandate, the need 
to move beyond an advocacy role for the Fund in the area of capital account 
liberalization was questioned. In line with the position taken by former IMF chief 
economist Jacques Polak, this group argued that the Fund had considerable success in 
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promoting current account and trade liberalization through the use of surveillance, 
technical assistance, and conditionality but without exercising its jurisdiction. Hence, 
the expansion of the legal remit of the Fund would be “neither necessary nor helpful in 
promoting the orderly liberalization of capital movements” (Polak 1998: 47). The 
preferred strategy was to hold off on the decision-making schedule concerning the 
amendment until empirical studies about the prerequisites and effects of capital account 
liberalization found conclusive answers. 
 
4.3.2. The outside story: discursive changes in the academic community 
 
In addition to internal obstacles for the amendment, the authorizing environment 
in which the IMF operates changed dramatically after the Asian crisis. The crisis, which 
was marked by a sharp reversal of capital flows and threatened the stability of the 
international economic system through financial contagion, vividly demonstrated the 
risks of rapid capital account liberalization, leading prominent mainstream economists 
to question the arguments in favor of capital freedom put forward by the IMF over the 
past decade. 
In light of the disruption caused by capital flight, numerous observers noted that 
the benefits of capital account liberalization needed recalculation, either for not having 
the costs of financial crises adequately factored in or because the gains in terms of 
economic growth had been exaggerated. Furthermore, the crisis raised doubts about the 
alleged market discipline associated with financial liberalization. In this atmosphere, 
capital controls became (again) a plausible policy option (Krugman 1998). Even the 
Institute of International Finance, the global association of private financial institutions, 
became sensitive to arguments in favor of controls. While controls on capital outflows 
were still regarded as “generally difficult to justify on efficiency or welfare grounds,” 
controls on inflows appeared “more acceptable than they had been before” (IIF 1999: 
ii). The support for capital controls coming from the academic and financial 
establishment added to the more radical advocacy articulated by non-governmental 
organizations and representatives of several developing countries. 
When several emerging market economies suffered spectacular losses after years 
of outstanding economic growth, the authorizing environment that had allowed the 
institutionalization and diffusion of the Fund’s ideas suddenly became a venue for 
contestation. In particular, the arguments that capital account liberalization is welfare-
enhancing and that the IMF is a responsible manager of financial globalization were 
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severely challenged (Sachs 1997; Radelet and Sachs 1998; Rodrik 1998; Stiglitz and 
Furman 1998). 
These criticisms had an immediate impact on the Fund. As an institution 
primarily staffed with PhD economists, the criticisms leveled by the profession from 
which it recruits could not easily be discarded. With a substantial part of the economics 
profession forcefully making the argument that there is no clear connection between 
financial integration and economic growth and accusing the organization of at least 
partially causing the economic downturn in Asia, IMF staff started to reconsider the 
available evidence on capital account liberalization. As a result and in response to 
demands from the Executive Board, the Fund staff submitted a number of research 
papers to the Board beginning in early 1998, in which the consequences of capital 
market integration were reassessed in an attempt to take stock of the Asian crisis 
experience (IMF Archives 1998c, 1998d). 
These reports demonstrated the return to a sequential approach. They revised the 
earlier view about the alleged benefits of a rapid movement to capital account 
convertibility and qualified conventional wisdom by distinguishing between the effects 
of long-term and short-term capital flows. While stating that the former have been 
unambiguously advantageous for developing countries, the “premature” or “disorderly” 
liberalization of the latter had been associated with the outbreak of financial crises 
(Eichengreen et al. 1998). In essence, the reports reflect the ‘cautious’ position within 
the Executive Board as well as a changing intellectual climate in the aftermath of the 
Asian crisis. 
 
4.4. Today’s Capital Account Discourse: The orm is Dead, Long Live the Idea 
 
Since 1998, the IMF has refined its view on capital account liberalization 
further, in an attempt to develop what Kenneth Rogoff (2002), the Director of the 
Research Department between 2001 and 2003 called an ‘eclectic approach’ – an 
approach that contrary to the IMF’s earlier policy takes the specific conditions of 
countries with weak financial systems and inadequate macroeconomic frameworks into 
account. Although some authors argue that the IMF has not abandoned ‘the neoclassical 
model’ that fails to recognize the imperfections in international capital markets (Stiglitz 
2004), recent IMF studies provide evidence of the evolution of the Fund’s thinking. We 
can appreciate the continuities and discontinuities in the Fund’s thinking by analyzing 
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how the new policy norm relates to changes in the norm itself and to the Fund’s 
operating procedures. 
Today’s thinking about capital account liberalization reflects important 
continuities with the earlier discourse. Capital account liberalization is still regarded as 
an inevitable and desirable economic policy choice for IMF members. However, there 
has been a significant reconsideration of how the benefits of liberalization can be 
realized. That is to say, the presumed positive and direct relationship between financial 
liberalization and economic growth has come under scrutiny. The benefits of 
liberalization are no longer considered to be direct and automatic. Capital inflows do not 
necessarily promote growth by providing finance for domestic investments and 
diversifying risks. Rather, the benefits of liberalization are supposed to be indirect or 
‘collateral’. For instance, in a recent study on the effects of financial globalization, a 
team of the IMF Research Department supports the view that “far more important than 
the direct growth effects of access to more capital is how capital flows generate a 
number of …‘potential collateral benefits’” (Kose et al. 2006: 8). These alleged benefits 
include strengthening domestic financial market and institutional development, good 
governance and market discipline; these factors, in turn, are supposed to indirectly 
contribute to GDP growth.59 In other words, the IMF has enlarged the range and scope 
of policies and formal institutions deemed necessary as preconditions for successful 
financial development.  
In terms of operating procedures, the IMF’s new thinking entails a substantial 
revision of the accompanying practices that make capital account liberalization 
beneficial. In this context, the use of capital controls and the sequence of economic 
liberalization have received renewed theoretical and empirical attention. In particular, 
there seems to be a more accommodating attitude towards the use of capital controls. 
For instance, the Fund now displays qualified support for Chile-type controls on capital 
inflows, whose use was stigmatized in the first half of the 1990s (IMF 1998b: 79, 150). 
Even though capital controls are still regarded as ineffective and distortionary in the 
long run (IMF 2007, chap. 3), the recognition of the attendant risks of capital account 
liberalization demonstrated by the Asian crisis led the IMF to no longer regard 
temporary market-based controls on capital inflows “as incompatible with the still-
desirable goal of capital account liberalization” (IMF Archives 1998d: 49).60 
                                               
59 See Rodrik and Subramanian 2009 for a critique of the most recent IMF approach to empirically prove 
the benefits of capital account liberalization for developing countries. 
60 Market-based controls “include taxes and tax-like instruments that make their effect felt by altering 
relative prices, rather than through the use of administrative controls” (IMF Archives 1998d: 49). 
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In sum, the current IMF view on capital account liberalization builds on the 
realization that liberalization is not in and of itself a factor that contributes to economic 
growth and that its welfare-enhancing effects are a function of other policies, including 
macroeconomic and regulatory policies. Acknowledging that the benefits of capital 
account liberalization are not direct but dependent upon other variables suggests that 
there are circumstances in which the costs of liberalization are substantial. Contrary to 
the early 1990s thinking that did not contemplate the possibility that financial 
liberalization could be welfare-reducing, today’s view clearly acknowledges the 
possibility that capital account liberalization may not produce economic growth in the 
short and medium run. Drawing on extensive empirical research, an IMF study 
concludes that “there is no strong, robust, and uniform support for the theoretical 
argument that financial globalization per se delivers a higher rate of economic growth” 
(Prasad et al. 2003: 3). As a result, a “pragmatic approach” to capital account 
liberalization – seemingly opposed to the previous dogmatic one – that takes into 
account the specific economic conditions in developing countries is now advocated 
(Prasad and Rajan 2008).61 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
The fate of the capital account liberalization norm in the International Monetary 
Fund is an interesting case to consider for several reasons. First, it is one of the few 
examples of an idea included in the initial ‘Washington Consensus’ agenda that did not 
reach the stage of norm stabilization during the last fifteen years. Second, the fate of the 
capital account liberalization amendment sheds substantial light on the mechanisms of 
norm creation and policy change within the IMF. Specifically, the analysis shows the 
interplay between inside/outside forces on the one hand, and ideational/strategic 
interests on the other. Third, it reveals the processes and mechanisms that can interrupt 
or even terminate the “life cycle” of a norm. Fourth, after 1998 developing countries 
have been substantially less constrained by the IMF to adopt a liberal approach to 
capital account management. As a result, they have been given more autonomy from the 
international level to determine their policies. In what follows, I elaborate on these four 
general points. 
In the middle of the 1990s, influential staff members and the management of the 
IMF felt encouraged to propose a change to one of the fundamental pillars of the 
                                               
61 National Public Radio, Global Reality Challenges IMF’s Free Market Gospel, March 18, 2010. 
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organization. They were aided by external events, such as the end of the Cold War and 
the resulting free-market enthusiasm that favored the removal of all remaining 
instruments of government intervention in the national economy and an ideological 
change in the economics profession towards the neoclassical orthodoxy. It is important 
to point out that they were acting strictly on ideational beliefs supporting the superiority 
of market-based solutions in economic policy rather than narrowly defined material 
interests. The lobbying efforts of IMF staff members for the case of capital account 
liberalization started in the late 1980s with internal advocacy and tweaking the rules of 
the game in operational practice. Their hitherto limited fight to outlaw capital controls 
on a national level gained momentum in the early and mid-1990s and turned into a 
cause at the global level. Going beyond advocacy and persuasion vis-à-vis developing 
country authorities on an individual level, the norm entrepreneurs aimed for the 
ultimate, irreversible stabilization of the norm. They considered amending the charter of 
the IMF as the adequate and most effective form of institutionalizing open capital 
accounts and to turn capital freedom into a global norm. 
By early 1998, all seemed to go well for finally turning the idea of free global 
capital mobility into a statutory element of the international financial system through an 
amendment to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. The social recognition of capital 
account liberalization, both among industrial and developing countries, seemed so 
overwhelming that only “a second great depression or a third world war” (Obstfeld 
1998: 28) could stop the institutionalization of the norm. However, as the adage has it, 
‘something happened on the way to heaven’; in this case the Asian financial crisis and 
its effects on the capital account discourse inside and outside the IMF. Specifically, the 
reinterpretation of the effects of capital account liberalization in light of the Asian 
financial crisis rapidly increased the level of acceptance of capital controls among the 
Fund’s key internal and external constituencies, making it virtually impossible for the 
IMF management to proceed with the amendment. 
Notwithstanding the failed attempt to institutionalize the norm, the Fund has not 
given up its pursuit to find the ‘Holy Grail’, i.e., to empirically prove – rather than 
theoretically assume – that capital mobility on balance leads to improvements. On the 
one hand, the Fund has acknowledged that the empirical evidence for the 
unambiguously positive effect of capital account liberalization is still wanted. As a 
consequence, although the IMF has recognized that the benefits of capital mobility are 
not automatic but dependent on policies and institutions, it has not yet drawn any 
definitive conclusion on the relationship between capital mobility and economic growth. 
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In fact, all empirical research dedicated to encounter the expected positive effects of 
capital account liberalization for economic growth based on cross-country growth 
regressions have ended in inconclusive findings at best, or in outright failure at worst. 
However, the quest for finding universally acceptable evidence for the benefits of open 
capital accounts continues unabated (Mishkin 2009; Obstfeld 2009). In its most recent 
version, it points to “catalytic” or indirect gains from capital account liberalization. 
In addition, capital account liberalization, as it is now interpreted within the 
Fund, shares several notable continuities with the past approach. Most importantly, the 
IMF has not moved away from the position that an open capital account does ultimately 
provide more benefits than costs and that capital controls are harmful and ineffective 
policy instruments in the long run (IMF 2007: chap. 3, 9-12). Even in the midst of the 
recent global financial crisis, the Fund has defended the ultimately positive effects that 
financial liberalization allegedly entails. For example, in a paper analyzing the causes of 
the subprime crisis, Fund staff argue that the crisis “show[ed] the potential dangers of 
capital inflows” (that) can lead to excessive risk taking and to exposure of domestic 
financial institutions, households, firms, to exchange rate risks”. However, this 
conclusion was predicated on the assumption that “(s)urely, the lesson [from the crisis] 
is not that capital flows should be sharply curtailed” (IMF 2009: 8). 
What this makes clear is that although much more nuanced in its argumentation 
than at the beginning of the 1990s, the Fund has not given up its principal support for 
the norm of capital account freedom (Chwieroth 2010: 226-254). For that to happen 
(yet) another ideational change, primarily in economic theory, has probably to take 
place first. In fact, very few mainstream economists, and even less IMF staff, would 
contest the proposition that capital account liberalization is ultimately welfare-
enhancing. What most economists and policymakers argue about is the speed or (again) 
the sequence of economic liberalization and the required policies or domestic 
institutions that ostensibly need to accompany – or be in place before – capital account 
liberalization. 
Notwithstanding the Fund’s benevolent view on capital freedom, developing 
countries have gained some breathing space regarding capital account management over 
the last ten years. Before the Asian crisis, the IMF was a powerful and determined actor 
pushing for capital account openness. While due to legal constraints it had relatively 
little coercive power vis-à-vis developing countries, the Fund instead resorted to 
discursive power resources to persuade developing countries to let capital flow freely in 
and out. After 1998, however, the IMF has virtually disappeared as a unified, active 
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advocate for capital account liberalization in developing countries. In its post-Asian 
crisis interactions with developing countries, the Fund has generally applied a cautious, 
gradualist approach towards capital account liberalization, yet without losing sight of 
the ultimate goal (IEO 2005). The organization now exhibits an increased tolerance for 
‘unorthodox’ capital account management techniques under the provision that they (i) 
are meant as transitory, market-based measures to deal with a dramatic rise of short-
term capital inflows, (ii) are only applied as an instrument of last resort after purely 
macroeconomic policy responses have been exhausted or proven inadequate, and (iii) 
given that specific economic conditions in the country are met (Ostry et al. 2010). At 
the same time, the Fund continues its zero tolerance position vis-à-vis administrative 
measures intended to restrict international capital movements on a permanent basis.62 
As a result of their regained wiggle room in terms of the international discourse, 
a couple of IMF member-states in the developing world generally, and in Latin America 
specifically, have resorted to limiting the inflow of international capital into their 
countries in order to assuage their negative effects for the domestic economy. What a 
decade ago would have caused strong recriminations from financial market actors, 
mainstream economists and the IMF, is now considered an acceptable policy choice.63 
Analyzing the evolution and drivers of the international discourse on capital 
account management is a crucial step in order to understand the role of the IMF for the 
sustainability of capital account openness in Latin America. However, the question 
remains why some countries in the region continue to be capital mobility enthusiasts 
despite receding international pressure and the cognitive dissonance of the academic 
community vis-à-vis capital account liberalization, and alternatively why other Latin 
American countries have been capital mobility laggards even in times of global 
                                               
62 It will be interesting to see the Fund’s response to the request by the Group of Twenty (G-20) to 
analyze “the range of options countries have adopted or are considering as to how the financial sector 
could make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens associated with government 
interventions to repair the banking system” (G-20 Leaders’ Statement, Pittsburg Summit, September 24-
25, 2009). This task includes an evaluation of a general financial transactions tax (FTT). Given the Fund’s 
intellectual track record on this issue, a favorable assessment seems beyond imagination. A recent 
comment by the IMF official in charge of the study, First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky, a 
former vice chairman of the JPMorgan investment bank, that “avoiding distortions and insuring systemic 
efficiency and effectiveness will be important considerations in evaluating the options, including a 
potential transactions tax, among other alternatives”, already hinted at a negative assessment of a FTT 
(Lipsky 2009). The interim report for the G-20 finance minister meeting in Washington, D.C. on April 23, 
2010 has confirmed this expectation; according to Carlo Cottarelli, Director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs 
Department, a FTT “is not the most effective way to address the task at hand” (http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2010/04/25/fair-and-substantial%e2%80%94taxing-the-financial-sector; accessed April 
26, 2010).  
63 The Financial Times labeled Brazil’s decision to impose a 2% tax on portfolio capital inflows in 
October 2009 a “good choice by the government” (Editorial, October 21, 2009). 
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enthusiasm for capital account freedom. The following two chapters try to answer this 
question analyzing the cases of Peru and Colombia, respectively. 
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Chapter 5: Capital Account Policy in Peru. The Institutional 
Legacies of the Economic Crisis 
 
 
In line with several other countries in Latin America, the traditional pattern of 
economic policymaking in Peru has been a stop-go cycle with abrupt oscillations 
between market-oriented reforms and the subsequent return to protectionist policies. For 
Latin American standards, Peru had a relatively open economy until the late 1960s 
when the leftist military dictatorship under General Juan Velasco Alvarado assumed 
power. The military government attempted to reduce dependence on foreign capital, 
eliminate oligarchic power and accelerate industrial development. To accomplish these 
goals, it empowered the state and introduced protectionist and nationalist economic 
policies, following the then dominant Import-Substitution Industrialization model. The 
economy was successively restructured along protectionist lines and international 
economic transactions, including capital movements, heavily regulated. The end of the 
dictatorship and the return to democracy in 1980 brought a political and economic 
opening of the country. President Fernando Belaúnde launched a pre-‘Washington 
Consensus’ package of economic policies, including the liberalization of capital 
movements. However, his presidency ended in economic turmoil due to the accelerating 
debt crisis affecting the entire region. The result was a backlash against liberal 
economic policies with the election of President Alan García in 1985. He promised and 
delivered a strict nationalist course whose most visible demonstration was a partial debt 
moratorium and strict controls and regulations in many part of the economy, including 
capital account transactions. Yet the application of the so-called heterodox model ended 
in even bigger economic failure. 
With the election of President Alberto Fujimori in 1990 began yet another cycle 
back to the market. Since then, however, liberal economic policies, including capital 
account liberalization, have had a much longer life span. The radical liberalization of 
the capital account introduced in 1991 has proved to be a durable policy despite several 
changes in government and external economic conditions. In this chapter, I argue that 
two long-term consequences of the economic crisis preceding the initial liberalization 
phase help to explain this surprising outcome: (i) the restructuring of state-business 
relations providing the financial and mining sectors with a veto-player position for 
economic policymaking in Peru; and (ii) the social construction and successful societal 
embedding of an economic discourse delegitimizing capital controls, denouncing them 
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as an alleged slippery slope toward economic chaos and mismanagement. In other 
words, I argue that the explanation for the longevity of capital account openness in Peru 
can be found in specific institutional changes accompanying the initial opening of the 
economy. The legacy of the profound economic crisis during the late 1980s gave rise to 
a new socially shared understanding about the illegitimacy of capital controls in the 
contemporary political economy of Peru. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section one describes the context and the 
content of the initial adoption of capital account liberalization in the early 1990s. It 
emphasizes the social construction of capital account freedom as a crucial lesson from 
the economic crisis of the late 1980s. Section two discusses competing explanations for 
the sustainability of capital account liberalization in Peru: on the one hand, the influence 
of the International Monetary Fund, and the political strength of the neoliberal epistemic 
community on the other. I show the limited influence of the IMF over capital account 
policy decisions and the entrenched discursive, though not necessarily political, power 
of the neoliberal epistemic community. Based on survey data, I document the strong 
commitment of the foreign-trained community of elite economists to the principle of 
capital account freedom. Section three analyzes the institutional foundations for the 
durability of capital account openness over time: (i) changes in state-business relations 
favoring the interests of the financial and mining sectors over those of the industrial or 
non-mining export sector; and (ii) the social embeddedness of capital account freedom 
in contemporary Peru. Section four concludes. 
  
5.1. The Rise of Capital Account Openness from the Ashes of Economic Chaos 
 
5.1.1. The national trauma 
 
There can be little doubt that Peru lived through a dramatic economic crisis at 
the end of the 1980s (Crabtree 1992). President García’s heterodox economic policies 
resulted in a desperate economic and social situation.64 In his inaugural speech in July 
1985, García promised a ‘home-grown solution’ to the inflation problem as opposed to 
                                               
64 However, not all problems facing the country should be blamed on García’s policy mistakes. As Carol 
Wise (2003: 176) points out, three structural problems have beset the Peruvian economy since the late 
1960s: (i) a strong dependence on external financing, especially foreign direct investment, to support 
government programs; (ii) a high amount of savings in foreign currency leading to informal dollarization 
of the economy; and (iii) a conflictual relationship between the state and domestic entrepreneurs, resulting 
in a low domestic investment rate. Add to that the periodic pendulum swings between orthodox 
adjustment and heterodoxy that had a profoundly negative effect on economic growth (Ortiz de Zevallos 
1989; Gonzales de Olarte and Samamé 1991; Pastor and Wise 1992). 
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IMF orthodoxy. The central element of the ensuing heterodox program was a partial 
moratorium limiting service payments on Peru’s medium- and long-term public debt to 
no more than 10% of annual export earnings. In addition, the program contained the 
direct administration of prices and wages as well as the strict regulation of imports and 
foreign exchange. As a result, debt service-payments decreased substantially and several 
economic and social indicators showed some improvement between 1985 and 1987. At 
the same time, however, loan disbursements from international financial institutions 
became negative and the default on service payments for public and private debt turned 
Peru into a pariah of the international financial community. 
Beginning in late 1987 public finances collapsed within the context of an 
increasingly desperate foreign-exchange situation and García’s erratic policy decisions. 
In July 1987, the president announced his intention – against the background of high 
levels of capital flight – to nationalize all commercial banks as well as all finance and 
insurance companies. At the same time, borrowing abroad by private banks was 
substantially limited and the cash deposit requirement was reimposed. The decision to 
nationalize the banks resulted in García losing the support of virtually all of his political 
allies and marked the beginning of an ‘antipopulist backlash’ and the rise of a 
conservative opposition movement (FREDEMO) led by novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. 
Between 1988 and 1990, per capita GDP in real terms fell by 25%, all the way 
back to the level of the early 1960s. Real GDP in 1990 was similar to the one in 1978. 
Between 1988 and 1990, Peru’s industrial production contracted by 30% and exports 
per capita were lower overall than they had been in the 1950s (Rossini and Paredes 
1991: 285). Tax receipts amounted to only 3% of GDP by the end of García’s term 
(Klarén 2000: 407). There was a substantial drop in public investment, especially in 
public health and education. The public-sector deficit reached 11% of GDP by 1988 due 
mainly to the rapidly shrinking tax base. Annual inflation approached 2,000% by late 
1988, more than 3,000% in 1989 and peaked at approximately 7,500% in 1990. The 
stock of net international reserves at the end of July 1990 had a negative balance of US$ 
163 million (Ledesma 2001: 9). 
The social costs of the economic tail-spin were enormous: real income dropped 
22% between 1987 and 1989, falling to the 1960s levels. Wages of public employees 
fell by 60% between 1985 and 1990. By 1990, a full 70% of the workforce was either 
unemployed or underemployed (Klarén 2000: 395). 
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Table 5.1  Macroeconomic indicators for Peru, 1985-1990 
 
Year Growth of 
real GDP 
(constant 
2000) in 
annual % 
change 
Inflation, 
Consumer 
price index 
(in %) 
Trade 
balance 
(millions 
of US$) 
Debt service 
of % of 
exports of 
goods, 
services and 
income (in %) 
Investment 
as % of 
GDP 
Fiscal 
deficit as 
% of GDP  
International 
Reserves 
(annual % 
change) 
1985 2,8 163.40 980 27.69 19.28 -3.47 -35.84 
1986 10 77.92 -404.83 21.07 20.65 -5.82 -95.50 
1987 8 85.82 -871.03 13.27 20.68 -8.83 -917.02 
1988 -8.70 667.02 -466.46 9.44 22.33 -5.49 -201.42 
1989 -11.70 3398.68 938.95 8.92 18.58 -9.49 48.65 
1990 -5.14 7481.66 33 10.81 16.47 -7.95 145.50 
Sources: World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics, Banco Central de la Reserva 
del Perú.  
 
Not being able to freely exchange their local currency for US dollars not only 
enraged the external sector but also the population at large. One characteristic element 
of García’s heterodox program was increasingly tougher restrictions on international 
capital transactions. Driven by the attempt to stem rising levels of capital flight, the 
administration introduced a variety of capital and exchange controls. For example, 
immediately after taking office, the government froze all dollar accounts forcing them 
to be turned into local currency only at the new, devalued exchange rate plus a 3% 
premium. 
A direct, if unintended consequence of the capital and exchange controls was a 
sharp rise of the informal or de facto dollarization of the Peruvian economy at the end of 
García’s presidency. People increasingly lost faith in the stability and value of their 
domestic currency and started a ‘flight to quality’ by substituting their local currency for 
US dollars, not only to preserve the value of their assets but also as a medium of 
exchange and as a unit of account. Similar to countries such as Bolivia or Argentina 
during the same period, dollarization in Peru emerged as a response to macroeconomic 
instability, particularly high levels of inflation and a rapidly depreciating exchange rate, 
first during the late 1970s and in a rather dramatic fashion during the hyperinflation 
period at the end of the 1980s.65 
Within a relatively short period of time, the dollarization ratio of the Peruvian 
economy increased dramatically: after the end of the military regime in 1980, the 
dollarization ratio steadily rose during the second presidency of Belaúnde (1980-1985) 
                                               
65 Dollarization follows a well-defined pattern: first agents replace domestic currency as reserve of value, 
holding usually dollars outside the financial system (“under the mattress”). Then, the dollar is used in 
some transactions, typically involving real estate and durable goods, and eventually some prices are set in 
dollars. Most governments later on allow banks to issue deposits in foreign currency to avoid financial 
disintermediation (Savastano 1996). 
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to about 60% in 1985. The ratio fell to less than 10% between 1985 and 1988 as the 
result of the forcible conversion of foreign currency banks deposits into domestic 
currency, accompanied by a range of foreign exchange and capital controls that limited 
the issuance of new foreign currency deposits. People who could not transfer their 
foreign currency abroad in order to avoid the confiscation of their deposits preferred to 
keep their dollars outside of the financial system. As a result, the controls regime failed 
in its attempt to de-dollarize the economy and the government eventually re-allowed 
foreign currency deposits in September 1988. The consequence was that dollarization 
rapidly increased between 1988 and 1990 reaching its old level of 60% in 1991 and has 
since remained between 65% and 75% (Quispe 2000), though recently falling to levels 
around 50% (IMF 2010: 34-56).66 Against the background of the substantial 
dollarization of the Peruvian economy – an institutional legacy of the 1980s crisis – the 
effectiveness of controls on international capital movements in and out of the country 
invariably suffers given people’s choice to move portfolio from foreign to national 
deposits and vice versa within the domestic financial system. 
5.1.2. The initial liberalization of the capital account 
 
García’s successor as president, Alberto Fujimori, was left with little room to 
maneuver in terms of economic policies. The country was considered a pariah by the 
international financial community. Since García had inaugurated the debt moratorium, 
the country run up arrears with the IMF and was declared ineligible to borrow funds in 
1986. After having won the presidential election on a gradualist reform platform, 
Fujimori quickly changed course once being sworn into office and ominously shortly 
after a trip as president-elect to New York in June 1990 where he met the leaders of the 
IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. There he was told 
that “if the new president tried to avoid an immediate, painful adjustment, his 
administration would run the course of Alan García’s. If he did not adjust, he ought not 
to turn to the international financial institutions for help (…) In other words, if the 
government did nothing, it would face continued isolation; if it did everything the 
international financial institutions wanted, it could count on them for full support” 
(Stokes 1997: 217; Abusada 2000: 130). The subsequent switch from a gradualist 
                                               
66 For comparison, due to legislation prohibiting foreign currency loans, except for on-lending, and a ban 
on foreign currency deposits, financial dollarization in Colombia is virtually non-existent. In 2004, just 
2% of all deposits were in foreign currency and 6% of all loans were denominated in foreign currency. 
The same numbers for Peru were 64% and 74%, respectively (Rennhack and Nozaki 2006: 15). 
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stabilization program to a neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ is widely considered the direct 
consequence of this trip.67 
The international financial institutions clearly demarcated the terms of financial 
rapprochement along the lines of the ‘Washington Consensus’. As Wise puts it, “once 
he (Fujimori) was elected it took just ten days for the newly inaugurated administration 
to realize that hyperinflation had rendered gradualism a foreclosed option. The complete 
collapse of state finances, combined with the halt of capital flows to Peru, meant there 
was zero financial room to maneuver” (Wise 2006: 204; emphasis added). Binding 
structural constraints and the policy limits set by the international financial institutions 
were a major impetus behind the wave of neoliberal economic reforms in Peru during 
the early 1990s. 
The majority of the Peruvian population was willing to go along and accepted a high 
political and economic risk in order to get out of the dire straits (Weyland 2002a: 116-
118). Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of economic chaos, Fujimori seemed 
destined to bring about this radical turnaround.68 Immediately upon taking office in 
August 1990, he launched an all-out reform program – the so-called Fujishock – 
intended to stabilize the run-away economy. The explicit purpose of the draconian 
adjustment program was a quick fix for hyperinflation.69 
Capital account liberalization was not part of the initial stabilization plan. Even 
though hyperinflation was reduced in the aftermath of the adjustment program, inflation 
levels remained rather high – 24% per month in early 1991 – and came down only 
slowly. As a result, when the initial ‘shock treatment’ “proved insufficient for curing 
inflation, Fujimori intensified the dosage” (Weyland 2002a: 117). He fired Juan Carlos 
Hurtado Miller as Minister of Economy and Finance in February 1991 and appointed 
the outspoken free-market enthusiast Carlos Boloña as his replacement. Boloña 
describes his approach to financial sector management in the following way: 
 
The objective of the money market reform is to obtain a financial system that is 
efficient, profitable, competitive, open to foreign markets, and characterized by 
                                               
67 Interview with Felipe Ortiz de Zevallo, June 8, 2005. 
68 Note, however, that Fujimori’s 1990 election campaign was based on gradual economic reforms. In 
fact, his contender during the elections, Vargas Llosa, promised much more radical reforms to stabilize 
the economy. Hence, one should be careful to associate the domain of losses with a higher risk-seeking 
attitude of the population (Weyland 2002a). In fact, during the presidential elections the majority of the 
population voted for the candidate that apparently constituted a lower risk in terms of the painfulness of 
the economic adjustment. 
69 Unlike other successful macroeconomic stabilizations in Latin America at the same time, the Peruvian 
program did not fix the exchange rate but controlled the money supply via a restrictive monetary policy. 
Subsequently, the Central Bank only intervened by attempting to depreciate the currency to a degree that 
was consistent with the objective of reducing inflation. 
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solvency and prudence. These reforms aim to eliminate financial repression and 
create a new system that covers financial needs in the short and long runs. We 
also seek to develop a capital market that can play a significant role in the 
financing of businesses. The financial sector must be an efficient private savings 
intermediary so that both private and public savings finance the different 
economic sectors (…) To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to liberalize 
interest rates, eliminate quantitative and qualitative controls, and reduce the 
required reserve ratio to normal levels (Boloña 1996: 201). 
 
Boloña wasted no time to implement his liberalization strategy. One month after 
his nomination, he introduced a string of structural reforms in various sectors of the 
economy, including the full liberalization of the capital account (Morris 2000: 315). 
Under the Foreign Investment Promotion Act of 1991, foreigners were allowed to invest 
in almost all economic sectors and repatriate all profits and capital equipment as they 
saw fit. Additional legislation was passed that protected all investors, domestic and 
foreign, from sudden changes in existing laws and established procedures for the 
resolution of investment disputes (Manzetti 1999: 251). 
Boloña’s main intention was to reassure the international financial community 
and to regain its trust in the country, especially in the context of ongoing negotiations 
over debt rescheduling. With the surge of structural economic reforms, Boloña wanted 
to signal to investors that Peru had made an irreversible choice for a free-market 
economy and he hoped to attract new capital inflows in order to reignite economic 
growth (Boloña 1996). 
The effect of the reforms in terms of monetary policy was characterized by a 
fundamental conflict between the economic objectives of low inflation, on the one hand, 
and a competitive exchange rate on the other (Hnyilicza 2001). Having introduced a 
restrictive monetary policy and abandoned interest-rate ceilings during the first wave of 
reforms, real domestic interest rates went up rapidly. That certainly helped to bring 
down inflation and stimulated capital inflows, yet at the same time contributed to a real 
appreciation of the exchange rate, thereby hurting the country’s external 
competitiveness (Sheehan 2006). The declared strategy of the government and the 
Central Bank to reconcile both economic objectives was to bring inflation down slowly 
in order to prevent a strong currency appreciation. Yet when push came to shove in 
macroeconomic decision-making, the clear preference of the government and within the 
Board of the Central Bank was to reduce inflation at all costs, assigning a secondary 
role to exchange-rate stability (Sheahan 1994; Gonzales de Olarte 1998: 73; Rodríguez 
et al. 2000: 109). 
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The restrictive monetary policy led to massive capital inflows: 1,226 million US 
dollars in 1993, 3,838 million in 1994 (2,241 million alone from privatizations), 2,551 
million in 1995, 4,080 million in 1996 and 2,736 million in 1997 (Rodríguez et al. 2000: 
106). In contrast, exports increased by only 17% in 1994 and 7% in 1995, resulting in a 
substantial current-account deficit, 5.6% of GDP in 1993 and 7.3% in 1995. Only the 
burst of privatization-related foreign direct investment helped to finance this deficit. 
 
Table 5.2  Macroeconomic indicators for Peru, 1991-2007 
Year Growth of 
real GDP 
(constant 
2000) in 
annual % 
change 
Inflation, 
Consumer 
price 
index (in 
%) 
Trade 
balance 
(millions 
of US$) 
Debt service of 
% of exports of 
goods, services 
and income (in 
%) 
Investment 
as % of 
GDP 
Fiscal 
deficit as 
% of 
GDP  
International 
Reserves 
(annual % 
change) 
1991 2.17 409.53 -601 25.05 17.29 -2.56 53.47 
1992 -0.43 73.53 -914 20.28 17.31 -3.89 37.04 
1993 4.76 48.58 -1325.68 58.53 19.31 -3.65 108.55 
1994 12.82 23.74 -1545.35 18.17 22.25 -3.17 16.15 
1995 8.61 11.13 -2974.72 15.93 24.82 -3.39 28.61 
1996 2.52 11.54 -2657.42 34.54 22.82 -1.44 19.07 
1997 6.86 8.56 -2497.35 35.59 24.09 -0.80 -9.69 
1998 -0.66 7.25 -3119.05 24.25 23.61 -1.13 -8.49 
1999 0.91 3.47 -1210.62 28.15 21.09 -3.14 -2.66 
2000 2.95 3.76 -1137.51 25.80 20.16 -2.79 5.30 
2001 0.21 1.98 -1141.49 22.21 18.77 -2.80 11.43 
2002 5.02 0.19 -672.68 33.54 18.40 -2.14 6.21 
2003 4.03 2.26 -14.06 21.60 18.43 -1.74 23.90 
2004 4.98 3.66 2272.56 17.13 17.95 -1.25 11.61 
2005 6.83 1.62 4451.81 26.54 17.89 -0.70 22.54 
2006 7.74 2.00 8152.60 12.83 20.04 1.46 60.28 
2007 8.86 1.78 7428.65 25.02 22.92 1.84 12.67 
Sources: World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics, Banco Central de la Reserva 
de Peru. 
 
The architects of the economic reform program defend the simultaneous launch 
of the entire range of structural reforms, including capital account liberalization, 
emphasizing political expediency and the need to mend relations with the external 
creditors as quickly as possible by signaling a credible commitment to comply with 
their demands, and, in fact, to go well beyond them.70 As Boloña explains: 
 
I was convinced not only that the reforms had to parallel the stabilization process 
but also that they had to be completed in as short a time as possible (…). 
                                               
70 Interview with Roberto Abusada, former adviser to the Minister of Economy and Finance, June 7, 
2005. 
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Reforms not made in the first difficult moments of the stabilization process are 
never made (Boloña 1996: 185). 
 
5.2. Competing Explanations for the Sustainability of Capital Account Openness 
 
There is a relatively good understanding of what drove the initial opening of the 
capital account in Peru, but much less knowledge about the reasons for its persistence 
given changing political and economic circumstances. In this section, I consider two 
‘outside-in’ explanations that emphasize the role of causal mechanisms located at the 
international level – the influence of the IMF and of the foreign-trained epistemic 
community of economists – before turning to the role of domestic institutional factors. 
5.2.1. Relations with the IMF: liberalization from the outside? 
 
Peru had very close interactions with the Fund during the early 1990s. Between 
1990 and 1993 it was heavily engaged in negotiations with the IMF about the 
restructuring of the external debt burden that the García administration had piled up 
(Abusada 2000). In the context of these close interactions, did the IMF, either through 
‘hard’, i.e., loan conditionalities, or ‘soft’ power, i.e., persuasion and policy dialogue, 
force or convince the Peruvian government to adopt and maintain an open capital 
account? 
External constraints on the country were clear and present when Fujimori took 
office in August 1990. Essentially, Peru was in a bind: due to Garcia’s antagonistic, 
confrontational stance it had lost all credibility with the international financial 
community. Given the chaotic situation, the new government urgently needed to restore 
trust and regain confidence on the international stage. As a result, the main objective on 
the international economic front during the first years of the Fujimori administration 
was to again become eligible for IMF loans after negotiating the rescheduling of the 
existing arrears. These negotiations were the cornerstone of the relations between Peru 
and the IMF from 1990 to 1993. 
However, the conventional image of a weak country, trapped in economic chaos, 
whose economic policies are subsequently dictated by powerful international financial 
institutions needs modification. As mentioned earlier, clear signals from the World 
Bank and the IMF were an important element behind the abandonment of the ‘no shock’ 
campaign promise by Fujimori. In addition, the initial adjustment program in 1990 was 
 127
developed in close collaboration with IMF and World Bank advisers (Abusada 2000: 
130). 
Peru resumed payments to the multilateral financial institutions as early as 
September 1990. The first tangible result of the negotiations with the Fund came in 
September 1991 when the IMF’s Board of Directors approved the so-called Rights 
Accumulation Program (RAP) for the period between October 1991 and December 
1992. Under such a ‘shadow program’ the country committed itself to specific targets in 
monetary and fiscal policy whose compliance does not result in disbursements but 
instead in the accumulation of borrowing rights. Once the process had been successfully 
completed, the country was able to access Fund resources. Having successfully 
completed the goals set out in the RAP at the end of 1992, the IMF approved the first 
loan to Peru after 1985 for US$1,395 million for the period between March 1993 and 
March 1996 under an Extended Facility Program (Abusada 2000). 
However, capital account liberalization was not and legally could not be on the 
list of reforms that the Fund required Peru to implement in order to restart relations with 
the country. In fact, Boloña’s 1991 economic reform package went well beyond what 
was asked of the Peruvian government by the IMF at the time (Weyland 2002a: 105-
6).71 Instead, it was a home-grown initiative by the Fujimori government intended to 
woo foreign investors back with a credible commitment to liberalized markets (Bartolini 
and Drazen 1997). While certainly not speaking out against capital account 
liberalization, the IMF had little direct influence or control over its content, let alone its 
rapid implementation schedule. To put it bluntly, Peru ‘jumped the gun’ by unilaterally 
going all the way down on the international financial liberalization front without 
explicit pressure or even implicit nudging from the IMF.72 When the Rights 
Accumulation Program with its attendant conditionalities was approved in September 
1991, the capital account was already liberalized for half a year. Neither coercive nor 
discursive power from the IMF was required for the liberal policy change to take 
place.73 Trapped in a desperate economic situation, the Fujimori administration had 
liberalized virtually all accounts of the balance of payments at once. 
                                               
71 Interview with Roberto Abusada, June 8, 2005, and written communication from Luis Durand-
Downing, IMF Mission Chief for Peru 1991-1996, August 3, 2007. 
72 Scholars defending the external imposition argument might argue that the Peruvian government merely 
applied some sort of anticipatory obedience vis-à-vis the IMF when introducing capital account 
liberalization in 1991. However, in my interviews or written communications with former IMF as well as 
Peruvian government officials I could not find any evidence that the preference for capital account 
openness was informally communicated by the IMF before the Peruvian government adopted capital 
account liberalization. 
73 Written communication from Luis Durand-Downing. 
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Generally speaking, during the past twenty years the IMF followed a hands-off 
approach to capital account management in Peru, after having seen its liberalization 
agenda exemplary implemented by the local authorities. According to the IMF staff 
reports, the topic was barely raised during the annual Article IV consultations with the 
Peruvian government. However, while not arguing against capital account liberalization 
on principle, in its policy consultations the IMF did highlight the attendant risks of an 
open capital account by, for example, urging the authorities to “move rapidly in 
implementing plans to strengthen financial supervision and prudential control” (IMF 
1993: 15). Yet both sides – the Peruvian government and the IMF country team – 
agreed that removing restrictions on international capital movements as fast and 
comprehensibly as possible was a desirable policy for the country. While not being the 
causal force behind this policy change, no objection, let alone protest, was ever 
registered from the IMF.74 
An interesting modification to the Fund’s passive stance occurred in early 1998, 
i.e., in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. The IMF staff team recommended the 
imposition of capital controls in order to deal with speculative capital inflows – a 
somewhat surprising move given the organizational climate advocating unrestricted 
capital flows at the time. In its Article IV report for 1998, the IMF team suggested – 
copying a measure already in place in Argentina – to extend the coverage of the 
marginal reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits to foreign borrowing, while 
at the same time lowering the percentage rate charged in order to deal with rapid credit 
expansion (IMF 1998c: 15). The staff argued that such a measure should be considered 
a prudential regulation instead of a conventional control on capital movements.75 
However, the IMF’s call for caution fell on deaf ears. The staff report notes that 
“the (Peruvian) authorities viewed the increase in bank borrowing abroad as part of the 
process of internationalization of the banking system and they did not favor extending 
the coverage of the reserve requirement, on the grounds that it might be construed as a 
step toward capital controls, which they wanted to avoid” (IMF 1998c: 15). According 
to a member of the Fund’s team at the time, the Peruvian government did not want to 
restrict international capital mobility as a matter of principle, even if such restrictions 
were couched in the language of prudential regulation. Their fundamental resistance to 
such measures seemed to have deep-seated ideological reasons.76 
                                               
74 Interview with Roberto Abusada and based on a review of all IMF Article IV consultations staff reports 
from 1990 onwards. 
75 Interview with Gilbert Terrier, Member of the IMF Peru mission during the 1990s, July 5, 2007. 
76 Interview with Gilbert Terrier, July 5, 2007. 
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In sum, the adoption and maintenance of capital account liberalization in Peru 
was not directly imposed or indirectly insinuated by the IMF. Instead, the process 
followed a domestic-level logic. In their quest to lure foreign investors back to their 
country at virtually any cost, Peru’s policymakers went far beyond the call of duty 
demanded by the IMF for restoring relations and assuring financial support for the 
economic reforms (Weyland 2002a: 19-22). The direct influence of the IMF on the 
initial adjustment program in 1990 rapidly waned and increasingly domestic free-
market enthusiasts such as Finance and Economy Minister Boloña dominated the 
reform agenda. Their ideological convictions combined with the perceived need to re-
attract foreign investors account for the adoption of capital account liberalization during 
the early 1990s. The hands-off stance adopted by the IMF in terms of capital account 
management also minimizes its role for the maintenance of capital account freedom. As 
a result, the drivers behind the sustainability of capital account openness in Peru must 
be found elsewhere. 
 
5.2.2. Foreign-trained economists’ views on capital account policy 
 
Is capital account policy in Peru determined by neoliberal economists trained at 
foreign universities and occupying influential positions within the state bureaucracy? In 
other words, are neoliberal ideas imported from abroad and represented by high-level 
members of the government the drivers of capital account policy in Peru? 
In order to assess the ‘orthodox temperature’ in terms of capital account 
management among foreign-trained economists in Peru, I applied an online survey 
among the recipients of the Central Bank scholarship for graduate studies abroad in 
September 2005 (see Appendix 2). The Human Resources Department of the Peruvian 
Central Bank provided me with a list of 46 names and email addresses of people who 
previously worked at the Central Bank and studied abroad with its financial 
sponsorship.77 From this list, 18 people (39%) completed the survey. 67% of the 
respondents indicated that they were able to shape capital account policy in Peru from 
positions in the political bureaucracy, i.e., within the government or the Central Bank. 
The survey participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a 
number of propositions regarding capital account management. Asked about their 
                                               
77 Unfortunately, the list did not contain the names of current employees of the Central Bank nor did it 
indicate the institutional affiliation of the 46 people. However, judged by the email addresses, most 
people were located in the Peruvian economy and finance ministry as well as other government agencies, 
private commercial banks, consulting agencies, and academia. 
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current view on capital account policy, 72% of the respondents either strongly or mostly 
agreed with the efficient market hypothesis compared with only 59% immediately after 
their graduation. A whopping 94% strongly or mostly agreed that government 
restrictions of international capital movements should be abolished; 76.5% believed this 
after graduating. An overwhelming majority, both presently and after graduation, 
considered capital controls as ineffective and unnecessary for the preservation of 
national autonomy. Almost 90% believed that market mechanisms, not government 
intervention, should determine capital flows, and that restrictions on long-term capital 
flows are not essential to foster domestic welfare. None of the respondents thought that 
quantitative limits, e.g., caps on foreign investment, are essential for the stabilization of 
the domestic economy. 
This strong neoliberal sentiment becomes a bit more nuanced in terms of short-
term capital flows. Concerning the question whether restrictions on short-term portfolio 
capital flows are necessary to address international capital market volatility, the 
responses indicated only a slight majority rejecting the proposition, both presently and 
immediately after graduation. However, a clear majority (83%) of the respondents 
spoke out against price-based restrictions, e.g., taxes on capital inflows, with a 
somewhat smaller majority (65%) immediately after graduation. Almost 90% of the 
respondents acknowledged the need for prudential regulations in the domestic financial 
market, while 40% recognized that capital controls can easily be disguised as prudential 
regulations. 
72% of the respondents attributed their views on capital account policy to their 
studies abroad. Yet 50% believed that it only had a moderate influence. On the other 
hand, 87.5% indicated that the domestic economic context strongly influences their 
views. 61% said that the experiences of other countries did so. 
33% of the respondents attended courses on capital account management at the 
IMF. Yet 55% saw little or no influence of the IMF on their views on capital account 
policy. A similar result was obtained regarding the influence of domestic business 
groups. 
Taken together, the results of the survey demonstrate an overwhelming rejection 
of almost all types of both traditional and new, i.e., price-based capital controls among 
foreign-trained Peruvian economists. An unambiguous preference for orthodox capital 
account management comes out in their responses. In accordance with the expectations 
of sociological or constructivist approaches, the negative view on capital controls 
perpetuates after receiving professional training abroad. Can we then safely conclude 
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that the persistence of capital account openness in Peru has its origin in the foreign 
training of elite economists – steeped in the neoclassical orthodoxy – who have 
occupied important positions within the political machinery? 
 
5.2.3. The neoliberal epistemic community: social rather than political power 
 
Postgraduate professional training and mutual identification as economists are 
rather recent phenomena in Peru. Professional economists with master’s or doctoral 
degrees only appeared during the 1970s. By that time, the disciplinary discourse was 
still dominated by the theoretical backbone of the Import-Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) model, i.e., CEPAL structuralism as well as Keynesianism and a significant dose 
of orthodox Marxism. Only the decay of the military government and the beginning of 
Peru’s prolonged economic crisis in the mid-1970s slowly shifted the discourse to 
include neoclassical or orthodox economic theory. However, “the political tenor of the 
1970s and 1980s in Peru was not especially propitious for the development of any 
particular widely-shared consensus on economic policy either inside or outside the 
academy, and especially not one in the neoliberal direction” (Conaghan 1998: 148). 
While people began to question the statist and populist economic policies of the military 
regime after 1976, these policies were not completely discredited within elite circles or 
in the broader public opinion as demonstrated by their resurrection during the first 
García administration in the late 1980s (Webb 1994: 372-373). 
One important factor behind both the increased professionalization of the 
discipline as well as its turn towards neoliberalism among the elite segment of the 
profession was post-graduate education abroad. However, in comparison with Chile and 
the external formation of a closely knit ‘monetarist or Chicago-style school’ at the 
Catholic University in Santiago de Chile, Peruvian economists were trained at a diverse 
set of institutions in the United States – ranging from Boston University, Iowa State, 
Rochester, Pittsburgh, Wisconsin, and Brown to the New School for Social Research – 
and only occasionally as economists in the first place (Conaghan 1998: 147; Cortázar 
2006). Given this heterogeneous composition of the elite segment of the economics 
profession, “there was no single shared language or binding set of basic assumptions 
that located professionals on a common ground in the 1980s” (Conaghan 1998: 148). 
Cacophony rather than the uniformity of views on economic policy characterized the 
intellectual landscape of Peruvian economists at the end of the 1980s. 
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Yet only a few years later, such a uniform, neoliberal view emerged and quickly 
came to dominate the academic and political discourse on economic policies. As 
Conaghan aptly put it, orthodox economists were the “stars of the crisis” (Conaghan 
1998). The 1980s economic crisis energized and radicalized the free-market discourse 
of a new breed of economists and simultaneously provided them with public credibility 
and political support to carry out their preferred reforms. The first phase of Fujimori’s 
term in office between 1990 and 1993 is generally seen as the heyday of orthodox 
technocracy’s influence on government economic policies (Mauceri 1997). From its 
‘home base’ in the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, a relatively small group 
around Minister Boloña provided the ideological basis for the first wave of economic 
reforms.78 
However, due to the institutional and disciplinary variety of the professional 
training of elite economists, it is rather unlikely that the neoliberal view on capital 
account policy is the direct result of their foreign education. Only a small fraction of the 
economic team during the Fujimori administration obtained professional degrees from 
foreign universities. In addition, the composition of the team reflected a high degree of 
disciplinary heterogeneity. Several members were not even trained in economics or only 
at the undergraduate level.79 A professionally coherent neoliberal team as a causal factor 
behind capital account liberalization certainly looks different (Chwieroth 2007a). 
In addition, the rise of neoliberal technocrats to public stardom and direct policy 
control was rather short-lived. Changes in the political calculation of President Fujimori 
at the beginning of 1993 ended Boloña’s brief career in politics as swiftly as he rose to 
the forefront in the first place.80 Boloña’s meteoritic rise and fall in politics seems to 
confirm the widespread association between the fate of specific economic ideas, the 
people associated with them, and their usefulness for the political calculations of 
executive leaders (Bates 1993). 
                                               
78 In fact, closely knit elite cliques have remained a characteristic of the Peruvian economic policymaking 
process until the present time. As a result, open discussions, flexibility and pragmatic decisions beyond a 
narrow range of ideologically acceptable policy options are the exception, not the rule (Morón and 
Sanborn 2006; Wise 2006: 224). 
79 See the biographies of the authors in the volume by Abusada et al. 2000. 
80 There is some uncertainty as to why Fujimori decided to fire Boloña in January 1993 given his 
successful track record as minister. Some observers indicate that Boloña simply became too orthodox for 
the taste of the president and the business sector as the economy stabilized and executive priorities began 
to change (Arce 2003: 341), while others believe that Boloña developed too much of a political profile or 
personal ego for Fujimori to stomach (Conaghan 1998: 160). Somewhat ironically, after winning his third 
presidential term in a rigged election in April 2000 Fujimori brought Boloña back from political 
retirement to serve in his old job in July 2000. However, only a few months later in November 2000 
Fujimori resigned in the midst of political turmoil caused by a bribery scandal. Boloña then ran as a 
presidential candidate for the elections in April 2001 (obtaining 1.7% of the vote) and was later charged 
with corruption as well as plotting a coup against Fujimori. 
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However, despite firing Boloña, Fujimori left capital account policy unchanged. 
In other words, the survival of capital account openness was not tied to the political fate 
of ideas-driven individuals. Instead, the view that capital freedom is and must remain an 
essential characteristic of economic policymaking became a generalized phenomenon in 
the Peruvian economics profession during the 1990s. 
Despite losing its prominent place in government, the neoliberal epistemic 
community was able to lay the intellectual foundation for a largely consensual 
interpretation of specific economic policies. The public voice and political influence of 
the so-called ‘liberal camp’ has dominated the public and intellectual discourse on 
economic policymaking beyond the end of Fujimori’s presidency.81 In fact, the 
difference between the diversity and rivalry of the economic discourse during the 1980s 
and today’s intellectual monoculture and interpretive predominance of the ‘liberal 
camp’ is striking.82 Even the corruption charges and numerous convictions of former 
members of Fujimori’s cabinet, including all ministers of the economy and finance, 
have not fundamentally undermined the social legitimacy of capital freedom in Peru.83 
Today both the orthodox (neoclassical) and the non-orthodox (structuralist or 
Neo-Keynesian) camps in the economists’ community agree on certain macroeconomic 
fundamentals.84 Especially prominent among them is the preservation of capital 
freedom. Even when so-called non-orthodox economists held politically influential 
positions in the Central Bank and in the Ministry of the Economy and Finance during 
the administration of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006)85, their policy decisions did not 
reflect any intention to fundamentally change this principle of economic policymaking. 
 
                                               
81 Interview with David Rivera, editor-in-chief of the economic journal PODER 360°, October 16, 2009. 
82 The incarnation of change par excellence is Alan García himself. He has publicly recanted his 
heterodox policy views of the 1980s and irrespective of his 2006 campaign promise to introduce a “social 
change” to the existing development model, including modifying the restrictive economic provisions of 
the 1993 Constitution, has continued the orthodox macroeconomic policies introduced during the 
Fujimori era. 
83 Conaghan exaggerates the impact of the corruption charges as ‘the end of neoliberalism in Peru’ 
(Conaghan 2005; 2006). Despite public indignation about the “immoral economy” that reigned under 
Fujimori, his neoliberal economic policies have proved rather resilient. In contrast to countries such as 
Argentina, the neoliberal discourse has not lost its social legitimacy in Peru. There is no strong, sustained 
groundswell within the population against neoliberal economic policies. Despite the fact that Peru’s 
population is the second most dissatisfied in Latin America with the economic situation generally and the 
political response to the current economic crisis specifically, a - slightly declining - majority continues to 
support market-based over state-based economic policies (Latinobarómetro 2009). 
84 The consensus between the two camps has its limits, though. Policies to de-dollarize the economy and 
higher taxes for the financial and extractive industries constitute a red flag for the liberal camp. 
85 The most important examples were Oscar Dancourt, first as member and then as president in charge of 
the Board of Directors of the Central Bank, and Kurt Burneo as Vice-Minister of the Economy and 
Finance. 
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5.3. Institutional Changes as Determinants of Sustainable Capital Account 
Openness 
 
5.3.1. Changes in state-business relations 
 
The nature of state-business relations is an essential element for the persistence 
of economic policies. Specific economic interests play an important role when it comes 
to the sustainability of neoliberal economic reforms (Arce 2003). The move from crisis-
induced reforms to their consolidation is affected by shifting governing coalitions and 
changes in the interactions between state and business. For example, Arce has shown 
how the dominance of different societal groups across different phases of the economic 
restructuring process helps to account for the mixed record of market reforms in Peru 
(Arce 2005). 
Here I consider this relationship and the origins of business sector support for 
capital account openness. After a period of distrust, uncertainty, and conflict between 
business elites and the government before 1990, the Fujimori administration reached out 
to the business community as a key political ally for its economic reform program. As a 
result, organized business played an active role in backing policy shifts during the 
1990s. Yet the business community is notoriously divided over many issues, including 
capital account liberalization and its consequences for specific economic sectors. The 
durability of capital account liberalization requires the support of the dominating 
alliance of economic sectors within the domestic business community. Capital account 
liberalization acquires a material fundament in society only if interest groups supportive 
of capital controls lose their influence over government policy to economic sectors that 
are unambiguously in favor of capital freedom. Peru after 1990 provides a showcase 
example for the reconfiguration of state-business relations as a domestic institutional 
condition for consolidating capital freedom. 
As a result of Boloña’s departure as minister of the economy and finance and his 
subsequent replacement by a former business sector executive (Jorge Camet), the 
influence of orthodox technocrats within the Fujimori government declined and 
somewhat more heterogeneous business interests came to dominate the state 
bureaucracy and economic policies (Arce 2005). However, capital account openness 
never came under threat. How can we account for this outcome? 
Starting in 1991 and especially after his ‘self-coup’ in April 1992 Fujimori 
actively courted the business community in order to broaden the base of political 
support for his semi-authoritarian regime. The Confederation of Private Entrepreneurial 
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Institutions (Confederación acional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas; 
CONFIEP), the business sector umbrella association created in 1984, became the 
primary interlocutor for extensive government-business cooperation. At its peak, 
CONFIEP represented twenty-two business associations (gremios) and was widely 
recognized as the unified voice of the private sector.   
However, behind the public image of a unified business community, CONFIEP 
has been characterized by internal tensions between rival economic interest groups. 
During the second part of the 1990s, gremios that represented more mobile factors of 
the economy, e.g., the financial sector or producers of commodities such as large-scale 
mining companies, started to dominate the organization, imposing their preferences 
over economic policies on the rest of the gremios assembled in CONFIEP, including 
several founding members of the organization (Cotler 1998; Gonzales de Olarte 
1998).86 Given the privileged position of CONFIEP in government-business interactions 
since the days of the Fujimori administration, those interests have prevailed over others 
in shaping government policy. 
Owners of mobile factors of production and producers of nontradable goods 
directly profited from the first generation of neoliberal reforms, including capital 
account liberalization. In particular, the large-scale privatization program starting in 
1991 and extending until 1997 led to a large inflow of foreign capital, especially in the 
mining and banking sectors. Multinational companies that came to dominate these 
sectors have been direct beneficiaries of capital account openness. Their primary 
concern has been with the free inflow and outflow of capital rather than a focus on the 
negative effects of capital account liberalization for the stability and competitiveness of 
the exchange rate. Their economic rationale is tied to the preservation of a stable 
investment climate with as little state intervention as possible. In addition, the highly 
dollarized cost structure of the mining sector makes it less sensitive to exchange rate 
fluctuations. As a result, important members of the Peruvian business community such 
as large, foreign-owned mining companies do not seek or support government actions to 
stabilize or devalue the nominal exchange rate (Pascó-Font and Ghezzi 2001: 259). 
While the real exchange rate in Peru certainly maintained stability during the last twenty 
years, it did so at a non-competitive level, i.e., in the context of a significant nominal 
appreciation of the exchange rate (see Figure 5.1 below). 
                                               
86 Most importantly, the business associations of the mining, oil, and fishing industries as well as the 
banking and insurance association. In addition, newly established gremios such as the Chamber of 
Exporters (COMEX) and the Association of Private Pensions Funds who joined CONFIEP during the 
early 1990s fall into this category. 
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Figure 5.1  Peru bilateral real exchange rate with the US, 1980-2008, deflated by CPI 
indexes (Index 1 = average 1980-2008) 
 
 
  Source: Frenkel and Rapetti 2010. 
 
On the other hand, producers of tradable goods, e.g., labor-intensive exporters of 
non-traditional goods, suffered from lower tariffs and the elimination of tax rebate 
subsidies for non-traditional exports. As a result, their business associations such as the 
National Society of Industries (SNI, composed of industrialists) and the Association of 
Exporters (ADEX, composed of non-traditional exporters) have demanded promotional 
policies for their more sophisticated, value-added products. These industries have been 
negatively affected by the restrictive monetary policy pursued by the Central Bank – 
justified in terms of inflation control – and the resulting appreciation of the exchange 
rate. 
Despite representing a much larger share of the economy compared to the first 
group of industries, SNI and ADEX have been systematically marginalized within 
CONFIEP (Arce 2003: 343-344; Durand 2002). Their interests and concerns related to 
the volatility of the exchange rate were simply not included in the policy consultations 
between CONFIEP and the government.87 As a result, potential measures to address 
exchange rate volatility, including capital controls, were never tabled by CONFIEP in 
its interactions with the government. Given this structural divergence within the 
organization and the inability to get a fair hearing for their policy proposals vis-à-vis the 
government, ADEX, SNI and the Chamber of Commerce of Lima decided to leave 
CONFIEP in 2000 in the hope that bilateral interactions with the government would 
yield an improved pay-off. However, in 2003 ADEX decided to re-join CONFIEP, 
                                               
87 Interview with Carlos González, Chief Economist of ADEX, October 15, 2009. 
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while simultaneously forming a policy coalition – the so-called Entrepreneurial Alliance 
for Development – together with SNI and the Chamber of Commerce of Lima. Yet even 
this parallel lobbying strategy has not substantially changed the relative political 
powerlessness of the industrial and non-traditional export sectors. 
Given the asymmetric power structure within CONFIEP, a specific coalition of 
industries profiting from the free flow of international capital and largely unaffected by 
exchange rate fluctuations has been able to usurp the voice of the domestic business 
community, granting them privileged access to economic policymakers. As a result, the 
appreciation of the exchange rate in the aftermath of financial and trade liberalization 
was not regarded as a business community-wide concern, but instead as an unfortunate 
but somewhat inevitable consequence of the economic liberalization process. The 
business groups suffering from its consequences over the medium and long run and 
hence the ones with an interest in modifying the unbridled flow of international capital 
have been politically sidelined (Durand 2004).88 
5.3.2. The long-term effects of the 1980s crisis: the social embeddedness of capital 
freedom 
 
In virtually every interview I conducted with current or former economic 
policymakers as well as outside observers, the ‘national trauma’ of the late 1980s 
invariably appeared as a critical juncture to understand the trajectory of capital account 
policy during the last two decades. The economic chaos left behind by the García 
administration and its concomitant economic policies have served as the political-
intellectual legitimization for an orthodox capital account management. The specter of 
the late 1980s continues to shape what Peruvian policymakers and the population at 
large consider to be socially acceptable economic policies today. Every policy 
instrument that is remotely reminiscent of this ‘dark period’ is automatically considered 
illegitimate and hence excluded on principle from the macroeconomic policy toolkit in 
contemporary Peru. No substantial discussion about the potential usefulness of capital 
controls is allowed to take place in economic and political circles due to the construed 
fear that economic chaos will be the inevitable result. In short, a national taboo 
surrounds specific aspects of macroeconomic management that are discursively linked 
with the economic disaster of the late 1980s. 
                                               
88 A related problem concerns the pride that the main institutions in charge of macroeconomic policy – 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Central Bank – take in their allegedly unbiased, technical 
analysis of specific proposals made by some business associations in order to address exchange rate 
volatility. Exporters’ associations such as ADEX thus prefer to try their luck in interactions with line 
ministries such as Foreign Trade or Production (Interview with Carlos González, October 15, 2009). 
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There can be little doubt that much of the economy’s tail-spin in the late 1980s 
was the result of President García’s so-called heterodox experiment, which imploded 
with a bang. The most visible sign of the economic crisis that afflicted the country was 
hyperinflation. The memory of this dramatic experience is etched into the collective 
consciousness of the Peruvian society. In their desperate situation the majority of the 
population was willing to support radical measures with the prospect of a quick 
recovery from the crisis. After his ‘neoliberal turn’, President Fujimori could build his 
personal popularity as well as the legitimacy of his radical economic policies on the 
widespread feeling of despair. However, conventional wisdom suggests that such 
feelings do not last forever and dissipate as soon as the first signs of economic recovery 
appear. As a result, the sustainability of neoliberal reforms is threatened by a change in 
public sentiment and the resulting turn toward risk-avoidance and truncated economic 
reforms on part of the political leadership (Weyland 2002a). Yet why have some 
neoliberal reforms escaped this logic and instead become embedded in the domestic 
political economy? The persistence of capital account openness highlights how the 
association of specific economic policies with ‘national disasters’ permanently removes 
them from the public discourse. Consequently, capital controls are not considered 
legitimate instruments for macroeconomic management well beyond the immediate 
aftermath of the economic crisis. 
Until the present day policymakers and observers alike refer with disdain to the 
‘dark period’ of economic management during the first García administration. They 
invariably associate the resulting economic and social chaos with the underlying 
heterodox policies, including substantial restrictions on international capital 
movements. The disastrous consequences of García’s economic management are 
extended to all forms of non-orthodox economic policy instruments such as providing 
subsidies, introducing price controls or fixing the exchange rate.89 
The remaining non-orthodox economists are seen as tainted by their direct or 
indirect association with the heterodox policies of the 1980s. As a result, their rather 
modest policy suggestions, e.g., temporarily putting a brake on international capital 
flows for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange rate, are an easy target for the 
representatives of the reigning orthodoxy. Their standard response to capital account 
policy suggestions that do not 100% conform to the pure gospel of neoclassical 
                                               
89 Interview with Javier Abugattás, former Vice-Minister of the Economy and Finance during the first 
García administration, October 12, 2009. For example, the National Accord on State Policies, signed in 
2001 by government officials, leading opposition parties, business, labor and other civil society 
representatives, explicitly commits the state to maintain a flexible exchange rate (Policy No. 22). 
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economics is to dismiss them out of hand with the argument that ‘heterodox policies’ 
have been discredited once and for all during the first García administration. Since the 
current economic development model crucially depends on foreign capital investment, 
any policy measure that ostensibly threatens to ‘scare investors off’ must be rejected on 
principal grounds, i.e., without any need to engage in a detailed discussion about them. 
The widespread opposition to the capital and exchange control system in place 
during the late 1980s has been strategically used by the neoliberal epistemic community 
to associate any criticism of its orthodox capital account policy with the failed economic 
model of yesteryear, leading to “economic holocaust” in the parlance of one of its 
members.90 Linking the existence of capital controls to economic chaos has become a 
staple in the dominant crisis narrative. In fact, Fujimori “was able to use a radical 
version of market reforms as justification for the liquidation of social, political, and 
institutional norms associated with what he considered the country’s ‘disastrous 
populist past’” (Tanaka 2003: 221-222). Against the background of a plethora of 
government interventions in day-to-day financial transactions, capital account 
liberalization was introduced and defended as a clear sign of economic freedom for the 
business community and the ‘common man and woman’. Taking away this “freedom” is 
thus officially portrayed as an attack on a fundamental economic liberty for the 
population at large. 
The discursive outlawing of capital controls also reached the formal institutional 
level. The charter of the Peruvian Central Bank (Ley Orgánica) commits it to a strict 
anti-inflation objective, which in turn has translated in the application of a restrictive 
monetary policy and the ‘benign neglect’ of the exchange rate. The inflow of foreign 
capital has been unambiguously regarded as a sign of the renewed confidence of the 
international financial community in the country. In addition, the Central Bank has 
considered the appreciation effect on the exchange rate as moderate and acceptable for 
the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and growth.91 
Last but not least, the Constitution approved in 1993 includes several articles 
that restrict the discretionary power of the state in terms of macroeconomic 
management. The inclusion of these provisions was the intellectual brainchild of the 
team surrounding Minister Boloña, just before he was fired by President Fujimori. 
Article 64 guarantees Peruvian individuals and corporate bodies “the free availability, 
use and disposal of foreign currency as well as the guarantee of free convertibility of 
                                               
90 Interview with Roberto Abusada, October 16, 2009. 
91 Interviews with Adrian Armas, Chief Economist, Peruvian Central Bank, June 8, 2005, and Hugo Santa 
María, Chief Economist, APOYO Consultoria, October 13, 2009. 
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foreign currency at a single exchange rate”. The immediate purpose of these 
constitutional regulations was to facilitate the repatriation of capital that left Peru during 
the 1980s and to stimulate financial intermediation.92 On the other hand, they constitute 
a substantial limitation for the executive authority to use the full range of instruments 
for macroeconomic management. Capital freedom became a constitutionally guaranteed 
right in Peru, thereby perpetuating its removal from economic scrutiny and political 
debate. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
Hyperinflation in the late 1980s induced large numbers of Peruvians to swallow 
the painful economic medicine prescribed by President Fujimori. However, what 
explains the longevity of neoliberal reforms in Peru after their initial adoption in dire 
circumstances? I have argued that neither the influence of the International Monetary 
Fund nor the occupation of high-ranking government positions by members of the 
neoliberal epistemic community provide satisfactory answers to this question.  
The adoption of capital account openness in the early 1990s and its maintenance 
since then have been “driven by the country authorities’ own economic and political 
agendas” (IEO 2005: 4). The IMF pursued a largely passive, hands-off approach given 
that the ideas and policies it promoted were already entrenched in and practiced by the 
Peruvian authorities after 1990. While foreign-trained economists exhibit clear 
preferences for neoliberal capital account management, their direct political influence 
was rather short-lived. Instead, I posit that two domestic institutional factors help to 
account for the stability of capital account openness in Peru. 
First, state-business relations were restructured in the context of the economic 
liberalization process during the Fujimori era. The traditional business alliance 
demanding government interventions in order to stabilize and devalue the exchange rate 
lost its politically influential position and was replaced by business actors with a 
different set of distributive preferences, favoring the free flow of international capital 
over the stability and competitiveness of the exchange rate. In the context of the general 
opening of the economy and large-scale privatizations programs in the early 1990s, the 
financial and mining sectors came largely under foreign ownership. Given the 
increasing dependence of the Peruvian economy on foreign capital investments, these 
                                               
92 Interview with Hugo Perea, Chief Economist, BBVA Banco Continental, October 14, 2009. 
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economic actors occupy a veto-player position in terms of capital account policy. This 
skewed balance of power in the business community and regarding its interactions with 
the government has prevailed until the present time. 
Second, I have argued that the socially shared association between capital 
controls and economic disaster has provided the informal institutional foundation for 
economic policymaking in Peru during the last twenty years. As Haggard and Webb put 
it, 
 
[Y]ears after any traces of a direct effect on the economy have faded, economic 
successes or failures of the past continue to mold politicians’ views on policy 
reform. Economic experiences – whether “golden ages” or “nightmares” – 
provide elites with lessons and analogies that shape their current 
decisionmaking, however different the conditions (Haggard and Webb 1993: 
154). 
 
As McNamara has shown for the case of Germany’s rigorous low inflation 
stance in the run-up to the European Monetary Union, the political, social, and 
economic trauma associated with hyperinflation leaves a visible mark on the national 
consciousness and casts a long shadow over economic policymaking (McNamara 1998). 
Similarly, Peruvian policymakers and citizens alike are prone to remember the 1980s 
García presidency through the lens of hyperinflation and economic chaos that ought to 
never befall the country again.93 Put differently, the social construction of collective 
memory shapes how policymakers and the public at large approach economic 
policymaking in the present time. The discursive association between capital controls 
and economic chaos has led policymakers to exclude otherwise viable policy options 
from the available menu on principal grounds. As a domestic social convention, capital 
controls are not only considered ineffective but more importantly illegitimate 
instruments for macroeconomic policymaking. In other words, Peru’s status as a capital 
mobility enthusiast is inextricably linked to the social power of the ‘capital controls = 
economic chaos’ association.94  
                                               
93 The head of the consulting branch of the influential APOYO Group has a collection of bills from the 
García era displayed in his office. With both irony and contempt, he reminds visitors of the galloping 
inflation rate during that time. Interview with Gianfranco Castagnola, June 8, 2005. 
94 In contrast to both Chile and Singapore, Peruvian policymakers did apparently not protest against the 
ban on capital controls that the US government has mandated in its trade and investment treaties with 
developing countries since 2003 (Kevin P. Gallagher, Control That Capital, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/29/control_that_capital, accessed March 30, 2010). 
Apparently, the Peruvian government saw no problem whatsoever in tying its hands on macroeconomic 
policy as a result of the 2008 free trade agreement with the United States. 
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Chapter 6: Capital Account Policy in Colombia. The 
Institutional Legacies of Pragmatism 
 
Colombia’s political and economic history in the 20th century has long been 
considered an outlier among Latin American countries (Palacios 2006). The oldest 
democracy in the region, virtually free of military dictatorships, coups d’etat, and 
populist governments, with a stable two-party political system but also with the longest 
armed conflict in the region, a country that managed to avoid profound economic crises 
for most of the second half of the 20th century. It was the only major country in Latin 
America that emerged relatively unscathed from the 1980s debt crisis, preserving 
positive real GDP growth rates during that traumatic period for the region. A country 
with a long history of financial agreements with the International Monetary Fund during 
the late 1940s and 1950s that nonetheless broke off relations with the Fund in the mid-
1960s and pursued an autonomous form of macroeconomic policymaking until the 
1990s, which, as one observer described it, was “based on selective but firm 
government intervention, that neither fully choked the private sector with over-
regulation, nor allowed it to flourish” (Edwards 2001: 28). 
In this chapter I briefly review the history of capital account policy in Colombia 
before and after 1990. In line with virtually all countries in Latin America, Colombia 
started to radically open its economy in the early 1990s. Many restrictions on 
international capital movements that characterized the previous economic model based 
on ISI were abolished. The opening process – called La Apertura – also extended to the 
political realm trying to rebuild the political system with new, more participatory 
elements. 
However, capital account openness has not been a sustained feature of the 
Colombian political economy after its initial adoption in 1991. Against the background 
of large private capital inflows and the resulting appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
the government decided to impose restrictions on capital inflows in order to maintain 
external competitiveness. Effectively, Colombia copied the Chilean model of an 
implicit tax, the so-called unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) or encaje. The 
URR has not been a constant feature of Colombian capital account policy, though. 
Depending on changing circumstances, it was either operative with varying degrees of 
force or lay dormant. However, the encaje system has always formed part of the 
macroeconomic policy toolkit in Colombia. 
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In order to account for Colombia’s role as a capital mobility laggard, I first 
consider explanations located at the international level. I analyze the influence of the 
International Monetary Fund on the one hand, and the role of the foreign-trained 
neoliberal epistemic community on the other. I find little support for a decisive role of 
the IMF in Colombian capital account policy. The results of a survey among foreign-
trained Colombian economists show a moderately negative perspective on capital 
controls. However, the traditionally prominent representation of foreign-trained 
economists in the state bureaucracy and in high-ranking government positions has not 
ensured that the free flow of international capital became an enduring attribute of the 
Colombian political economy. 
As an alternative explanation, I stress the critical role of an informal institution – 
pragmatism – as a crucial mechanism for embedding (emerging) international norms 
and ideas into the domestic polity. Pragmatism as a “shared mental model” (Denzau and 
North 2000) has traditionally characterized the policymaking and business elites in the 
country. It was initially based on a consensual arrangement between the two main 
political parties after the end of a bloody civil war during the 1950s. In addition, state-
business relations have been relatively free of structural conflicts guaranteeing not only 
the access of the business community to the political elite but also a largely consensual 
view on the main content and instruments of macroeconomic policy. Most importantly, 
the tradition of pragmatism has survived the opening process of the economy in the 
early 1990s and continues to shape economic policymaking until the present time, 
including capital account management. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section one discusses the puzzle of 
initiating market reforms without a prior economic crisis and provides a short overview 
of the pre-liberalization system of capital account management. Section two describes 
capital account policy during the liberalization era, emphasizing the content and 
frequent use of the encaje system. Section three analyzes the role of the IMF for capital 
account policy in Colombia. Section four reports the results of a survey among foreign-
trained Colombian economists regarding their views on capital account management. 
Section five describes the domestic culture of pragmatism and consensus-orientation 
that characterizes economic policymaking and state-business relations to the present 
time, laying the institutional foundations for capital account policy in Colombia. Section 
six concludes. 
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6.1. The Colombian Puzzle: Market Reforms without Economic Crisis 
 
Remarkable consistency and relative stability have traditionally characterized 
economic policymaking in Colombia (Stallings 1990; Thorp 1991; Urrutia 1991). As a 
result, the radical economic liberalization process that started in 1990 constitutes an 
intriguing, though largely understudied puzzle for most political economy approaches. 
The frequent argument that a severe economic crisis is a necessary condition for the 
start of structural reforms is contradicted by the Colombian case (Williamson and 
Haggard 1994: 564).95 In contrast to virtually all other Latin American countries, 
Colombia was not significantly affected by the debt crisis of the 1980s (see Table 6.1 
below). It was the only country in Latin America with no declining GDP during that 
period. Average GDP growth stood at 3.4% between 1980 and 1989. In addition, a 
relatively moderate level of inflation – 21% on average during the 1980s – was ensured 
through a variety of formal and informal price indexation mechanisms. 
As a result, the pressure on the government to implement drastic economic 
reforms in light of an unbearable debt and/or inflation burden and in the context of US-
led debt restructuring initiatives (Baker and Brady Plans) did not apply to Colombia. 
Individual-level explanations based on cognitive psychology are also built on the 
assumption that policymakers undertake drastic economic reforms only when faced 
with a dramatically negative state of the economy (Weyland 2002a). However, 
Colombian policymakers and the public at large during the late 1980s were not focused 
on the urgency to reduce run-away inflation as in other Latin American countries. In 
addition, according to the traditional political economy perspective, the electoral system 
prohibiting the reelection of presidents should provide little incentives for incoming 
administrations to implement radical reforms.96 
                                               
95 The crisis analogy is appropriate for the Colombian context, though, in terms of the political situation 
during the late 1980s. The illegal drug trade, most visibly the power of the Medellín cartel led by Pablo 
Escobar, besieged the country and led to rapidly increasing levels of political violence. Several 
presidential candidates were assassinated between 1987 and 1990, among them the front-runner in the 
polls for the elections in 1990, Luis Carlos Galán. Given the widespread violence and the threat of the 
collapse of the existing institutional order, many people shared the impression that the country was indeed 
at the edge of chaos. However, justifying the economic opening of the country with reference to the 
existence of a political crisis seems rather far-fetched (Edwards 2001: 33-4). To use a historical analogy, 
the political crisis after the assassination of presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 that led to 
a period of widespread political and criminal violence in the country prompted several institutional 
innovations, most importantly the creation of the Frente acional (National Front) of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties, but no corresponding changes in the economic model. 
96 The 1991 Constitution prohibits the reelection of the Colombian president. However, a constitutional 
change allowing the reelection of President Álvaro Uribe for one term was approved in 2004. Uribe was 
subsequently reelected for a second term in May 2006. The attempt to yet again change the Constitution 
in order to allow Uribe to run for a third term in office was rejected by the Constitutional Court in 
February 2010. 
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Table 6.1  Macroeconomic indicators for Colombia, 1985-2007 
Year Growth of real 
GDP (constant 
2000) in annual 
% change 
Inflation, 
Consumer 
price index 
(in %) 
Trade 
balance 
(millions 
of US$) 
Debt service of 
% of exports of 
goods, services 
and income (in 
%) 
Fiscal deficit 
as % of GDP 
International 
Reserves 
(annual % 
change) 
1985 3.09  24.05  -595 41.76  -2.00 24.43 
1986 5.84  18.87  1346 32.13  -1.18 58.99 
1987 5.37  23.30  1325 36.82  -0.36 3.14 
1988 4.06  28.11  565 44.23  -1.08 11.75 
1989 3.42  25.87  1200 48.40  -1.24 -1.55 
1990 6.04  29.15  1821 40.88  -0.68 23.31 
1991 2.28  30.37  2740 36.26  -0.20 39.64 
1992 5.03  27.02  1188.70  38.82  -1.47 22.03 
1993 2.37  22.44  -1458 33.81  -0.65 0.84 
1994 5.84  22.85  -3277.47  45.29  0.63 0.11 
1995 5.20  20.89  -3718.52  31.53  -1.93 3.15 
1996 2.06  20.80  -3284.69  36.94  -2.48 18.87 
1997 3.43  18.47  -4138.08  28.38  -2.75 -0.88 
1998 0.57  18.68  -3911.32  29.84  -4.39 -10.51 
1999 -4.20  10.87  571.58  40.77  -4.62 -7.98 
2000 2.92  9.22  1411.24  27.70  -4.89 18.07 
2001 2.18  7.97  -812.16  35.07  -5.14 6.92 
2002 2.46  6.35  -1128.44  39.31  -4.78 9.01 
2003 4.61  7.13  -883.46  44.70  -4.20 1.48 
2004 4.66  5.90  -333.52  32.97  -3.88 22.24 
2005 5.72  5.05  -506.94  35.58  -4.07 7.30 
2006 6.94  4.30  -1796.65  30.74  -3.04 11.56 
2007 7.55  5.54  -3203.42  21.98  -1.15 29.92 
Sources: World Development Indicators; Banco de la República de Colombia. 
 
Notwithstanding conventional wisdom, Colombia enthusiastically embraced the 
teachings of the ‘Washington Consensus’ during the administration of President César 
Gaviria (1990-1994). Economic liberalization was situated in the context of a wider 
modernization project for the country, including the state and its institutions (Juárez 
1993; Urrutia 1994). The “full insertion of Colombia into the world” became the 
dominating mantra of the Gaviria government right from its start. Free-market reforms 
went hand in hand with structural reforms of the state, its roles and functions as well as 
its institutional apparatus. These political, economic and social changes were enshrined 
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in the new Constitution of 1991. Structural reforms were declared unavoidable in order 
to achieve the status of a ‘modern country’ on par with its neighbors in the region, let 
alone the developed countries, after the end of the Cold War (Cohen and Gunter 1992). 
Unable to justify the need for structural reforms with the actual state of the 
economy, reforms were portrayed as indispensable in order to increase economic 
growth in the medium and long run and to maintain macroeconomic stability in the 
short run. The slogan of the time was: “La economía va bien, pero el país va mal” (“the 
economy is doing well, but the country is doing badly”). Colombia was said not to be 
able to afford a closed economy any longer given that the world was changing rapidly 
toward democracy and economic freedom. Nothing less than a revolution, albeit a 
peaceful one, was considered necessary to make the leap forward into modernity 
(Gaviria 1990). 
It thus comes at little surprise that rationalist-material explanations of economic 
policy reforms have problems with the Colombian case (Williamson and Haggard 1994: 
563). Sociological explanations that link reforms to the desire of domestic elites for the 
social recognition as a modern country by the international community seem more 
adequate (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer et al. 1997). In order to achieve the sought-
after recognition and to overcome the widespread image of a ‘narco-state’, the Gaviria 
administration emulated the policies and institutions befitting a ‘modern country’ 
according to the list of the recently approved ‘Washington Consensus’, but without a 
genuine domestic need for them. Unlike Peru, the adoption of capital account 
liberalization in Colombia was not related to pressing economic circumstances or 
powerful business interests. Instead, the economic liberalization process had complex 
sociological, not narrow rationalist-materialist foundations. It was the symbolic rather 
than the utilitarian value of capital account liberalization that motivated its initial 
adoption. 
 
6.2. The Fall of the pre-1990 Capital and Exchange Control Regime 
 
Given the ‘revolutionary’ mood during the early 1990s, several traditional 
institutions for economic policymaking in Colombia were quickly brushed aside. 
Perhaps the most notorious and best-known example of the previous economic model 
was the management of international capital flows. In March 1967, in the midst of a 
severe balance-of-payments crisis with negative foreign exchange reserves and after 
failed negotiations with the IMF who pressed for the introduction of a floating exchange 
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rate regime, the government of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo broke ranks with 
conventional wisdom and introduced the so-called crawling peg exchange rate regime 
based on frequent, pre-announced mini-devaluations of the currency (Nelson et al. 
1971: 215-261; Currie 1981: 96-99; Thorp 1991: 145-158). In order to sustain the fixed 
exchange rate regime while simultaneously preserving the autonomy of monetary 
policy, capital mobility had to be limited. The result was the ‘Decree-Law 444’ – the 
Estatuto Cambiario – that governed every aspect of Colombia’s foreign exchange and 
trade transactions and was the center of the country’s external sector policy for more 
than thirty years. 
The Estatuto Cambiario had four major components (Montenegro 1990: 357-358): 
 
1. Control of all foreign exchange operations through the Central Bank. It was 
illegal for private citizens to hold and trade foreign exchange domestically or 
abroad. All exporters had to declare their foreign exchange earnings in advance 
and remit them to the Central Bank in exchange for pesos or so-called 
“Certificates of Exchange”; 
2. Strict quantitative restrictions on imports through government provision of 
import licenses; 
3. Monopoly of the Central Bank over all international capital movements and 
strict limits on private indebtedness; 
4. Strict regulation of foreign direct investments. All investments of more than 
US$100,000 required the prior approval of the National Planning Department 
according to pre-established criteria. 
 
The principal goal of these measures was to avoid real exchange rate overvaluation 
as the result of the crawling peg exchange rate regime. The results of the Estatuto were 
rather impressive: the system was credited – both by Colombian and foreign observers – 
with allowing the country to maintain a stable real exchange rate and avoiding recurrent 
balance-of-payments crises as well as the accumulation of large quantities of 
international reserves (resulting from export booms) without negative effects for the 
inflation rate. In addition, the system was flexible enough to successfully steer the 
domestic economy both through good and bad times in the international economy and 
helped to keep external indebtedness under control. The upshot was a stable, coherent 
macroeconomic policy and the absence of economic populism that beleaguered 
Colombia’s neighbors in Latin America. 
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However, the widely shared perception that the capital and exchange control regime 
was an important fundament for the country’s economic success story changed 
dramatically and rapidly at the end of the 1980s. As late as 1987, the head of the Central 
Bank, Francisco Ortega, emphatically declared on the occasion of a conference 
celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the introduction of the Estatuto Cambiario: 
  
The positive results of its application are well known, given that it allowed the 
country to avoid new exchange rate crises. Phenomena such as external debt 
have been regulated, most importantly in the critical aspect of private debt (…) I 
dare to anticipate that the [criticisms and suggestions coming out of the 
conference] have more to do with the actual operation of the various instruments 
contained in the Estatuto than with its conception and philosophy (Ortega 1987: 
20; my translation). 
 
In fact, while some analysts proposed modifications of the Estatuto, nobody 
seemed to question the overall legitimacy of the existing regime. As Rudolf Hommes, 
the finance minister in the Gaviria administration put it, the Estatuto Cambiario 
constituted a “social totem, practically untouchable” among the economic profession 
and business community of the country (Hommes 2002: 286; my translation). 
Yet several economists who only a few years earlier defended the regime on the 
basis of its positive track record in preventing balance-of-payments crises suddenly 
changed course and spoke of a “structural stagnation of the Colombian economy”. 
Specifically, they considered the capital and exchange control regime an anachronism: 
“the majority of Colombians violated it almost daily and it stopped being a useful 
instrument to deal with the economic problems of the 1980s and 1990s. It became more 
an instrument of sectoral rather than macroeconomic intervention, and with time, a mere 
formality, with little or no compliance on part of the population” (Hommes 2002: 286; 
my translation). 
In addition to being rendered ineffective, it was argued that exchange and capital 
controls provoke the misallocation of resources. Armando Montenegro, the head of the 
National Planning Department in the Gaviria administration highlighted the paradox 
that Colombian policymakers were facing in 1990 when proposing to scrap the 
Estatuto: 
 
In a few years the consensus that existed in public opinion, among 
businesspeople and economists about the virtues [of the Estatuto] changed 
substantially. One moved from the assertion that the Decree-Law 444 of 1967 
has been fundamental for overcoming the exchange rate crisis of the 1960s and 
useful for the management of the economy for twenty years to the recognition 
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that it has developed into a straightjacket for Colombia during the 1990s 
(Montenegro 1990: 352; my translation). 
 
Just like in Peru at the same time, justifying the abolition of the Estatuto was 
couched in the language of economic freedom for the business community and the 
population at large (Restrepo 1991). If people were allowed to travel abroad, why were 
they not allowed to freely acquiring the needed financial resources? Given the existing 
legal restrictions in the country, most people simply turned to the parallel (‘black’) 
market for their foreign financial transactions (Grosse 1992). Most well-to-do citizens 
had illegal bank accounts outside the country. The Estatuto was allegedly made 
redundant by the technological advances of globalization and the relatively easy access 
of private citizens and businesses to foreign sources of finance.97 In addition, the decline 
in the investment rate at the end of the 1980s served as a pretext for allowing domestic 
agents to look for funds abroad. Given the lack of competition in the domestic banking 
sector – where foreign banks could not establish subsidiaries – and heavy state 
intervention through directed credit schemes, neoliberal reformers aimed at breaking the 
monopoly of public banks through the liberalization of foreign direct investment in the 
banking sector, providing domestic agents with cheaper credit through the direct access 
to foreign banks.98 
The fate of the capital and exchange control regime was sealed since no 
distinguishable economic interest group directly profited from it. In addition, President 
Gaviria lured the external sector with the promise of increased access to external 
finance to support the abolition of the regime.99 Given this constellation, once Gaviria 
publicly stated his intention to abolish the Estatuto100, no political or economic veto-
player stepped forward and defended the regime. As Edwards put it, 
 
(f)rom a political economy perspective, the importance of the reform of the 
Exchange Rate Statute was not related to what happened after it was enacted, but 
                                               
97 Interview with Roberto Junguito, former Minister of Finance (1984-1986 and 2002-2003), October 1, 
2004. 
98 Interview with María Mercedes Cuéllar, former minister of Foreign Trade, member of the Board of the 
Colombian Central Bank (1991-1996) and currently head of the private financial sector association 
(Asobancaria), March 13, 2007. 
99 Interview with Guillermo Perry, former Minister of Finance (1996-1998), September 21, 2004. 
100 In his inauguration speech as president in August 1990, Gaviria used the phrase “reforming the 
Estatuto Cambiario” instead of abolishing it. He said: “We will reform the Estatuto Cambiario which has 
provided the country with a framework that significantly contributed to the development of foreign trade 
and to the stability of the exchange rate. With this change we will abandon the pretension to control 
everything, which today is a bit utopian, beyond the reality of an economy that is now bigger, more 
diversified and more solid compared with the one when the Estatuto was in place. This reform is required 
for the sake of developing our foreign trade and the financial markets for goods and services” (Gaviria 
1990; my translation). 
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what did not happen. There was no generalized outcry, nor accusations that a 
major institution had been abandoned, nor charges of excessive neoliberalism. 
Almost nothing happened (Edwards 2001: 71; emphasis in original). 
 
It seemed as if the Gaviria administration merely formalized what was already a 
widespread informal practice. In addition, apart from a few economists linked to the 
introduction of the Estatuto in the 1960s and the leadership of the Central Bank, in 
particular President Ortega who criticized the reform, nobody else seemed to even take 
notice at the time.101 
 
6.3. Capital Account Policy in the post-1990 Era: the Encaje System 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Colombia experienced a profound 
transformation from a coffee-based to a petroleum-based economy. The discovery and 
subsequent exploitation of large oil fields in the south of the country quickly replaced 
coffee as the major export product. Starting in the 1930s and up until the mid-1980s, 
coffee constituted more than 50% of Colombian exports (Arango 2005). As a result, 
macroeconomic management was built around coffee: when the international price was 
high, the country accumulated reserves, increased taxes, and tried to prevent the 
currency from appreciating in order to safeguard its non-traditional exports. Conversely, 
when coffee prices were low, the government pursued deficit spending, borrowed, and 
tried to prevent exchange rate depreciation (Nelson et al. 1971; Palacios 1980; Thorp 
1991). 
The descent of this long-standing arrangement was inextricably linked with the 
rise of oil as the major export product and the volatile, decreasing international coffee 
price in the aftermath of the virtual death of the International Coffee Organization in 
1989 (Bates 1997). The oil boom had mixed effects on the Colombian economy, 
improving some economic indicators, such as GDP growth, increasing tax income and 
higher public spending, while deteriorating others, such as the trade balance and the 
external competitiveness of the non-oil economy (Echeverry et al. 2009). Against the 
background of this structural transformation of the economy, the simultaneous 
liberalization of the current and capital account in 1991 led to a rapid surge of capital 
inflows, especially foreign direct investment (see Figure 6.1 below). As a result, 
managing the rise of capital inflows became a major task for the economic authorities. 
                                               
101 Interview with Carlos Caballero, former executive director of the economic think-tank Fedesarrollo, 
May 2, 2007. 
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Figure 6.1  Private capital flows to Colombia, 1970-2004 (in millions of US$) 
 
Source: Villar et al. 2005. 
 
The 1991 Constitution provided the Board of Directors of the Central Bank with 
formal independence from the executive branch in terms of monetary, credit and 
exchange rate policies. The Constitution also committed the Central Bank to the sole 
objective of achieving price stability, albeit under consideration of economic growth 
concerns and in collaboration with the government. Active exchange rate management 
was relaxed and an exchange rate band with a width of 7.5% above and below a mid-
point rate was adopted in 1994, laying the foundation for the gradual introduction of a 
floating exchange rate regime (finally introduced in 1999). 
In the period between 1991 and 1993, the Central Bank adopted a number of 
regulations eliminating its monopoly over foreign exchange transactions, the reduction 
of capital and exchange controls, and allowing the public to hold foreign currency. 
However, rather than including the full liberalization of all remaining restrictions on 
international capital movements in the so-called “first generation” package of reforms 
as done in Peru, Colombian capital account policy in the post-1990 period followed a 
different path, highlighting the critical role of pre-liberalization informal institutions for 
contemporary economic policymaking. 
In the aftermath of the abolition of the Estatuto Cambiario and the introduction 
of a substantial import liberalization program, the country was faced with a strong 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (see Figure 6.2 below). From the last quarter of 
1990 to the second quarter of 1997, the effective real exchange rate appreciated by 
around 40%, before depreciating sharply in the context of an economic crisis during the 
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late 1990s (Kamas 2001: 136). The initial reaction of the Central Bank was a policy of 
aggressive sterilization of accumulated reserves in order to resist the appreciation 
pressure. The result, however, was an inconsistent policy which further contributed to 
appreciation and inflation by creating incentives for capital inflows and additional 
reserve accumulation. The failure of the initial approach to quell the surging peso gave 
rise to an alternative strategy to discourage short-term capital inflows: the encaje system 
(Urrutia 2002). 
 
Figure 6.2  Colombia bilateral real exchange rate with the US, 1980-2008, deflated by 
CPI indexes (Index 1 = average 1980-2008) 
 
 
 Source: Frenkel and Rapetti 2010. 
 
In September 1993 the Gaviria government, in close collaboration with the 
Central Bank and inspired by the Chilean model adopted in 1991, introduced the so-
called encaje system or unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) – an implicit tax on 
foreign borrowing and portfolio inflows. Initially, the requirement was a deposit of non-
interest bearing reserves of 47% to be held for one year against foreign loans with 
maturities of 18 months or less. The encaje system was frequently modified – with 
respect to the tax rate, the maturity of foreign borrowing subject to it, and the term 
limits of the deposits – over the course of the following seven years with the 
requirements ever more tightened in order to address the continued pressure of short-
term capital to enter the country (Ocampo and Tovar 2003: 9-11). 
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The administration led by Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) went even further and 
introduced a Tobin tax-style measure restricting short-term capital movements across 
the board as part of an “economic emergency plan” in January 1997. Under this system, 
a tax was imposed on all foreign loans irrespective of maturity with rates between zero 
and 8%, which would be levied in addition to the already existing URR. After the 
Constitutional Court overturned the declaration of “economic emergency” in March 
1997, the government amended the encaje system by extending the maximum maturity 
of loans subject to the deposit requirement.102 
With the onslaught of the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, the global context 
for capital flows changed dramatically. Along with other emerging market countries, 
Colombia quickly lost its appeal as a lucrative investment location for foreign capital. 
As a result, the tax rate of the encaje was gradually reduced to zero and the holding 
period requirement waived in May 2000 in order to contain downward real exchange 
rate pressure. 
However, the encaje system staged a comeback as soon as external 
circumstances changed yet again with the resumption of large capital inflows to 
emerging market countries during the first decade of the new century. Faced with a 
sharp and sustained appreciation of the national currency, the administration of 
President Álvaro Uribe decided to resurrect the encaje system in December 2004, albeit 
with only limited success (Concha and Galindo 2009; Clements and Kamil 2009; 
Coelho and Gallagher 2010).103 With the beginning of the global financial crisis at the 
end of the decade and a depreciatory trend of the exchange rate, the government 
abolished all capital controls for foreign investment and external borrowing in October 
2008. 
The use of the encaje system by governments of different political orientations 
indicates its widespread acceptance among the policymaking elite, in particular during 
times of dramatic real exchange rate appreciation. Interestingly, the only partial success 
of the URR to deal with a surge in short-term capital inflows and currency appreciation 
during the 1990s has not prevented policymakers from reviving it in recent times. To be 
sure, the use of the encaje system has been justified as a temporary, strictly market-
                                               
102 The results of the encaje system in place during the 1990s have only partially vindicated its 
champions. While the URR did not reduce the overall amount of private capital inflows and did not alter 
the real exchange rate, it nevertheless enhanced the independence of monetary policy and led to a change 
in the composition of foreign capital toward long-term flows. The relative importance of short-term, 
highly liquid debt and private investment flows declined in favor of longer-term foreign direct investment 
flows (Cárdenas and Barrera 1997; Ocampo and Tovar 2003; Rincón and Villar 2003; David 2007). 
103 With a suspension between June 2006 and May 2007. 
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based measure in order to achieve a specific target in the short run, not as a permanent 
instrument for exchange rate management. According to Colombian policymakers, 
capital controls are not considered an adequate instrument for achieving long-term 
macroeconomic goals.104 
 
6.4. The Role of the IMF: The Limits of Persuasion 
 
As pointed out earlier, economic reforms in Colombia at the beginning of the 
1990s cannot be attributed to the specter of an economic crisis. Neither was coercion 
from international financial institutions responsible for this outcome.105 The structural 
situation of the Colombian economy during the early 1990s and the traditionally 
autonomous economic course of the country confined the relationship between the 
government and the IMF to technical consultations until a Stand-by Agreement was 
signed in 1999 in the midst of a severe financial crisis.106 For most of the 1990s and 
thereafter Colombia has enjoyed a favorable international investment grade which led to 
an investment boom and large inflows of foreign capital. These developments made the 
need for official capital flows, let alone IMF loans, virtually redundant.107 
The direct influence of the IMF over economic policy decisions in Colombia 
was limited after the fall-out over exchange rate management during the Lleras Restrepo 
administration in the mid-1960s. Its principal instrument of leverage was confined to the 
annual policy dialogue as part of the Article IV consultations with the economic 
authorities. There was no financing arrangement between the Fund and the Colombian 
government after the expiration of the so-called “shadow program” in 1987.108 
                                               
104 Interview with Mauricio Cárdenas, former executive director of the economic think-tank Fedesarrollo, 
September 28, 2004. 
105 Estrada Álvarez argues that “the formulation of policies for trade liberalization, reforms of the capital 
market and of the productive sector, which were implemented during the Gaviria administration, were 
under the control of those institutions (IMF and World Bank)” (Estrada Álvarez 2005b: 285; my 
translation, emphasis added). However, he presents no empirical evidence to corroborate this assertion. 
106 By which time, however, the encaje system was suspended and more importantly, the IMF had 
modified its view towards accepting controls on capital inflows at least as a temporary policy measure. 
107 Interview with Salomón Kalmanovitz, former member of the Board of the Colombian Central Bank 
(1993-2005), August 30, 2004 and interview with Mauricio Cárdenas, September 28, 2004. 
108 The term “shadow program” refers to an agreement concluded in July 1985 under which Colombia 
received the official ‘seal of approval’ for structural adjustment from the IMF but without signing a 
formal Stand-by Agreement as it is usually required, and without a request for money (Boughton 2001: 
404). The program consisted of enhanced monitoring services by the IMF in exchange for signaling 
government creditworthiness to private investors and thereby obtaining a US$ 1 billion ‘jumbo loan’ from 
a consortium of private banks in order to finance large-scale investment projects (Junguito 1986; Garay et 
al. 1994: 25-69). 
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Judging from IMF staff reports for the Article IV consultations during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, capital account liberalization did not form part of the policy 
discussions with the Colombian authorities until the government decided to introduce 
the URR in 1993 (IEO 2005: 30, 59). On the other hand, the Fund’s position on the 
encaje system took an interesting, if somewhat counterintuitive, turn during the 1990s. 
Initially, the IMF country team was not opposed to the measure. According to the 
independent evaluation report on the Fund’s approach to capital account liberalization, 
“this may have reflected the staff’s understanding that the URR in Colombia was a tool 
to manage the transition from an administrative control regime to a liberal one” (IEO 
2005, Annex 1: 69). The IMF’s initial support for the encaje system may also have 
resulted from the simultaneous decision of the Colombian government to dismantle the 
remaining qualitative or administrative restrictions left over from the previous capital 
and exchange control regime. 
Yet in 1994 the Fund’s position on the URR suddenly turned negative. IMF staff 
tried to convince their Colombian counterparts during the policy discussions to get rid 
of the measure. For example, the staff report for the 1994 Article IV consultations stated 
that 
 
the authorities should move promptly away from external borrowing restrictions 
as a policy tool to slow down private capital inflows. Experience suggests that 
these regulations are increasingly circumvented. Furthermore, they could inhibit 
productive investment and be seen by the markets as inconsistent with the 
country’s commitment to outward-looking policies (IMF 1994: 11). 
 
After a strongly worded intervention defending the encaje system by the 
Colombian representative on the Fund’s Board of Executive Directors prior to the 
discussion of the staff report in January 1995, the summary statement after the Board 
meeting noted that “a few speakers encouraged the authorities to remove the recent 
restrictions on external borrowing, but others considered that capital controls – despite 
their shortcomings – would be an acceptable temporary response to capital inflows” 
(IMF 1995: 2). After yet another change of heart, IMF staff praised the URR as an 
effective buffer against contagion resulting from the Mexican crisis in 1995 (IEO 2005: 
68). 
Taken together, the IMF country team transmitted inconsistent, contradictory 
messages regarding the URR to the Colombian authorities during the 1990s. 
Apparently, different staff teams gave different assessments. This confirms recent 
findings about the heterogeneity of advice provided by IMF operational staff on capital 
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account management during the 1990s, not only between countries – which would make 
some sense – but also between different mission teams to the same country (IEO 
2005).109 The credibility of policy suggestions made by the IMF vis-à-vis the 
Colombian authorities was severely tainted by these internal inconsistencies. As a 
result, the Colombian government felt little need to listen to the IMF’s suggestions in 
terms of capital account management.110 As the Fund’s head of Article IV missions to 
Colombia during the second half of the 1990s put it, 
 
I think Fund staff took the view during the 1990s that other instruments or 
policies than the encaje might be used to help stem the capital inflows and take 
some pressure off monetary policy. In particular, the Fund recommended steps 
to reverse the burgeoning fiscal deficit in an effort to control the inflows, noting 
that it was the fiscal drift that was giving rise to the skewed policy mix. I think 
the Fund's position on the encaje was consistent, but the issue was not regarded 
as clear-cut in much of Latin America, as some pointed to the apparent 
usefulness of a similar arrangement in Chile (written communication, November 
3, 2004). 
 
His conclusion is that “I don't think the Fund mattered a great deal. What I think 
– or hope – is that we were able to help keep alive the debate on these issues”. This 
statement highlights the limits of the Fund’s strategy during the 1990s to persuade 
governments to adopt an open capital account policy. Internally inconsistent advice and 
economic conditions favoring an autonomous course of action of the country doomed 
the Fund’s attempt to delegitimize the encaje system to failure. 
 
6.5. Foreign-trained Economists’ Views on Capital Account Policy 
 
Given the long-standing involvement of technocrats in economic policymaking 
in Colombia, it could be expected that their increasing ideological commitment to 
unregulated markets – presumably acquired during their studies at ‘neoliberal’ 
universities abroad – would set Colombia unequivocally and permanently on the path 
towards capital account freedom (Flórez Enciso 2009). In contrast to other countries in 
Latin America, Colombia’s polity has traditionally been fertile soil for technocrats who 
                                               
109 In contrast, non-operational or policymaking staff at the Fund had a much more unified view on capital 
account policy during most of the 1990s, namely that it should be liberalized under basically all 
circumstances. 
110 Analyzing a different region (Eastern Europe), a different sector (ethnic politics), and a different 
international actor (European Union), Kelley 2004b comes to a similar conclusion regarding the limits of 
international institutions’ influence over domestic policy choices. 
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have enjoyed considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the particular interests of politicians and 
the private sector (Urrutia 1991; Botero 2005; Dargent forthcoming). As a result, the 
conventional cleavage between ‘técnicos’ (technocrats) and ‘políticos’ (politicians) has 
not been a feature of the Colombian political system. In fact, the two groups have little 
history of clashes and, as the metaphor of the ‘revolving door’ indicates, have tended to 
merge with one another, ensuring a constant stream of economic elite circulation (El 
Tiempo, August 11, 2002). Ever since the late 1960s, economists have frequently held 
high-ranking positions in government. 50 of the 55 people in top economic policy 
positions between 1974 and 1996 pursued graduate studies abroad, and 13 of them held 
PhD degrees in economics from universities in the United States or Western Europe 
(Meisel 1996: 17).111 What is the view on capital account management among this 
group of elite economists who have long enjoyed privileged access to policymaking? 
  In October and November 2004 I applied the same survey (see Appendix 2) that 
was used for the Peruvian sample to the recipients of the Colombian Central Bank 
scholarship for graduate studies abroad (which started in 1980). While this group is by 
no means a representative sample of the country’s entire community of economists, it is 
nonetheless an indicative portion of all foreign-trained professional economists.112 In 
addition, this group has a relatively high representation of senior positions within state 
institutions in charge of macroeconomic policymaking, i.e., the Central Bank, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the National Planning Department. Out of the total of 50 
respondents of the survey, 28 alone were employed by the Central Bank. The rest 
mostly worked in academia or in international financial institutions. 
While capital controls are traditionally thought of as an essential instrument for 
the preservation of national economic autonomy, 88% of the respondents rejected this 
view. The same percentage agreed that market mechanisms – not government 
intervention – should determine capital flows. A slightly lower number of respondents 
(76%) agreed that government restrictions of international capital movements should be 
abolished. For more than half of them, capital controls make no sense because 
alternative instruments are always more effective for achieving the same goals. 68% 
agreed that capital controls can easily be circumvented, and for 70% capital controls are 
redundant under a floating exchange rate regime. 
                                               
111 Included in this list are the positions of minister of finance, the president of the central bank, the 
director of the National Planning Department, the advisers to the Monetary Board (up to 1991), and the 
members of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank (since 1991). 
112 The list of scholarship holders was provided by the Human Resources Department of the Central 
Bank. It contained a total of 114 names. However, email addresses existed for only 65 of them. 50 people 
completed the survey, which leads to a response rate of 44%. 
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 The distribution of responses becomes somewhat more heterogeneous if one 
considers the details of capital account management. A clear majority (86%) rejected 
restrictions on long-term capital movements, e.g., foreign direct investment and equity 
flows. However, the assessment becomes more nuanced concerning short-term capital 
flows. 56% did not agree with price-based restrictions on capital movements such as the 
encaje system. On the other hand, a slight majority (60%) agreed with the assertion that 
restrictions on short-term capital flows are essential to address international capital 
market volatility. It thus seems that only a narrow majority of Colombia’s elite 
economists actually supports the URR. For comparison, 83% of the Peruvian survey 
sample rejected such measures altogether. 
Three-quarters of survey participants against restrictions on international capital 
movements, yet 60% of them in agreement with limiting portfolio flows may sound like 
a contradiction. My interpretation is that most survey participants thought of traditional, 
administrative instruments of capital account management as applied under the ISI 
economic model when they responded to the first question. Their answers clearly reflect 
a rejection of those instruments. However, when asked about short-term capital flows, 
their responses reflect a moderate sympathy for quantitative capital controls – a crucial 
differentiation that only became noticeable in mainstream economic theory after the 
1990s Asian financial crisis. 
Different types of capital flows pose different risks for the stability of the 
domestic financial system. The risks associated with short-term flows only received 
widespread attention after the Asian crisis. Apart from their volatile character, short-
term flows have been blamed for the strong appreciation of the exchange rate in 
Colombia in recent years. On the other hand, the importance assigned to prudential 
regulations in the domestic financial sector is also a fairly recent phenomenon in 
mainstream economics. It is thus unlikely that before the Asian crisis such a high 
percentage of survey respondents (almost 90%) would have agreed with the statement 
that prudential regulations are indispensable for the stability of the domestic financial 
system. In fact, when asked about their views on that question immediately after 
graduation from their studies abroad, 20% did not think that prudential regulations were 
necessary at all. I thus interpret this specific survey result in the following way: the 
respondents associated the term ‘capital controls’ with the previous economic model – 
which an overwhelming majority strongly rejects – and interpreted the term ‘prudential 
regulations’ as referring to market-oriented policy instruments, which a majority 
approves of. 
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In order to assess the role that professional education abroad played for their 
views on capital account management, I asked survey participants to respond to the 
same policy propositions recollecting their position immediately after they finished 
graduate studies outside the country.113 Generally speaking, there were no significant 
differences with their current views, with the important exception regarding controls on 
short-term capital flows, where their position became more supportive over time. In 
other words, strongly negative views on short-term capital controls somewhat softened 
after reinsertion into the domestic context. The acceptance of the proposition that the 
efficient market hypothesis (financial markets use information efficiently) applies to the 
international capital market stood at 75% immediately after the respondents’ graduation 
abroad. Asked about their current view, still 65% supported the statement. 
In terms of the role of professional education, the survey results demonstrate (i) 
overall support for (neo-)liberal capital account management, and (ii) a shift from strong 
to qualified support for capital account openness as more time is spent at the home 
front. This result highlights an interesting difference between Peru and Colombia: 
whereas the domestic context seems to boost neoliberal views among Peruvian 
economists, it has the opposite effect among their Colombian counterparts. 
Asked about which factors determined their views on capital account policy, 
survey respondents pointed to a significant influence of the domestic economic context, 
the experience of other countries, current research findings, and their graduate studies 
abroad. Among those factors, professional training abroad played the most prominent 
role in terms of shaping policy preferences. In contrast, survey participants had little 
regard for the position of the international financial institutions or domestic business 
groups when forming their opinions on capital account management. The modest 
influence credited to the IMF as a source of individual preferences corresponds to the 
relatively low participation in Fund courses on capital account management. Only 11% 
participated in such a course. 
In sum, the survey results show that foreign-trained Colombian economists take 
a generally negative perspective on capital controls, at least in late 2005 when the 
survey was conducted. However, below the abstract level their views reveal important 
nuances compared with their Peruvian counterparts. Most importantly, they display a 
greater sympathy toward price-based, temporary controls on short-term capital flows as 
practiced by their own government, albeit their support for these measures can hardly be 
                                               
113 66% of the respondents studied in the United States, 21% in the United Kingdom, and the rest in other 
Western European countries (France, Spain). 
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called overwhelming. Rather than ruling all forms of capital controls out on principal 
grounds as seems to be the case for Peruvian economists, a majority of foreign-trained 
Colombian economists believes that temporary, market-oriented capital controls are a 
legitimate and potentially useful instrument at the disposal of policymakers. 
Consider the following statement by Andrés Felipe Arias, the young, foreign-
educated114 ex-minister of agriculture and former vice-minister of finance. In the 
context of the rising appreciation of the Colombian peso, Arias said in an interview 
when asked about the application of capital controls to deal with this situation: 
 
It seems to me that it is an instrument that should be evaluated without any type 
of precaution or ideological prejudice. Such a measure will not stop the economy 
and could help a lot of sectors which are beginning to drown […] At least I think 
that all these measures must be studied by the (Central) Bank (El Tiempo, May 
6, 2007, my translation). 
 
The domestic context of ideological moderation and his institutional affiliation 
as minister of agriculture defending a range of export-oriented sectors motivate Arias to 
assume a stance in favor of (limited) government intervention in financial markets for 
the sake of preserving exchange rate stability (FitzGerald 2005). His position reflects 
the informal institutional context in which economic policymaking in Colombia is 
situated: the culture of pragmatism. 
 
6.6. The Culture of Pragmatism and Consensual State-Business Relations 
 
What lies behind the failed institutionalization of capital account openness in 
Colombia? What explains the frequent changes between openness and closedness in 
capital account policy after 1990? In order to provide an answer to these questions, let 
us go back to the encaje system. 
The initial decision to introduce controls on short-term capital inflows was taken 
by the Gaviria administration in 1993. This fact seems to challenge conventional 
wisdom that interprets this government and the reformed, autonomous Central Bank as 
bastions of the neoliberal gospel in Colombia. To be sure, the encaje system was 
introduced under the most neoliberal government and Central Bank Board that the 
country arguably ever had. However, it did not need a change in economic doctrine 
related to a change in government, or the departure of free-market enthusiasts from 
high-ranking positions in the political bureaucracy in order to shift gears in capital 
                                               
114 Arias has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California in Los Angeles. 
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account management away from the neoliberal orthodoxy. Essentially the same people 
who pushed for international financial liberalization at the start of the economic reform 
period were responsible for the introduction of – a new type of – capital controls. 
This change in capital account policy coincides with the contemporary phase in 
the relationship between Colombian elite economists and policymakers as described by 
economic historian Marco Palacios. In his account, the period since the mid-1990s 
marks the return to ‘business as usual’. The vitality of the traditional political system 
undermined the long-term sustainability and internal cohesion of the neoliberal project 
in Colombia. The traditionally high influence of economic interest groups combined 
with the need for a redistributive discourse on part of the political elite constituted a 
major obstacle for the enduring hegemony of the neoliberal discourse and its impact on 
economic policymaking (Palacios 2005: 203). 
After the initial opening of the capital account in early 1991, ‘business as usual’ 
with a – now implicit but no less relevant – focus on exchange rate stability returned 
rather quickly. While the government’s discourse justifying the neoliberal reforms was 
primarily focused on reducing inflation, it subsequently tried to balance the inflation 
target with the traditional exchange rate objective. I argue that this policy stance reflects 
the informal institution that defines economic policymaking in Colombia: pragmatism. 
According to Palacios, three characteristics or core values define the Colombian 
economic policymaking process: (i) economic and business pragmatism ahead of 
doctrinal purity; (ii) collaboration and consensus between the private and the public 
sector instead of struggle and conflict; and (iii) priority for agreed-upon and limited 
state intervention in the economy in lieu of open competition among economic actors 
(Palacios 2005: 187). 
According to former Central Bank head Miguel Urrutia, pragmatism in 
economic policymaking refers to the preservation of traditional solutions and 
approaches to current economic problems within a broadly defined orthodox 
framework.115 As a result, governments cautiously pursued capital account liberalization 
mindful of its negative consequences for important domestic constituencies. Policies 
have been pragmatically adjusted given changing external circumstances and based on a 
consensus-oriented strategy vis-à-vis the business community. Traditionally aware of 
the risks of large capital inflows, Colombian policymakers resisted the siren song 
coming from the outside world to pursue complete capital freedom. The encaje system 
                                               
115 Interview with Miguel Urrutia, former head of the Colombian Central Bank Board (1993-2005), 
January 16, 2006.  
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represents an example of a pragmatic, market-based solution to a well-known problem 
of export-oriented countries in the aftermath of trade and financial liberalization. 
The culture of pragmatism has permeated both the political and economic 
structures of Colombia ever since the country gained independence in the early 
nineteenth century (Safford 1976; Safford and Palacios 2001). It was reinforced and 
politically institutionalized during the era of the Frente acional (National Front), a 
unique coalition government arrangement inaugurated in 1958 after the end of a civil 
war (La Violencia). Under the Frente acional the conservative and liberal parties 
shared political power, alternating the presidency between them every four years 
(Hartlyn 1988). The Frente acional initially operated until 1974, but continued 
unofficially with the inclusion of ministers from the defeated political party in the 
government until 1986. However, the informal practices or socially acceptable rules of 
behavior rehearsed during the Frente acional have shaped economic policymaking 
beyond its formal end.116 
 The absence of populist movements during the twentieth century in Colombia 
was accompanied by distaste for political and economic ideologies among the country’s 
elite. Instead the elite revealed a clear penchant for gradualism in political and economic 
affairs beyond the fashionable doctrines of the time combined with a “relative 
sophistication and health of the short-term economic management system (…) backed 
by impressive resources in terms of academic and technical skills” (Thorp 1991: xvi). 
The result was a unique pattern of economic policymaking in Colombia that reflects “a 
tendency toward market opening and restrictions on the role of government, but usually 
with a rhythm of two steps forward and one step back […] The two steps forward 
usually occur during normal times, whereas the step back is almost invariably related 
with a crisis” (Lora 2005: 46-7; my translation). In other words, whereas economic 
actors in other Latin American countries perceive economic crises as a window of 
opportunity in order to introduce reforms in line with their material self- interest, major 
reforms in Colombia tend to occur during ‘good times’ when consensus and cooperation 
can be more easily achieved. The sustainability of economic policies then depends on 
how effectively the specific policy or instrument can withstand stress tests during ‘bad 
times’. Policies that do not perform satisfactorily are usually not buried altogether but 
rather – pragmatically – adjusted. 
                                               
116 Similarly, the informal institution of clientelism that dominated the Colombian political system during 
the Frente acional has survived its formal end (Leal Buitrago and Dávila Ladrón de Guevara 2009). 
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Closely related to the culture of pragmatism in economic policymaking are 
congenial relations between government and business (Schneider 2004a: 128). Informal 
agreements rather than fierce power battles have long characterized this relationship. 
While rationalist-material political economy approaches postulate irreconcilable 
differences between economic groups along class or sectoral lines, the behavior of 
business actors in Colombia instead reflects a tradition of collaboration and consensus-
building through negotiations among themselves and with the government (Thorp and 
Durand 1997). Starting in the 1920s with the formation of the coffee growers’ 
association, state actors have tried to organize domestic business by providing their 
associations (gremios) with significant benefits – from privileged access to material 
resources – encouraging companies to join them. As a result, the gremios became 
important interlocutors between the government and private sector interests (Urrutia 
1983; Hartlyn 1985; Losada 2000; Jaramillo et al. 2001). For example, the president 
regularly invites the leaders of the major gremios for consultations in which government 
initiatives and specific proposals for economic and sectoral policies are discussed and 
political decisions agreed upon. It is not uncommon during those meetings for the 
representatives of the gremios to agree to economic measures that hurt the short-term 
interests of their own constituency but contribute to the solution of economic problems 
facing the majority of the business community and the country as a whole. 
Unlike other governments in Latin America during the 1990s that pursued the 
rapid reduction of inflation as their top economic priority while accepting exchange rate 
appreciation as a necessary complement, the Colombian government was unable to take 
such an orthodox position. Preventing real exchange rate volatility has remained an 
important imperative from previous times and has shaped the country’s approach to 
capital account management also during the economic liberalization period. 
As soon as the strong appreciation of the exchange rate started to undermine 
their external competitiveness, the export and import-competing sectors of the economy 
made their voices heard. In contrast to their Peruvian counterparts, though, the 
government proved receptive to their concerns. As Edwards explains, “maintaining a 
highly depreciated real exchange rate – and even further depreciating it – was the key 
compensation mechanism offered to most of the influential private sector gremios, in 
order to obtain their support for the trade liberalization reform” (Edwards 2001: 67). 
Having surprised the country with the bold move to open the capital account in 1991, 
the Gaviria administration had to partially retract from it in order to safeguard the 
support of the business community for its economic reform agenda. The initial 
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introduction of the encaje system can thus be interpreted as a pragmatic move on part of 
the government to placate the influential export sector.117 
A vivid example of the essence and operation of pragmatism and consensual 
state-business relations is the decision-making process leading up to the government’s 
ruling in December 2004 to require a minimum one-year stay for nonresident portfolio 
inflows, in order to halt the rapid appreciation of the peso against the US dollar. 
Formally a government prerogative, the decision was preceded by an emergency 
meeting of the president, his economic advisers, the head of the Central Bank, the 
presidents of the two most important commercial banks, and the leaders of the major 
business associations. In light of the accelerating appreciation of the real exchange rate 
(see Figure 6.2 above), at the beginning of the meeting President Uribe stated his 
intention to declare an “economic emergency” allowing the government to impose 
extraordinary measures, including capital controls. Seeking to mitigate this threat, the 
president of the second-largest commercial bank in Colombia proposed to restrict 
portfolio inflows as a solution to quell the peso’s appreciation.118 His suggestion ended 
up generating the least resistance among the participants of the meeting and was 
subsequently adopted by the Ministry of Finance (El Tiempo, December 15, 2004). 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
Three conclusions emerge from the analysis of Colombia’s capital account 
policy during the past twenty years. First, the ineffectiveness of IMF ‘soft power’ in the 
presence of favorable economic conditions of the country and internal contradictions in 
the policy advice given to domestic authorities. As a result, the Fund’s strategy to 
persuade Colombian policymakers to maintain or expand capital account openness fell 
on deaf ears. Despite having a coherent economic team embracing the free-market 
agenda during the Gaviria administration, the policy dialogue with the IMF did not 
produce a convergence of views on capital account management. Instead, one could 
argue that a reverse socialization effect occurred after several rounds of discussion when 
                                               
117
 Even though some observers have diagnosed a fall from grace for the gremios as the preferred 
interlocutor for the state in its dealings with the private sector (Revéiz 1997; Rettberg 2003, 2006), the 
influence of the organized business community over economic policymaking in Colombia is still 
substantial when compared to other countries in Latin America rather than to its own ‘golden past’ 
(Giacalone 1997; Schneider 2004a). 
118 Interview with María Angélica Arbeláez, deputy head of the Colombian Bankers Association 
(Asobancaria), December 20, 2004. 
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the IMF country team finally came around to accept the legitimacy and potential 
usefulness of the encaje system. 
Second, the existence of a foreign-trained cadre of elite economists with 
prominent positions in the state bureaucracy constitutes no guarantee that neoliberal 
ideas about capital account management – presumably acquired during professional 
training abroad – become embedded in domestic policy outcomes. Survey data show a 
moderation in the pro-capital account freedom beliefs of this group upon reintegration 
into the domestic context. As a result, the effect of professional training on capital 
account policy is conditional on the domestic social context which may either enhance 
(Peru) or reduce (Colombia) the preference of foreign-trained economists for capital 
account openness. 
Third, the domestic social context that has prevented the institutionalization of 
capital account openness in Colombia is characterized by an engrained sense of 
pragmatism and consensus-orientation among the country’s elites. The behavior of 
government and business actors is fundamentally shaped by the search for pragmatic 
solutions to economic challenges, rather than being driven by irreconcilable differences 
based on sectoral cleavages. However, interest-group politics is salient for capital 
account policy in Colombia, too. Given the traditionally powerful position of export-
oriented sectors vis-à-vis the government and other members of the business 
community, maintaining an open capital account against the threat of substantial 
exchange-rate appreciation ultimately proved to be a bridge too far in Colombia. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
 
The world economy is full of all manner of fascinating, important 
social constructs, identities, norms, and collectively held beliefs, 
and they should be incorporated into our explanations along with 
the obviously important material facts of the world (Abdelal 
2009: 76). 
 
 
A rigorous political science needs to be built on the foundation of 
contextual and comparative historical studies, which helps us to 
uncover tacit knowledge. Within particular parameters, we can 
arrive at historically bounded generalizations that identify 
material and ideational structures and the agents that move within 
and between them to create, over time, both choice and change 
(Katzenstein 2010: 20). 
 
Economic policies are the result of both domestic and international factors, even 
more so in developing countries. In order to explain the evolution of capital account 
policy scholars must first consider political and ideational changes at the international 
level before proceeding to analyze their (lasting) impact at the domestic level. As the 
proponents of the policy diffusion literature have pointed out, it is unlikely that national 
policymakers made the decision to liberalize their economies for purely domestic 
reasons. Instead, their choices were influenced by events and actors at the international 
level. The fact that capital account openness simultaneously increased in several regions 
of the developing world illustrates the importance of taking global factors and actors – 
especially in terms of ideational changes – into account. 
I have shown how international institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund came to embrace a policy of open capital accounts during the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Having adopted it internally, the IMF tried to spread the norm of capital account 
openness to its member-states, in particular to developing countries. The organization 
sought to acquire the legal mandate over national capital account policies through an 
amendment of its Articles of Agreement in 1997. However, the Asian financial crisis in 
1997-98 derailed this plan and led to a reconsideration of the costs and benefits of 
international capital mobility inside and outside the IMF. Subsequently, the 
organization has refrained from promoting capital account liberalization as an 
international norm. However, the IMF has not given up its principal conviction that the 
free movement of capital is a desirable policy for all countries in the long run. 
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Global forces are important for domestic economic policy choices, but they do 
not determine their durability over time. Internal factors play the crucial role in ensuring 
whether capital account openness is sustained or not. For example, Peru’s commitment 
to an open capital account has been unaffected by the global discussion about the costs 
and benefits of capital mobility in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and also the 
most recent global financial crisis. Peru’s policymaking and business elites show 
unwavering support for the free movement of capital into and out of the country. 
Conversely, Colombia’s elites did not subscribe to the capital account freedom 
discourse emanating from Washington, D.C. in the early 1990s. Despite outside 
pressure, the country has remained committed to an independent course on capital 
account management, most visibly in the context of the encaje system to limit capital 
inflows. 
While the general trend during the last twenty years towards greater capital 
account openness is unquestionable, the durability of capital account liberalization in 
developing countries generally, and Latin America specifically, shows considerable 
variation – both cross-nationally and longitudinally. Contemporary political economies 
in Latin America reflect the difference between an ‘embedded’ and an ‘orthodox’ path 
toward neoliberalism. While the latter version is wedded to the concept and practice of 
the minimal state, in the former version “the state becomes a promoter of economic 
production through active supply-side interventions” (Kurtz and Brooks 2008: 233). 
What then explains why some countries – in line with orthodox thinking – 
enthusiastically embrace capital mobility, while others – in line with the concept of 
“embedded neoliberalism” (Kurtz and Brooks 2008) – show a more ambivalent 
approach toward capital account openness? 
I have argued that informal institutions at the domestic level in combination with 
specific state-business relations are key to understanding this variation. Domestically 
shared beliefs about legitimate economic policies and policy instruments constitute a 
prism through which (emerging) international norms are refracted. Domestic informal 
institutions either reinforce or constrain the impact of the capital account freedom norm, 
thus leading to the diversity of capital account policy amidst global and regional 
convergence around higher levels of capital account openness. More precisely, whether 
capital account openness is sustained over time depends on the extent of agreement 
among the national policymaking and business elites that capital controls continue to be 
effective and legitimate, or else that they have lost their effectiveness and legitimacy as 
instruments of macroeconomic policymaking. In addition, the durability of capital 
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account openness depends on the nature of relations between the state and the domestic 
business community. If business sectors largely unaffected by exchange-rate 
fluctuations but with vested interests in unfettered capital movements are able to co-opt 
government decisionmaking on economic policy, capital account liberalization is based 
on a sustainable institutional fundament. Conversely, if export-oriented sectors 
concerned about exchange-rate volatility and competitiveness are influential players for 
government decisions on capital account policy, the long-term viability of an open 
capital account faces substantial obstacles. 
This concluding chapter is structured as follows. First, I assess the power of 
alternative accounts in explaining the variation of capital account policy in Peru and 
Colombia in the time period after 1990. I focus on two ‘outside-in’ explanations: (i) the 
role of the International Monetary Fund, and (ii) the epistemic community of foreign-
trained elite economists. Second, I summarize the novel argument of my dissertation, 
emphasizing the importance of domestically shared understandings about legitimate 
policies and instruments of macroeconomic management. Finally, I elaborate on the 
relationship between international norms, the domestic social context, and economic 
policies. I highlight how domestic informal institutions act as filters for global norms 
and ideas, reinforcing or reducing their impact on economic policy choices, thereby 
determining the durability or fragility of free-market economic reforms. 
 
7.1. The International Monetary Fund and Capital Account Policy 
 
 
The global trend toward more open capital accounts is inextricably linked to a 
normative change at the international level. During the 1980s, international financial 
institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund, began to change their 
position on the desirability of capital controls in developing countries. Primarily related 
to internal organizational dynamics, the IMF started to promote the removal of all 
remaining obstacles to unfettered capital flows across borders. During the 1990s, IMF 
staff began to actively advocate capital account liberalization in their interactions with 
authorities from developing countries, albeit with significant (i) country-to-country, (ii) 
region-to-region, and (iii) up to mission-to-mission variation. The attempt to transform 
capital account openness into an international norm culminated in the 1998 proposal to 
change the Fund’s Articles of Agreement to give the organization the legal mandate to 
promote and supervise capital account liberalization in its member states. After most 
countries had closed their capital accounts in the aftermath of the 1980s debt crisis, 
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Latin America became one of the prime targets for the IMF’s capital account freedom 
campaign. 
Yet capital account openness was not institutionalized as an international norm 
after all. The proposal to amend the IMF’s Articles of Agreement failed. The critical 
juncture that derailed the norm’s institutionalization was the Asian financial crisis of the 
late 1990s. The advocates for embedding capital account liberalization within the 
Fund’s charter did not succeed in convincing the internal and external constituencies of 
the IMF of their interpretation of the causes of the crisis and its consequences for the 
Fund’s mandate and policies. Most members of the IMF’s Executive Board and 
influential outside observers interpreted the causes of the crisis as inconsistent with the 
glorification of capital account openness. As a result, the IMF’s official position after 
1998 has reflected a more accommodating view on restricting international capital 
movements, notably regarding short-term capital inflows. In turn, the organization has 
refrained from actively promoting rapid, unconditional capital account liberalization. 
Instead it has expressed qualified support for temporary, market-based capital account 
management techniques. However, the Fund’s principled support for the goal of capital 
freedom has remained unchanged. In contrast to previous arguments emphasizing a 
direct positive relationship between capital account openness and economic growth, the 
IMF now points to indirect, collateral economic benefits in order to make the case for 
capital account liberalization. 
The 1998 watershed also affected the interaction between the IMF and its 
member states. Before the Asian crisis, the Fund was a significant push factor for 
capital account liberalization in developing countries. Its role can perhaps best be 
described as the intellectual cheerleader for the cause of capital account freedom, 
helping to push governments over the brink towards the adoption of capital account 
liberalization, given specific domestic conditions and like-minded government 
interlocutors.119 Given that capital account liberalization could not openly be included 
in the conditionality part of lending agreements, the IMF was forced to resort to ‘soft’ 
or discursive power to persuade developing country governments of the advantages of 
capital account openness. 
                                               
119 According to Woods (2006: 65-83), an ‘ideal’ setup for the IMF and the World Bank to persuade 
states to adopt certain economic policies would have the following three characteristics: (i) the occurrence 
of an economic crisis and the resulting resource constraint on governments; (ii) a like-minded 
technocratic epistemic community pulling the levers of policy clear of any pressure from recalcitrant 
societal groups; and (iii) a centralized policymaking process with strong powers for the executive. 
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Yet as the two case studies on Peru and Colombia show, the impact of IMF ‘soft 
power’ on domestic capital account policy decisions was marginal at best, even in the 
Peruvian context of profound economic dire straits. On the one hand, the effectiveness 
of ‘soft power’ in institutionalizing specific international norms into domestic politics is 
closely linked to the simultaneous availability of ‘hard power’ instruments (Kelley 
2004a). The power of the IMF to influence domestic policy outcomes is severely 
constrained by the absence of lending agreements, and even more importantly by the 
impossibility of formally including capital account liberalization in the accompanying 
conditionality package. As a result, countries that did not depend on the Fund for 
financial assistance due to favorable economic conditions could ignore the siren song 
for capital account openness coming out of Washington, D.C. In short, even the full 
display of ‘soft power’ to convince recalcitrant governments to pursue capital account 
liberalization is ineffective in the absence of accompanying ‘hard power’ instruments 
related to the material incentives of conditionality. 
However, even the co-existence of coercive and persuasive power instruments 
on part of the IMF does not ensure that domestic policy results reflect Fund 
prescriptions. Rather, the impact of the IMF on domestic policies requires a particular 
social context that establishes the match between the norms promoted by international 
institutions and domestic policy outcomes. Three distinct characteristics define the 
social context and thus condition states’ compliance with the policy prescriptions of 
international institutions (Epstein 2006). 
The first scope condition refers to the international level: a normative consensus 
in the international community about the technical correctness or political desirability of 
the policy prescription. I have argued that such a normative consensus on capital 
account liberalization existed in the international community up until the outbreak of 
the Asian financial crisis. Most international institutions, academic experts, private 
sector representatives, policymakers, and states agreed during the 1990s that capital 
controls were on their way out of the international monetary system. The debate at the 
time was how soon that would and should happen and whether the domestic 
liberalization processes needed to be supervised or controlled at the international level. 
The general commitment to capital freedom was conventional wisdom at the 
international level, eliciting a low level of normative contestation during the 1990s. The 
international community debated the appropriate strategy needed to achieve the goal of 
unfettered international capital flows but did not question the legitimacy of the goal in 
itself. 
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In the context of the Asian financial crisis, doubts increasingly clouded the 
previously existing consensus and unraveled the united front of capital freedom 
supporters. The prescription to liberalize the capital account rapidly and under virtually 
all possible circumstances quickly lost credibility and subsequently disappeared from 
the agenda of the Fund. From then on, IMF research staff have become immersed in the 
search to justify why and under what conditions capital account openness is an optimal 
policy. The hitherto existing assertiveness and principled conviction that capital account 
liberalization was the appropriate path towards economic development was gone. An 
ever increasing host of institutional and policy conditions was identified before capital 
account openness could become an economically beneficial policy. Yet an organization 
debating the effectiveness of a policy prescription can hardly be a convincing advocate 
for its worldwide adoption or maintenance. 
The second scope condition for the power of international organizations over 
domestic policy outcomes requires a discontinuity in the economic sector under 
consideration. The traditional pattern of operation must become unviable in the context 
of policy failure. This was clearly the case in Peru in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis in the late 1980s. The imposition or tightening of capital and exchange controls 
during the García administration was widely held responsible for the worsening of the 
crisis. As a result, restrictive forms of capital account management lost domestic 
legitimacy. In contrast, Colombia’s capital and exchange control regime worked rather 
well until its abrupt end in 1991. Certainly it could not be held responsible for causing 
or worsening an economic crisis. 
The third scope condition refers to the need of a country to receive social 
recognition from the international community. Governments in urgent need of such 
recognition are more susceptible to give in to the policy demands of international 
institutions. Again, this was the case of Peru during the early 1990s: a small country 
with a terrible reputation trying desperately to shed its image as a pariah in the 
international community in order to attract fresh capital. In contrast, Colombia was in a 
rather comfortable economic position during the same period, receiving large amounts 
of private capital. Obtaining social recognition from international institutions or 
investors was not a priority for Colombian policymakers at the time. 
Taken together, the IMF faced distinct social contexts in Peru and Colombia 
during the 1990s. As a result, its impact on domestic policy decisions theoretically 
carried a better chance in Peru than in Colombia. However, in neither case was the IMF 
the decisive factor for decisions on capital account policy. Put briefly, whether capital 
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account openness becomes an institutionalized domestic policy has little to do with the 
IMF. At best, the organization can use its intellectual leadership to promote the 
maintenance of capital account openness, but only if the policies and policy instruments 
associated with previous or alternative development strategies have been removed from 
legitimate macroeconomic management. 
 
7.2. Epistemic Communities of Foreign-Trained Economists and Capital Account 
Policy 
 
An alternative explanation for the introduction and sustainability of capital 
account openness in developing countries emphasizes the role of epistemic communities 
of foreign-trained economists. This theory posits a direct relationship between 
individual professional training and preferences over economic policies. As intellectual 
norms within a specific profession change, so will the policy-relevant beliefs of people 
trained in this profession. Put simply, as the neoclassical orthodoxy became hegemonic 
in (most) US and UK graduate programs in economics and more future policymakers 
from Latin America obtained professional degrees at universities in the United States or 
Great Britain, their economic policy preferences became aligned with the free-market 
gospel. 
Several scholars have pointed out that the liberalizing trend in capital account 
policy was preceded by the rise of a new elite of policymakers in Latin America. The 
central characteristic of these technocrats or “technopols” was their professional training 
abroad (Domínguez 1997; Centeno and Silva 1998). As the mainstream discourse in the 
economics profession moved towards neoclassical orthodoxy during the 1970s and 
1980s, the previously dominant Keynesian perspective on capital account management 
gradually went out of fashion and was removed from the curricula of graduate programs 
in economics at most universities. As a result, graduate students, including an increasing 
number of students from developing countries (Aslanbeigui and Montecinos 1998), 
were subjected to a negative outlook on capital controls. Subsequently occupying 
prominent positions in the policymaking arena in their home countries, those 
economists-turned-politicians acted upon their beliefs acquired during professional 
training, formed “coherent policy teams” and introduced and institutionalized capital 
account openness (Chwieroth 2007a). 
The empirical evidence presented in the two case studies casts doubts on the 
explanatory power of this theory. In short, professional training at foreign universities 
does not account for the variation of capital account policy between Peru and Colombia. 
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On the one hand, despite a relative lack of professional training abroad, Peruvian 
economists implemented drastic neoliberal reforms, including capital account 
liberalization, during the administration of President Fujimori in the early 1990s. On the 
other hand, Colombian economists who have traditionally held professional degrees 
from US or UK universities have not followed the pure tenets of neoliberalism in terms 
of capital account management. The same technocrats who rose to political power 
during the early 1990s and introduced capital account liberalization were later 
responsible for the re-vitalization of capital controls in form of the encaje system. 
To be sure, foreign-trained elite economists in both countries share a negative 
assessment of capital controls. The empirical evidence thus supports the epistemic 
community theory. It suggests that professional training abroad forms the views of 
economists on capital account policy. However, beyond the overall rejection of capital 
controls as useful instruments of macroeconomic management, important nuances 
emerge. Peruvian economists reject restrictions on all forms of international capital 
flows, including short-term portfolio flows, while a majority of their Colombian 
counterparts have a favorable view of them. 
These differences cannot be deduced from differences in professional training 
between economists from both countries. Colombian economists ‘see a world’ where 
temporary, market-based controls on capital inflows fulfill an important macroeconomic 
function, which justifies their use under specific circumstances. In contrast, Peruvian 
economists ‘see a world’ where all forms of restrictions on international capital 
movements have been relegated to the history books. According to their view, capital 
controls writ large have not only lost their effectiveness but more importantly their 
overall legitimacy in today’s world.120 They do not belong to the inventory of a 
‘modern’ nation. I argue that these important nuances in capital account policy amidst a 
general convergence in favor of capital account openness have their origin in distinct 
shared understandings about legitimate economic policies and instruments among 
Peruvian and Colombian economists. 
In conclusion, the epistemic community theory overstates the link between 
professional training and policy preferences of domestic policymakers. Following 
Chwieroth (2010), such a socialization mechanism might indeed be substantial for staff 
                                               
120 The metaphor of ‘seeing the world’ is inspired by James C. Scott (1998). Scott emphasizes how the 
creation of technical knowledge requires a “narrowing of vision” (Scott 1998: 78), a process of 
abstraction and simplification that by increasing the legibility of a society increases the capacity of 
policymakers to design formal institutions to shape social behavior. As a result, how a specific epistemic 
community of economists ‘sees’ its domestic society will shape its economic policy preferences and 
recommendations. 
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of international organizations such as the IMF or economists working at universities or 
think-tanks, where a detached, technical discourse and ideological consistency from 
academic training to professional practice are highly esteemed and thus relatively easy 
to maintain. However, maintaining the consistency of beliefs about ‘appropriate’ capital 
account policy is much less likely for policymakers whose actions are subject to a 
significantly greater variety of factors beyond the impact of professional norms acquired 
during studies abroad. 
As a result, the epistemic community theory overestimates the unity of the 
“neoliberal thought collective” (Estrada Álvarez 2004, 2005a; Mirowski and Plehwe 
2009). Beyond a general consensus on free market principles, country-specific nuances 
on economic policies prevail among the members of the community of foreign-trained 
economists in Latin America. In other words, despite having been taught similar 
professional principles and norms, elite economists in Peru and Colombia have been 
responsible for rather different capital account policies. Apparently, the neoliberal core 
of economic thought allows for a variety of capital account management techniques. I 
have highlighted the crucial role of the domestic social context as the intermediary 
factor between international norms and national policy outcomes. 
 
7.3. Domestic Informal Institutions, State-Business Relations, and Capital Account 
Policy 
 
Both material and ideational factors at the international level drive countries in 
the direction of capital account openness. However, global forces fail to account for the 
variation of capital account policy after the initial liberalization. Domestic-level factors 
lie behind the fact that some countries are capital mobility enthusiasts, while others are 
laggards. I have argued that domestic informal institutions act as a prism through which 
emerging international norms are refracted. Depending on the content of shared rules 
and understandings underpinning and legitimizing economic policies among the 
national policymaking and business elites, an open capital account becomes 
institutionalized in the domestic political economy. In other words, domestic informal 
institutions minimize or maximize external forces pushing and pulling for capital 
account liberalization. 
The factors highlighted in the literature as causes of capital account policy are 
associated with rather different outcomes. The variation of capital account policy in 
contemporary Latin America goes beyond the variation in structural economic strength, 
the dependence on foreign capital, the fragmentation of the legislature, or the political 
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orientation of the government. Peru and Colombia have comparable sizes and 
characteristics in their economies, in addition to similar political and economic 
institutions, and ideologically like-minded governments during the past two decades. In 
addition, both countries have confronted similar macroeconomic challenges in the post-
1990 era. In light of the overall congruence of causal factors identified in existing 
explanations and the divergent path of capital account policy in Peru and Colombia, I 
have focused my attention on a variable that is conspicuously lacking in the literature to 
explain capital account policy: informal institutions underpinning and legitimizing 
economic policies in both countries. 
Whether domestically shared rules and understandings act as catalysts or brakes 
for the impact of international norms is closely related to (i) the context in which capital 
account liberalization was initially adopted, and (ii) the nature of state-business 
relations. First, the specific context in which capital account liberalization was 
introduced shapes the likelihood of it being sustained over time. The capital account has 
the high probability of remaining open if its initial liberalization occurred in the context 
of a profound economic crisis, as a result of which the previous economic development 
model associated with the use of capital controls was discredited. Second, capital 
account openness is a durable policy if economic actors benefitting from capital 
mobility are able to dominate state-business relations. 
The formation process of actor interests vis-à-vis capital account policy tends to 
be overly static in the existing literature. According to interest-based accounts, actor 
preferences over economic policy outcomes are cast in stone and essentially unmovable 
after the initial adoption of capital account liberalization. However, the domestic 
interest group coalition supporting the initial opening of the national economy to 
international capital flows is not automatically stable over the medium and long term. 
Export-oriented sectors quickly realize that capital account openness in combination 
with trade liberalization and a floating exchange rate regime leads to exchange-rate 
appreciation and thus negatively affects their competitiveness. As a result, the initial 
support for capital account liberalization among exporters, based on short-term gains 
such as access to foreign capital sources, rapidly dwindles and gives rise to demands for 
limits on capital inflows in order to stop the appreciation of the exchange rate. In turn, 
the pro-capital account freedom coalition from the beginning of the economic 
liberalization process unravels and the sustainability of capital account openness is put 
at risk. 
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The case of Peru illustrates the durability of capital account liberalization in the 
context of its introduction during a deep economic crisis and the transformation of state-
business relations privileging the interests of economic sectors benefitting from capital 
mobility over the long run. The deep economic crisis that affected the country at the end 
of the 1980s profoundly changed the institutional landscape. The Fujimori government 
succeeded in its discursive strategy to link the causes of the crisis with government 
interventions in the economy per se, including the existence of capital controls. As a 
result, the initiation and maintenance of capital account openness has been based on a 
changing interpretation in terms of the legitimacy of capital controls in the aftermath of 
the crisis. An agreement among Peru’s policymaking and business elites regarding the 
illegitimacy of capital controls emerged and was formally codified in the 1993 
Constitution. 
In addition, the economic liberalization process during the early 1990s 
fundamentally changed the balance of power between the economic interest groups and 
thus the nature of state-business relations. The winners of the country’s economic 
opening were primarily composed of the financial and mining sectors. Their 
representatives have constituted important allies for the state within the business 
community. In return, the influence of these actors – who are largely unaffected by 
exchange-rate volatility in terms of their income – on government decisions has 
eclipsed those of other economic groups, notably industrialists and non-traditional 
exporters. The business associations representing the financial and mining sectors have 
become the preferred interlocutor for the state-business dialogue on economic policy 
issues. Given this constellation, the focus on exchange-rate stability and 
competitiveness, including the contemplation of capital controls as a possible 
instrument to reduce the appreciation of the local currency, became largely a non-issue 
for state-business interactions in Peru. 
In contrast, capital account openness faces a low probability of being sustained 
over time if its initial adoption occurred in the absence of a dire economic situation and 
export-oriented sectors are able to preserve their political influence over state-business 
relations. Colombia’s trajectory after 1990 illustrates the fragility of capital account 
openness given the survival of pre-liberalization informal institutions that remained 
unchallenged by an economic crisis delegitimizing the use of traditional instruments of 
macroeconomic policymaking such as capital controls. 
The culture of pragmatism and consensus-seeking in state-business relations was 
traditionally associated with the prudence and stability of economic policy in Colombia. 
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The engrained sense of pragmatism survived the liberalization of the economy during 
the early 1990s and continues to permeate the business and policymaking elites of the 
country, tilting their behavior and actions toward compromise-seeking and the pursuit 
of national – not particularistic – macroeconomic goals. Pragmatism ensures that 
exchange-rate stability and competitiveness have remained a central concern for 
policymakers and the business community in the context of a liberalized economy. 
In addition, the domestic business coalition actively supporting or at least 
acquiescing to the initial adoption of capital account liberalization unraveled as soon as 
its negative consequences became visible, in particular in terms of a rapid appreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate. Concerned about their diminished income, exporters 
exploited their traditionally close connections to the Colombian government in order to 
impress upon it the need to take policy measures to get the appreciation under control. 
Given the Central Bank’s exclusive control over monetary and exchange-rate policy, the 
executive followed suit with the introduction of the encaje system, administratively and 
temporarily restricting the inflow of foreign capital. 
The encaje system also survived the adoption of a (managed) floating exchange 
rate regime by the Central Bank in 1999. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the 
Colombian case shows that a floating exchange rate regime can co-exist with capital 
controls. The post-1999 governments have utilized the encaje system in comparable 
proportions to their predecessors during the fixed exchange-rate period in Colombia. As 
a result, the formal economic institution of a floating exchange-rate regime is not a 
structural impediment for restrictions on international capital flows. 
To be sure, the focus on pragmatism as an informal institution underpinning 
economic policymaking in Colombia does not deny the impact of distributive 
preferences. However, interest-based approaches such as the Open-Economy Politics 
(OEP) framework overestimate the intensity or cohesive force to which these 
preferences are held among economic actors. In the case of Colombia, the informal 
institution of pragmatism leads the business community as a whole to interpret their 
interests in line with overall macroeconomic goals focused on the overall stability of the 
domestic economy. As such, pragmatism supported by the prominent role of exporters 
in state-business relations has worked against entrenching capital account openness in 
the Colombian political economy. Traditional approaches to explain capital account 
policy built on an ontological edifice of rationalism and materialism fail to recognize 
that actors’ material incentives are socially mediated. 
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However, the analysis of state-business relations highlights the contribution of 
interest-based approaches for an adequate understanding of capital account policy. Yet 
it is not the level of business organization or the extent of government autonomy from 
economic interest groups per se that is related to specific economic policies. Both 
Colombia and Peru have highly organized business communities dominated by peak 
associations, providing economic interest groups with multiple entry points into politics. 
In both countries, the government is highly dependent on private sector support and 
hence susceptible to the interests of the business community. Yet despite these 
similarities between Colombia and Peru in terms of state-business relations, the 
approach of both countries towards capital account management is rather different. The 
crucial point is what kind of coalition is able to dominate the business community and 
thus able to enjoy privileged political access and veto-power over economic policy 
decisions. Capital account openness could be sustained in Peru partly based on the 
effective exclusion of economic actors concerned about exchange-rate volatility and 
competitiveness from state-business interactions. 
Taken together, political decisions on capital account policy are inextricably 
linked to collectively held understandings among a country’s policymaking and 
business elites. Intersubjectively shared beliefs about legitimate economic policies 
shape actors’ perceptions of their interests and inform their behavior above and beyond 
their material self-interest. Domestic informal institutions supported by specific state-
business relations demarcate the limits of legitimate thinking and possible actions in 
terms of economic policies and policy instruments. 
Collectively shared understandings mold how economic agents perceive and 
pursue their interests, thereby defining the range of socially acceptable forms of 
macroeconomic management. Intersubjective rules and beliefs lead societies “to their 
own interpretations of the purposes of economic activity, the legitimacy of certain 
economic institutions, and the meaning of their economic interdependence with others” 
(Abdelal 2009: 72). As a result, domestically shared understandings about the social 
purpose of specific economic policies can advance or restrict the success of the 
campaign for open capital accounts. 
 
7.4. International orms, the Domestic Social Context, and Economic Policies 
 
The analysis of domestically shared beliefs, rules and understandings about 
legitimate economic policies is a lacuna in the literature on capital account policy that I 
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have set out to fill. Scholars interested in explaining the sustainability of neoliberal 
economic reforms and the impact of international norms and ideas on domestic policy 
choices ignore the role of domestic informal institutions at their peril. Traditional 
approaches focused on material interests, formal political and economic institutions, and 
global norms and ideas fail to account for the variation of capital account policy in an 
age of mobile capital. Paying heed to the change and continuity of shared 
understandings about legitimate economic policies is key to understanding both the 
influence of international norms on domestic policy, and the durability or fragility of 
economic reforms. In order to become institutionalized in the domestic political 
economy, international norms setting out to diffuse free-market policies must encounter 
a social context in which alternative development strategies have lost their legitimacy. 
My focus on domestic informal institutions is situated within the constructivist 
research program in comparative and international political economy (Blyth 2009; 
Abdelal et al. 2010). However, constructivist scholarship has not paid sufficient 
attention to how shared understandings emerge, operate, and change at the domestic 
level – independent from global norms and ideas.121 Rather than merely norms and 
ideas held by a specific group of actors such as epistemic communities, shared rules and 
beliefs among a country’s policymaking and business community assume the status of 
social institutions within the domestic context. These informal institutions, in turn, 
define how states and societies react to (emerging) international norms. Policy 
outcomes are thus the result of the dynamic interaction between domestically and 
internationally shared rules and understandings. 
Collectively shared beliefs about ‘appropriate’ economic policies have unique 
national-historic roots and manifestations which to a certain degree overlap with, but are 
not reducible to universal economic ideologies and their concomitant norms, such as 
Keynesianism or neoclassical economics (FitzGerald 2005). Given their focus on the 
level of the international system, structural constructivists such as Finnemore, Sikkink, 
and Wendt tend to overstate the domestic impact of international norms and ideas 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1999; Wendt 1999).122 Global norms and ideas interact with 
preexisting national social orders. The result of the dynamic interaction between foreign 
and domestic norms and ideas are contingent policy outcomes. Going beyond the 
dichotomous results of wholesale adoption or outright rejection of global norms and 
ideas, norm localization 
                                               
121 Exceptions are Abdelal 2001 and Darden 2009. 
122 See Checkel 1998 for the difference between structural and agent-focused approaches in constructivist 
scholarship in international relations. 
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describes a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build 
congruence between transnational norms (…) and local beliefs and practices. 
[…] The success of norm diffusion strategies and processes depends on the 
extent to which they provide opportunities for localization (Acharya 2004: 241). 
 
 
The process of norm localization builds on Peter Hall’s crucial insight that the 
domestic impact of economic ideas critically hinges on their fit with the existing 
“structure of political discourse” in a country (Hall 1989: 383).123 Agency-oriented 
constructivists such as Checkel speak of a cultural match between international norms 
and historically constructed domestic institutions leading to 
 
a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are 
convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system 
(constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational 
ethos and administrative agencies). (Checkel 1999: 87) 
 
 
However, matchmaking is a dynamic process that defies the notion of a 
primordial, existential match between foreign and domestic norms, in addition to 
recognizing the essential role of domestic actors for norm localization and congruence-
building between domestic and international ideas (Acharya 2004; Chwieroth 
forthcoming). I have argued that the sustainability of neoliberal reforms over time 
depends on the change of informal institutions that provided the normative and material 
fundament for the previous development model. Policy instruments associated with 
alternative strategies of economic development must become illegitimate in the eyes of 
the national policymaking and business community. The attempt of norm entrepreneurs 
to reconfigure the social rules and understandings underpinning and legitimizing 
economic policies toward free-market solutions is made easier by the existence of a 
profound economic crisis that can be blamed on previously dominating development 
models, associating the use of alternative policy instruments such as capital controls 
with the specter of economic mismanagement, corruption, and chaos (Hall 2003).124 
Economic crises thus serve as critical junctures for the redefinition of 
collectively shared beliefs about legitimate economic policies and policy instruments. 
                                               
123 According to Hall, the political discourse of a nation includes “shared conceptions about the nature of 
society and the economy, various ideas about the appropriate role of government, a number of common 
political ideals, and collective memories of past policy experiences” (Hall 1989: 383). 
124 Note, though, that an economic crisis is not a prerequisite for the initial adoption of capital account 
liberalization (Pepinsky 2009b). In fact, it was introduced in Colombia in the absence of an economic 
crisis. 
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New ideas about economic management are able to fill the intellectual void left by the 
failure of the previous development model and its concomitant economic policies and 
instruments (Blyth 2002). As a result, crises provide an ideal launching pad for 
alternative norms and ideas for policymaking (Widmaier et al. 2007). However, a crisis 
– even a profound one of the magnitude we have recently experienced – in combination 
with new ideas about economic management is not sufficient to engender large-scale 
political and economic change on its own. Rather, the widely shared perception of a 
crisis must encounter favorable institutional conditions at the domestic level, including 
informal ones, in order to become an effective catalyst for a “great transformation” 
(Polanyi 1944). 
Finally, a methodological caveat is in order. Informal institutions do not lend 
themselves to simplistic forms of causality and consequences, suitable for the testing of 
explanatory variables where a preexisting cause is linked to a subsequent effect in a 
more or less mechanistic way. As shared ideas, informal institutions rely on a 
constitutive notion of explanation (Wendt 1998). According to this perspective, the 
researcher seeks to establish conditions of possibility (or impossibility) for certain 
actions and policy outcomes. As such, a specific economic policy is an ‘effect’ of the 
conditions that make it possible in the first place. In other words, intersubjective beliefs 
and rules – “social facts” (Searle 1995) – cannot be pressed into the straightjacket of 
causal theorizing precisely because of the depth and complexity of context-specific 
institutional forces that permeate social and economic life. As Fourcade puts it, “(t)he 
explanatory factor (…) is no less dense than the object to be explained” (Fourcade 2009: 
16). Put differently, a specific set of domestically shared rules and beliefs governing 
economic policymaking makes it possible (or impossible) to sustain capital account 
openness, even though informal institutions do not ‘cause’ policy outcomes in any 
direct or linear way required by the traditional notion of causality. Rather, the unfettered 
flow of international capital is nationally viable because alternative courses of action 
have become virtually unthinkable among the domestic elites. 
In conclusion, the major contribution of my dissertation to a better 
understanding of capital account policy lies in its insight that domestic institutions 
define the range of socially acceptable economic policies and policy instruments, thus 
sealing the fate of economic reforms over time. The sustainability of economic reforms 
is based on the shared belief among domestic elites that alternative policies and 
instruments no longer represent a legitimate part of macroeconomic management. As a 
result, scholars need to pay greater attention to the interaction of informal institutions 
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located at the global and the national level, leading to contingent policy outcomes. 
Despite living in an age of financial globalization, the potential for and practice of state 
interventionism and policy divergence among developing countries exist unabated. 
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Guillermo Perry, former Colombian Finance Minister (1994-1996) and World Bank 
Chief Economist for Latin America (1996-2005), September 21, 2004 
 
Leonardo Villar, Member of Colombian Central Bank Board (1997-2009), September 7, 
2004 
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Fabio Villegas, Head of the Colombian National Association of Financial Institutions 
(ANIF), September 15, 2004 
 
Miguel Urrutia, former Head of Colombian Central Bank (1993-2005), January 16, 
2006 
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Appendix 2: Survey Questions for Foreign-trained Elite 
Economists in Colombia and Peru 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Thank you for your time and interest in completing this survey on economists' views on 
capital controls. In particular, I want to gauge the role that professional education 
abroad has on your view today.  
 
This survey is part of a broader study on capital account liberalization in Latin America 
in the 1990s.  
 
The online survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 
Do not hesitate to contact me at r.j.leiteritz@lse.ac.uk should you have any questions or 
need further information regarding this study. Thank you again for your time and 
participation. 
 
Ralf Leiteritz 
 
 
2. Current view on capital controls 
 
This section asks for your view on capital controls TODAY.  
 
Please use COLOMBIA (PERU) as your point of reference when making your 
judgments. Please click on the option (strongly agree, mostly agree, etc) that best 
corresponds to your opinion on each of statements provided below.  
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Mostly 
agree 
Mostly 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Not 
sure / 
No 
position 
The efficient market hypothesis (i.e., prices can 
be regarded as optimal estimates of true 
investment value at all times) applies to the 
international capital market. 
     
Government restrictions of international capital 
movements should be abolished. 
     
Capital controls make no sense because 
alternative instruments are always more effective 
for achieving the same goals. 
     
Capital controls make no sense because they can 
be easily circumvented by financial agents. 
     
Capital controls are essential for the preservation 
of national economic autonomy. 
     
Market mechanisms, not government 
intervention, should determine capital flows. 
     
Capital controls are redundant under a floating 
exchange rate system. 
     
Restrictions on short-term portfolio capital flows 
are essential to address international capital 
market volatility. 
     
Restrictions on long-term capital flows (FDI,      
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equity) are essential to foster domestic welfare. 
Quantitative restrictions, e.g., caps on foreign 
investment, are essential for the stabilization of 
the domestic economy. 
     
Price-based restrictions, e.g., an implicit tax on 
capital inflows, are essential for the stabilization 
of the domestic economy. 
     
Prudential regulations are indispensable for the 
stability of the domestic financial system. 
     
Capital controls can be easily disguised as 
prudential regulations. 
     
 
 
3. View on capital controls immediately after graduation abroad 
 
This section asks for your view on capital controls at the time when you received your 
professional degree ABROAD. 
 
Please use COLOMBIA (PERU) as your point of reference when making your 
judgments. Please click on the option (strongly agreed, mostly agreed, etc.) that best 
corresponded to your opinion on each of the statements provided below at the time of 
receiving your professional degree abroad. 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Mostly 
agree 
Mostly 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Not 
sure / 
No 
position 
The efficient market hypothesis (i.e., prices can 
be regarded as optimal estimates of true 
investment value at all times) applies to the 
international capital market. 
     
Government restrictions of international capital 
movements should be abolished. 
     
Capital controls make no sense because 
alternative instruments are always more effective 
for achieving the same goals. 
     
Capital controls make no sense because they can 
be easily circumvented by financial agents. 
     
Capital controls are essential for the preservation 
of national economic autonomy. 
     
Market mechanisms, not government 
intervention, should determine capital flows. 
     
Capital controls are redundant under a floating 
exchange rate system. 
     
Restrictions on short-term portfolio capital flows 
are essential to address international capital 
market volatility. 
     
Restrictions on long-term capital flows (FDI, 
equity) are essential to foster domestic welfare. 
     
Quantitative restrictions, e.g., caps on foreign 
investment, are essential for the stabilization of 
the domestic economy. 
     
Price-based restrictions, e.g., an implicit tax on 
capital inflows, are essential for the stabilization 
of the domestic economy. 
     
Prudential regulations are indispensable for the 
stability of the domestic financial system. 
     
Capital controls can be easily disguised as 
prudential regulations. 
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4. Determinants of your view on capital controls 
 
This section asks for the origins of your view on capital controls TODAY. Please click 
on the option (strong influence, moderate influence, etc.) that best describes the 
influence of the factors listed below on your view on capital controls today. 
 
 Strong 
influence 
Moderate 
influence 
Little 
influence 
No 
influence 
University studies abroad     
View of the IMF     
Current state of research     
Domestic economic context     
Experiences of other countries     
Position of domestic business 
groups 
    
Other     
 
If 'Other', please explain. 
 
 
5. Influence on political decision-making process 
 
This section asks for the positions from where you influence or influenced capital 
account policy in Colombia (Peru). Please click on the option/s (you can choose more 
than one) that best describe the position/s from which you are / were able to shape 
capital account policy in Colombia (Peru). 
 
• Political executive (government, Central Bank) 
• Political legislature (Congress, Senate) 
• Advisory position (think tank, business group) 
• Academia 
• Political commentator in media 
• No position of influence 
• Other (please specify) 
 
 
Have you attended courses on Capital Account Management? 
 
• No 
• Yes, offered by the IMF (in Washington or elsewhere) 
• Yes, offered by: (Please indicate course provider) 
 
 
